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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with certain aspects of the reign of 
Muzaffar al-Din Shah of Persia from 1896 to 1907; during the last 
year of which Persia ceased to be an absolute monarchy and adopted 
; a constitution,.
The thesis first of all discusses the value of various British 
archives for the study of this period. It goes on to consider the
character of Muzaffar al-Din and the nature of government during his
©
reign. Two particular organs of government are'Studied in detail: 
the army and the Customs administration, which was then undergoing 
reform at the hands of Belgian experts. The diffusion of cholera 
throughout Persia in 1904 is described, and the effects of that epidemic 
are discussed. The thesis then turns to a study of the political and 
economic circumstances which prevailed in the two important provinces 
of Pars and Isfahan.
The thesis shows that there was much discontent in Persia, and it 
notes that few of the sources of that discontent were new„ It is seen 
that members of the religious classes played an important part in events 
throughout the period,, It is shown that the government of Muzaffar al- 
Din Shah was weak, that it failed to exercise effective central control, 
and that it was incapable of meeting the demands made upon it. It is 
argued that Anglo-Russian rivalry had a considerable impact on domestic 
events, and that that rivalry increased the problems facing the country, 
while at the same time it revealed to many Persians the extent of the 
governments weakness. It is concluded that although many demands were 
being made of the Shah and his government, they were not essentially 
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PREFACE
The thesis would not have been possible without the assistance 
and support of many individuals and academic institutions. I would 
first like to thank my parents for their unfailing encouragement in 
my studies. The School of Oriental and African Studies awarded me 
a Governing Body Postgraduate Exhibition which enabled me to begin 
my study of Persian, and the School later appointed me to a 
lectureship in History, The years I have spent under its roof have 
been happy and rewarding ones. I would also like to acknowledge the 
administrative help which I have received from the Registrar of the 
School and his staff. My thanks are due to the Department of Education 
and Science for the award of a Hayter Studentship which enabled me to 
pursue research in London and to spend time travelling in Persia, The 
British Institute of Persian Studies in Tehran provided a warm welcome 
for me.
The staffs of the Library of the School, of the Senate House 
Library in the University of London,and of the British Library (British 
Museum) have given me much willing help, and the resources of those 
libraries have been invaluable in my work* The staff of the Public 
Record Office met my every request with great courtesy and equal 
efficiency. I am deeply in their debt. Quotations from Crown Copyright 
Records in the Public Record Office appear by permission of the 
Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office*
I have received much help from colleagues at the School. In 
particular I would like to thank Professor P.M* Holt, Professor B. Lewis 
(now of Princeton University), Dr. K.S. McLachlan, Dr. D.O. Morgan and 
Dr. M.Eo Yapp for their informed interest in, and help with my research.
4Dr. T .0* Gandjei and Mr. A. A. Haidari shared, with my supervisor, 
the trying task of teaching me Persian. I also owe much to 
Mr„ J.R. Bracken for his encouragement, and for his attempts to 
improve my prose style. His lack of success will be obvious to all
readers of this thesis. Miss Janet Marks of the Department of
Economic and Political Studies at the School showed great skill in 
reading my handwriting and in typing the final copy of the thesis.
I have learned much from discussions with Dr. R.W. Ferrier, the 
Archivist of the British Petroleum Company, and with Mr. A oH 0 Morton, 
formerly the Assistant Director of the British Institute of Persian 
Studies in Tehran. Miss Elizabeth Monroe and Mr. A„H. Hourani of 
Oxford gave valuable help and guidance in the early stages of my 
research, and I am very grateful to them. I would also like to
record my thanks to Dr. B. Anderson of the University of London Health
Service, who worked in Calcutta during the cholera epidemic of 1971, 
for the time which she gave to discussing that disease with me, and 
for reading and commenting upon a draft version of Chapter V. Dr. M. 
Woods of Birkbeck College raised questions which I had ignored, and 
encouraged me to find some of the answers. Mr. C. Birch read much of 
the final version of thesis, and helped to prevent some of its errors 
from reaching the reader0
I would also like to acknowledge^because I cannot repay, the debt 
to my wife for her very great help and support - without her this thesis 
would never have been finished. The person to whom I owe most is my 
supervisor, Professor A.KoS. Lambton. She awakened my interest in 
Persia and has sustained it constantly,, Her profound knowledge of 
that country and its history has been matched by her patience and
5devotion as a teacher. Any merits which this thesis may possess must 
be attributed to her guidance; the faults which remain are entirely 
due to my inability to learn from her.
The transliteration system used is basically that of the Cambridge 
History of Islam, with the additional and variant forms for Persian which 
are permitted under that system. Exceptions have been made in the case 
of some place names where strict transliteration would have given rise 
to peculiar spellings, as in the case of Tihran and Khwansar - here 
rendered as Tehran and Khunsar. Other examples of departure from the 
system are Abadeh, Bushire, Enzeli, Lingeh and Saveh0 Where there are 
accepted English spellings - bazaar and Caliph - these have been used.
In footnotes where British archives have been cited, the standard form 
used in those documents has been followed, thus Shiraz Diary, not Shiraz 
Diary. In the case of diplomatic and consular despatches, the place of 
origin has been indicated only where it differs from that of the post 
occupied by the writer of the despatch, or where confusion may otherwise 
have arisen. In the bibliography* I have referred only to the series of 
documents which have been used, quoting the numbers of the volumes where 
I began and ended my research: but full references are provided in the
case of each foot-note.
6CHAPTER X 
INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION OF SOURCES
"Yet let him know that undertakes to pick out the best ear amongst 
an acre of wheat, that he shall leave as good if not a better 
behind him, than that which he chooseth."
Attributed to Thomas Fuller, 
in Autobiography of Joseph Scaliger 
translated and edited by G.W. Robinson. 
Cambridge (USA) 1927, p 08.
The events examined in this thesis happened some 100 years after 
the establishment of the Qajar dynasty. That century had seen the 
renewal of European interest in Persia, an interest which had lain 
largely dormant since Safavid times. But the concerns of the European 
powers - chiefly England and Russia - were now wider and more important 
than they had been in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries„ Then 
the . interest of the external powers in Persia had been mainly, if not 
exclusively, commercial. Under the Qajar Shahs political and strategic 
considerations were to predominate and although trade was still a 
significant element it was subsidiary to, even if entangled with, those 
two paramount concerns.
This intensification of external interest in Persia was one of the 
features which attracted me to the study of Qajar history. The 
geographical location of Persia is such that her history has long been 
open to the influence of external events; but from the early nineteenth 
century contacts with other countries became much wider in scale, as 
well as changed in their nature. The factors which shaped the history 
of Persia under the Qajars were, however, more complex than those which 
derived solely from an intensification of external interests in the 
country: for at the same time a reverse process was taking place and
7some, albeit few, Persians were now starting to take note of European 
events and ideas. As the Anglo-Russian contest for influence increased - 
leading within 7 months of the death of Muzaffar al-Din to the signing 
of the agreement which divided Persia into spheres of influence* - many 
Persians came to regard that rivalry as one of the major causes of their 
country’s weakness. The groups which blamed the external powers for
Persia's internal decay were many and varied, and they agreed on little
but the general cause of the decline. A few Persians, however, saw Europe 
not so much as the origin of Persia's weakness, but rather as a possible 
source of ideas, and of institutions, which might assist in the 
regeneration of their homeland. To look outside Persia, indeed outside 
the Islamic world, for help in diagnosing and curing their country's 
ills was something new in the history of Persia.
The acceptance of external assistance in the task of making Persia
C T -
strong can be seen as early as the reign of Path All Shah, when that 
monarch sought help variously from Britain and France in the attempt to 
improve the condition of his military forces.^ Nasir al-Din Shah later 
turned to Russia when he too wished to strengthen his army, and Muzaffar 
al-Din was responsible for the bringing in of Belgian experts to effect 
a major reform of the Customs administration. The reforms which the Qajar 
Shahs tried to make - and most of their efforts were fitful - were designed 
to strengthen the prevailing system of absolute rule by making it more 
efficient.
1. For the text of that agreement see C.U. Aitchison (compiler),
A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating
to India and Neighbouring Countries, Calcutta 1933, Vol.XIII, pp.119-21.
2, See Report on the Persian Army by Lieutenant-Colonel H.P. Picot, 
in F.O. 881:7364, Secret and Confidential, pp.^O-^S*
8But by the early years of the twentieth century a few Persians 
were beginning to seek something other than an increase in the efficacy 
of royal rule. In a tentative manner they were starting to call for 
a new form of government; one in which political power would be shared.
It can be argued that any major reform in administrative methods will sooner or 
later require some.corresponding readjustment in values and 
attitudes; in the case of political reforms, however, the relationship 
between the two aspects of change is much closer. For example, the 
use of Europeans to train the Persian army did not necessarily pose an 
immediate threat to the basis of the Shah’s political authority. But 
to try to establish a representative form of government meant to seek 
a limitation on the powers of the Shah; and that was a distinct break 
with the political traditions of the past.
In other words, some of the reforms made with European assistance 
could appear to be compatible with the prevailing philosophy of absolute 
rule, but other changes, and specifically those concerned with the 
introduction of a constitution and elections required for their success 
the modification, if not the, rejection, of traditional concepts of power. 
Once the door admitting European ideas and institutions was open it was 
very difficult to establish any effective criteria to determine what 
should or should not be borrowed. If some of the Shahs saw Persia as 
needing a strong army and a more effective administration, other Persians, 
few though they may have been, saw their country as needing more 
profound changes if its weaknesses were to be removed.
It was no easy task in Qajar Persia to institute reforms derived 
from Europe. Any such attempt was likely to meet formidable opposition,
9particularly from members of the religious classes; while at the same
time other sections of the population sometimes demanded that the
reforms should be implemented with greater vigour and determination.
This division of opinion can be seen even in the case of the much-
detested attempt to set up the Tobacco Regie. One of the beliefs
which lay behind the opposition of some members of the religious classes
was that the introduction of European businesses would reduce their
role in legal matters and would so diminish their prestige and authority.
The newspaper Akhtar, which was published in Istanbul, also condemned
the concession, but it did so on the grounds of the protection of
Persian national interests; saying that the profits from the trade
would in future accrue to British rather than to Persian merchants, and
that the proposed agreement with Talbot would not produce as much
- 4
revenue for the Shah as the Turkish one did for the Sultan. As will be 
seen later (Chapter III), some members of the Persian religious classes 
opposed the introduction of Belgian customs officials because they 
objected to non-Muslims carrying out tasks such as revenue collection. 
Some members of the merchant classes objected for different reason: in 
the early stages of the reform they resented having to pay heavier dues, 
but their opposition became even stronger when they found that little if 
any of the new revenue was being spent on improving conditions for trade, 
and that facilities at the ports and security along the roads continued 
to decline. While some of the religious classes protested about the
3. See A.K.Sp Lamb ton, The Tobacco Re* gie; Prelude to Revolution, Studia 
Is1 arnica, Vol.XXII, 1965, pp.119-57, and Vol.XXIII, pp.7|-90, and 
NT” Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of
1891-1892, London 1966.
4. Quoted in N. Keddie, op.cit., p.49.
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increasing number of European merchants and businessmen in Persia,
the Calcutta newspaper Habl al-Matin was urging native merchants to
learn from the Europeans, and to form a chamber of commerce for the
5
protection of their interests.
When reactions to the introduction of European reforms were so 
strong the intensification of Anglo-Russian political rivalry could 
serve only to exacerbate the situation. Had that rivalry not existed 
the pressure for reform might have been less; but at the same time 
the Shah would have been able to claim, probably with greater conviction, 
that the reforms which he was instituting were voluntary and were not 
being carried out at the behest of London or St. Petersburg. Persia's 
first foreign loan had been raised to pay the compensation demanded for 
the cancellation of the Tobacco concession, and the later loans aroused 
opposition both because they came from foreign sources^and because they 
produced no tangible benefits for the country. The granting of 
concessions to foreign entrepreneurs was also greatly resented,'for 
although some of these did increase government revenue, few appreciable 
benefits were seen by the public at large: while the fact that the
holders of the concessions were usually neither Persian nor Muslim was 
regarded as a further sign of the inability of the Shah to defend the 
Islamic community.
In order to understand better these complex reactions to the 
introduction of European ideas and institutions, part of this thesis 
has been devoted to events in the provinces; for in the secondary
5. Translated in C, Issawi (ed,), The Economic History of Iran 1800- 
1914, Chicago 1971, pp067-9. The edition of the newspaper in 
question is that of 18 May 1906.
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literature little attention seemed to have been given to what was 
happening outside Tehran and, to a lesser extent, Tabriz. Obviously 
not all the provinces could be studied in detail, so the solution 
adopted was to look at the evidence concerning events in two important provinces^ - 
Isfahan and Fars, while also investigating two other major events 
during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din - the reform of the Customs 
administration and the cholera epidemic of 1904 - on as wide a geographical 
basis as was possible. The examination of the Customs administration was 
also undertaken to evaluate the many sorts of difficulties which lay in 
the path of any major attempt at administrative reform.
At quite an early stage in the study of the British sources a major
question arose„ Those papers contain many reports which indicated the
weakness of the Shah and his government, yet it was also obvious that
6
the people were protesting about tyranny (zulm). How could such a 
feeble administration seem so oppressive to so many people? In order to 
clarify this question evidence was collected about affairs at Court
(Chapter II), and the condition of the army (Chapter III). The kind of
questions posed were: What sort of ruler was Muzaffar al-Din? What
bearing did the personality of the Shah have on the functioning of
government? What was the state of Muzaffar al-Din1 s health and how did
this affect his capacity as a ruler? What was the relationship between 
the Shah and his Ministers, and what were relations like between the
6. Zulm (tyranny) is the opposite of cadl (justice), the quality which 
Muslims required of good rulers. In the words of the Russian Vice- 
Consul .in Tabriz at the time zulm ’’implies that the government or 
the shah himself has ceased to be the father of his subjects and is 
committing acts of unlawful oppression", A.D. Kalmykow, Memoirs of 
a Russian Diplomat: Outposts of the Empire 1893-1917, New Haven 1971,
p.50.
1 X2
Ministers? All these questions were necessary to see if the system 
of government was working well or not, and the answers would help to 
clarify the matter of whether any failure was due to the fact that the 
established system could no longer cope with Persia's problems, or 
whether that system had not been kept in good order and was not being 
used to its full potential. Similar questions were asked of the army 
in order to ascertain its effectiveness and to appraise its morale.
In brief, this study of the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah has two 
main purposes0 It seeks to examine the effects of growing contacts 
with, and knowledge of, European ideas and institutions, and of the 
keen Anglo-Russian competition for influence in Persia. It also attempts 
to analyse the causes of the growing opposition to the Shah and his 
government, and to see why conditions in Persia were regarded by many 
people as becoming intolerably tyrannical.
To these ends considerable use has been made of British diplomatic
sources. Much of this archival work had been completed when the article
by Hafez F„ Farmayan was published in which, while urging the production
of a multi-volume history of Qajar Persia, he warned that "Non-Persian
materials in the form of diplomatic correspondence, governmental reports,
personal memoirs, etc., are essential but can be used only as
supplementary material. Almost never should they be used as basic
material, at least not exclusively, as has been done heretofore by too
7
many contemporary scholars". It is hoped that this thesis will indicate 
that useful work can be done using British sources.
7. Hafez F. Farmayan: Observations on sources for the study of
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Iranian history, International 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.V, 1974, p.48. That author's 
plea for the creation of a national archives system in Iran and for 
the granting of access to government papers there to foreign scholars 
deserves the widest possible support.
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One must, however, agree with that author that some of the work 
which has been carried out using foreign sources, and particularly that 
based on some of the British papers, is open to criticism. This is 
particularly true when conclusions are based on evidence derived from 
the foreign Office Confidential Print Series of papers on Persia 
(F.O. 416). The fact that these documents have been microfilmed means 
that they have become widely available, but their usefulness is limited 
for their defects are several and serious. At the most obvious level 
they contain printing errors with names wrongly spelt and dates which 
are sometimes inaccurate. These defects are most frequent when the 
printer was dealing with names or calendar systems which were unfamiliar 
to him, and on several occasions Persian laqabs have been turned into a 
meaningless^and occasionally unrecognisable^ jumble. The more serious 
objection to the use of the Confidential Print Series is that the 
documents contained therein have already been edited and selected. The 
purpose of the Confidential Print was to disseminate as quickly as possible 
information which was considered to be important and relevant for the 
conduct of current British diplomacy. Whether it succeeded in that aim 
is of no consequence to this investigation; what it is important to 
recognize is that the needs of current diplomacy are obviously very 
different from those of the historian who investigates events at a later 
date.
The defects of the Confidential Print Series can be seen clearly 
in the reports concerning the various attempts by Persia to raise 
international loans during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din. Those loans 
were regarded, and justifiably so, by the British and Russian governments 
as an important means of exercising influence over the Shah, and the
14
negotiations surrounding them produced a considerable volume of 
diplomatic correspondence. Much of this is reprinted in the Confidential 
Print Series, but the documents there are concerned with the details of 
rival loan proposals and reports on the current state of negotiations.
This was what the diplomats of the day needed to know. What was less 
important for their purposes was detailed knowledge of the reasons why 
Persia needed such loans; reasons such as deficiencies in her tax- 
collecting machinery which meant that funds were insufficient to meet 
current expenditures, including such important items as the payment of 
the army and the bureaucracy. This background material had been prepared 
by British officials in Tehran, often in consultation with knowledgeable 
local experts such as Naus and Rabino, whose sources of information were 
very good. But these papers were not regarded as relevant to the task of 
ensuring that the Persian government would accept a British and not 
a Russian loan, and therefore they were often omitted from the Confidential 
Print.
Such papers are, however, preserved in the General and Political 
Correspondence (F.O. 60), and those papers constitute a much better body 
of evidence for the historian, As well as the regular diplomatic 
correspondence, these papers often contain valuable information derived 
from non-diplomatic sources. For example, details about Muzaffar al-Din1s 
personal health were supplied to the Legation physician, Dr. T. Odling, 
by two of the Shah's personal medical advisers, Drs. H. Adcock and 
L. Lindley. Dr. Adcock had treated Muzaffar al-Din while he had been in 
Tabriz, and he became Consulting Physician-in-Chief to the Shah in 1896.
Dr. Lindley was appointed as assistant Court Physician in 1900, and 
later succeeded to Adcock's post. Information about political 
personalities and court intrigue too appears to have been given to the
15
Legation by these men. Dr. Odling had been the doctor for the Indo- 
European Telegraph Department for 19 years before he joined the 
Legation in 1891 , and he too had great knowledge of many leading Tehran 
families.
The Imperial Bank in Tehran also provided information to the 
Legation, and this was used in the compilation of economic reports. The 
two people who gave the greatest assistance in this respect were 
Mr. Joseph Rabino di Borgamale and General Alexander Houtum Schindler; 
both of these men had long experience of Persia and they had travelled 
widely through the country. The provincial offices of the Imperial Bank 
sent regular reports on local conditions to Tehran, and some of this 
information too was made available to the Legation. Political information 
also was occasionally provided by the Imperial Bank. For example, when 
Hakim al-Mulk sought secretly to open a bank account in London in 1901 
the Legation was told of that Minister’s fear for his future tenure of 
office and of his suspicions of the ambitions of his ministerial
g
colleagues. The Legation also received occasional commercial and fiscal 
information from the Belgian Director of Customs, Mr. Joseph Naus, and 
this too can be seen in the F.O. 60 papers.
This series of papers is useful also because it has preserved, both 
in the original and in translation, copies of the Shabnama (broad­
sheets) which were printed and distributed clandestinely in Tehran, and 
which criticised the Shah and his Ministers. These publications were 
ephemerali and only a handful are to be found in the Foreign Office papers.^ 
Very few seem to have survived anywhere else.
8. See Chapter II of this thesis.
9. See Chapter II of this thesis.
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A further series of Foreign Office documents which have apparently
been little used by historians, but whose value is, in some respects even
greater than the Foreign Office 60 series, is the Embassy and Consular
Archives (F.O. 2 4 8 ) This collection consists, among other things, of
the first-hand reports of Consuls and Native Agents to Tehran, together
with the drafts of despatches to London from the Legation. The former
provided the regular accounts of local events on which the Minister's
monthly new?report was based, and they often contained much more
information than it was felt necessary to forward to London. Similarly
the draft despatches are often longer and more detailed than the ones
which were finally sent to London, and the study of these papers increases
considerably the volume of evidence available.
The value of the F o0 o 248 series is, however, not merely
quantitative,. Some of the Consuls had long experience of the areas in
which they worked, and not a few had a deep and informed interest in
local affairs. For example, J 0R. Preece was Consul in Isfahan from the
*
time that the post was created in 1891 until March 1906. This continuity
of service and his close friendship with the Governor, Zill al-Sultan,■ •
make his reports valuable. Preece was the intermediary for the 
Governor's private correspondence with the British Minister in Tehran 
and several of these letters are preserved in the F.O. 248 series. It is 
from this correspondence that we learn, for example, of the Shah's alarm 
at the outbreak of disturbances in Russia in 1905 and his fear that the
10. The value of the Tehran Legation archives has been noted by
S. Bakhash, Iran; Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the 
Qajars, 1858-1896, London 1978, p.413, but his topic of research 
did not call for the extensive use of consular archives.
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unrest would spread to, and have serious effects in, Persia; for
Muzaffar al-Din had written to Zill al-Sultan in great secrecy about 
• •
the Russian events, and the Governor showed the letter to Preece 
before writing to the British Minister about the matter. The Consul 
in Isfahan was also responsible for maintaining contact with the 
leaders of the Bakhtiyari tribes, and while he was absent on these 
tours, news reports were sent to Tehran by the Acting Consul. This 
post had long been held by members of theAganoor family, one of whom, Dr. 
Steven Aganoor, had received his medical training at Edinburgh 
University, and had a large practice in Isfahan. Among his patients 
were Aqa Najafi and his brothers, and Aganoor1s knowledge of this 
group makes his reports of much value. In Tabriz, Mr. G.C. Wood 
had served as Consul for over 10 years, and his local knowledge was 
considerable. He had known Muzaffar al-Din during his last years as
-d - ,
Valx ahd in Tabriz, and he was able to provide first-hand information 
on his character and personality, as well as furnishing reliable 
details on his circle of courtiers.
The Embassy and Consular Archive papers are also useful in showing 
how widespread was Persian interest in events abroad: particularly those 
concerning the great powers, such as the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese
13
war and the later internal disturbances in Russia.** Knowledge of the 
latter was greater in northern than in southern Persia - the influx 
of refugees from Batum, Baku and the Caucasus was the major reason for 
this difference - but the consular reports show that in the southern 
provinces too there was considerable interest^ in and. alarm about the 
situation within Russia.
Those reports also serve to indicate the extent to which the 
Persian newspapers published abroad circulated within the country. It 
would be difficult to gauge the extent of this interest in external 
events, or the distribution of the expatriate press, from the F.O. 60 
series alone. It is true that some of the travellers' accounts indicate 
that the Persians were alive to the importance of external events, but 
such reports refer only to the places which the travellers visited and 
sometimes their visits were very brief. The consular reports on the 
other hand are often the result of continuous and close observation of 
one locality, and when they are put together they provide a significant 
body of evidence about affairs in the provinces. As well as being an
11. There had also been much interest earlier in the Boxer rebellion in 
China (see reference in Chapter VII of this thesis and F.O.60:637,
Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.163, 23 October 1901). Many consuls observed 
that great attention was given to the Boer War. The British Minister 
reported the interest which he had found in those events during the 
course of a three-month tour in western Persia (F.O.60:617, Durand to 
Salisbury, No.5, 18 January 1900). The British Consul in Tabriz also 
noted similar interest in that war (F.O. 60:618, Enclosure from 
Wood;, in Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.77, 25 July 1900), Considerable 
attention had also been paid to events in Sudan. Durand reported that 
news of the British victory at Omdurman had "spread like wildfire all over 
the country" (F.O. 60:648, Durand to Salisbury, No.16, 12 February 1899.) 
Sykes had noted that news of that victory was s&despread in Sistan 
(F.O. 60:612, Sykes to Salisbury, No.l, 11 February 1899.) Sykes had 
also had a long conversation with the Governor of Q3*in in that year and 
he had reported that the Persian official was well informed about the 
Sudan campaign and about the Cape to Cairo railway project (F.O.60:612, 
Sykes to Salisbury, No.7, 11 May 1899.)
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important source for Chapters VI and VII on Fars and Isfahan
respectively, that series has also been widely used for Chapter IV
on the Customs administration and for Chapter V on the cholera epidemic.
A few other British Departments of State as well as the Foreign
Office have papers of value for the study of this period. The War
Office series of intelligence reports contains an interesting document
1 2on Persia dated 1905, but the much more useful report made by Picot
on the Persian Army in 1900 is not to be found in the War Office papers,
13but in the F.O. 881 series. Most of the relevant India Office papers are
duplicates of those available in the F.O.60 series. Neither the Foreign
Office nor the India Office archives contained a copy of the
Biographical Notices of Persian Statesmen and Notables which was drawn
up by G.P. Churchill in the summer of 1905, but a copy was located among
the personal papers of the Fourth Earl of Minto, who became Viceroy of
14
India m  November 1905. The Parliamentary Accounts and Papers provide 
information and statistics on trade for most of the towns of southern 
and western Persia which imported and exported goods. Most of these 
figures seem to have been compiled by consular officials, but in the 
case of Kirmanshah, at least, the Imperial Bank was the source for much 
of the data.
12. Military Report on Persia compiled by the General Staff at the 
War Office, dated September 1905, in War Office 33-3333.
13. Report on the Persian Army. Secret and Confidential, by 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.P. Picot. Dated January 1900,
F.O. 881:7364.
14. Biographical Notices of Persian Statesmen and Notables, 
Confidential, by G.P. Churchill. Dated August 1905, Calcutta,
1906. Copy in Papers of the Fourth Earl of Minto, National Library 
of Scotland, Edinburgh.
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Political rivalry with Russia encouraged the British and Indian 
governments to try to increase commerce with Persia, and two missions 
were sent to investigate trading conditions. The first group, under 
the leadership of Mr. W.H. Maclean, was sent by the Commercial 
Intelligence Committee of the Board of Trade, and it visited northern^
15
western and southern Persia in 1903. Its report was published m  1904.
The British Consul in Kirman, P. Sykes, felt that south-eastern Persia
had been .'ignored, and he urged'.the Government of India to
sponsor a similar mission to investigate the opportunities for trade
in that region. A small group was sent from Bombay in October 1904,
and although unrest among the tribes of Persian Baluchistan prevented
it from completing its planned itinerary, the report which was published
in 1906, is a useful supplement to the Maclean-document.^
The private papers of a few British officials were investigated, but
they proved to be of little significance for this study. The exceptioniwas
an apparently unprinted paper, A.T. Wilson's "Precis of the Relations
of the British Government with the Tribes and Sheikhs of Arabistan",
. . . 1 7
which was helpful for the investigation of the Customs administration. 
Mrs, A. Destree has used the private papers of several of the senior
18Belgian officials employed in Persia, and her book was also of value.
The Spring Rice papers contain little that is not available in the
19version edited by S, Gwynn.
15. H.W. Maclean, Report on Conditions and Prospects for British Trade in 
Persia, Accounts and Papers 1904, Vol.XCV, Paper No.Cd.2146.
16. A.H. Gleadowe-Neweomen: Report on British Indian Commercial Mission to 
South East Persia during 1904-5, Calcutta 1906. (Copy in the India 
Office library.)
17. Copy of this is available in the British Library, London.
18. A. Destree, Les Fonctionnaires Beiges au Service de la Perse 1898- 
1915, Tehran-Libge, 1976.
19. The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice: A Record, edited 
by S. Gwynn, London 1929, 2 volumes.
21
Archives of commercial and business firms have not been used.
The papers of the Imperial Bank would have been of interest, but they 
remain closed. As noted above, however, some of the Bank's economic 
and financial information is contained in the F.O. 60 series.
There are several travel books concerning this period, but
20
nothing which compares in value with Curzon's encyclopaedic volumes.
21 -  22 
Napier Malcolm's book on Yazd and Sparroy's on Isfahan have been
used. Other contemporary travel works are cited in the footnotes and
bibliography, but none merits separate discussion here. The memoirs
of four diplomats - two British, one German and one Russian, who served
23 2 A 25 26in Persia at the time, Hardinge, Wratislaw, Rosen and Kalmykow
. 27
have been used. The economic compilation of Lorini is of interest, 
but some of its tables are aggregate ones, and they obscure important 
regional differences. On economic matters in general it is perhaps
as well to heed Rabino's contemporary warning, "In Persia there are no
. . „ 28 
statistics .
20. -G.N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, London 1892,
2 volumes.
21. Napier Malcolm, Five Years in a Persian Town, London 1905.
22. W. Sparroy, Persian Children of the Royal Family: The Narrative 
of an English Tutor at the Court of H.I.H. Zillu’s Sultan, London, 
1902.
23. C. Hardinge, A Diplomatist in the East, London 1928.
24. A.C. Wratislaw, A Consul in the East, Edinburgh and London 1924.
25. F. Rosen, Oriental Memories of a German Diplomatist, London 1930.
26. A.D. Kalmykow, Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat: Outposts of the 
Empire 1893-1917, New Haven 1971.
27. E. Lorini, La Persia Economica Contemporanea e La Sua Questione
v Monet aria,- Rome 1900...
28. J. Rabino, An Economist's Notes on Persia, Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Vol.LXIV;~1901y pf265.
Later monographs vary in their quality and relevance. There are 
no studies devoted specifically to the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah
29
known to the author. E.G. Browne's "The Persian Revolution 1905-1909"
is chiefly concerned with events after the granting of the Constitution,
and although somewhat partisan in its judgments it is still of value.
Mrs. Destree's book on the Belgian Customs administration has already
30
been noted, and other useful monographs were those by Algar and
31 .
Kazemzadeh. The periodical literature also varies considerably m
quality, and is cited in the footnotes and in the bibliography at the
end of this thesis.
Any conclusions based on British sources must of course remain
open to modification in the light of possible future work using Persian
materials. For example, if records of provincial tax revenues were to
become available, then some of the conclusions offered here may prove
to be incomplete. Similarly, the assessment of the importance of Aqa
Najafi and his family in Isfahan would be enhanced if accurate contemporary
*
registers of land holdings and their value were available. In brief, 
this thesis does not seek to show that British archives provide an 
exhaustive source of evidence for the history of the reign of Muzaffar 
al-Din Shah - for example, there is very little in them which can be used 
to investigate conditions in Persia's villages - but what it is hoped 
will emerge from this study is that those archives form a very valuable 
body of information which can, with judicious use, help to advance our 
understanding of those times.
29. E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution 1905-1909, Cambridge 1910.
30. H. Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906: The Role of the
Ulama in the Qajjat Period, Berkeley 1969.
31. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914: A Study 
in Imperialism, New Haven 1968.
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CHAPTER IX
THE POSITION OF THE SHAH AND AFFAIRS AT COURT
"Have you not heard that the greatest blessings - after religion and 
being Muslim - are good health and security? Now the security of 
the world depends on the discipline maintained by the Sultan
Ghazali's Book of Counsel for Kings 
(Nasihat al-Muluk), translated by 
I?. R . C . hag ley, London, 1971, p. 76.
Although the history of Persia has often been interrupted by 
changes of dynasty, and despite the fact that the country has experienced 
prolonged periods when it has been either absorbed into larger empires or 
fragmented into smaller units, a constant and notable feature of its 
political tradition has been the supremacy and central position of the 
ruler0 This was as true in Qaj5r times as it was earlier; for although 
that dynasty could not claim the hereditary religious right to rule which 
had been asserted by the Safavids, the Qajar Shahs were able to establish 
themselves as absolute monarchs. The great importance attached to the 
ruler1s position means that the personality, physical health and abilities 
of the Shah constitute one of the most important starting points in the 
investigation of any reign.
Muzaffar al-Din was born in March 1853, five years later he became 
Valicahd and like several other holders of that title he was made 
Governor-General of Azarbayjan. The long period of isolation which he 
had to endure in Tabriz until his father's assassination in 1896 had, as 
will be seen later, important effects on hia administration; but his 
residence in the north-west also meant that relatively little was known 
about him. Curzon notes that most of the European reports which he had 
read about Muzaffar al-Din were little more than repetitions of second­
hand or third-hand gossip. Even that writer, usually so well-informed 
about the affairs of Persia, had to admit that the character of the
24
future Shah was open to different interpretations: "He is emphatically
what would, in sporting parlance, be termed fa dark horse1".*
One of the few Europeans with some first-hand knowledge of the
Valf^ahd was A.D. Kalmykow who joined the staff of the Russian Consulate
in Tabriz in January 1895. He described Muzaffar al-Din as "a kind,
2
open, simple man", and as someone who was "kindhearted, without will
or ambition, utterly harmless and helpless, he was despised by his
3father and not much feared by his retinue". This latter characteristic, 
the inability to make people stand in awe of him,was noted by several 
of those who came to know the Shah well, and it was to prove a serious 
failing; for fear prompted obedience, and without obedience effective 
government was not possible0 The matter is portrayed well by Kalmykow 
who recounts that shortly after arriving in Tabriz he heard praise for 
a strong governoro On enquiring whether the governor was popular
4
Kalmykow was met with looks of amazement and was told "he is dreaded".
The ability to inspire awe and respect was certainly possessed by 
the previous Shah, Nasir al-Dfn. Sir Mortimer Durand, who knew both 
rulers well, wrote that Muzaffar al-Din "is more amiable than his father 
but he is weak and easily misled. The British Minister ascribed many of 
the difficulties faced by Persia to the new Shah's inability to maintain 
discipline. During the bread riots of November 1906, a bookseller in 
Tehran is reported to have told a French diplomat that similar disturbances
1. G.N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question^ London, 1892, I, p.415.
2. A.D. Kalmykow, Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat: Outposts of the Empire,
1893-1917, New Haven, 1971, p.460
3. A ;D .’ Kalmykow, op.cit., p .67.
4. A.D. Kalmykow, op.cit., p.56.
5. F.O. 60:608. Durand to Salisbury, No.16, 12 February 1899.
6. Ibid.
had taken place under the previous Shah but that he had brought them to
an abrupt end by visiting the breadshops and ordering one of the bakers
to be thrust into his own oven. "If the Shah were only as s t e m  as his
7
father," he said, "we should have nothing of all this." This small 
incident is of considerable significance for it indicates that what many 
Persians were seeking was effective government and that the re-assertion 
of control by the Shah might have gone a long way towards satisfying 
such grievances *
The serious results of Muzaffar al-Dtn's supineness are seen in a 
private letter which Spring-Rice wrote in 1899. "The Shah is a most 
excellent kind-hearted, and well-meaning man, but the people aren't afraid
of him and the rich men grind the faces of the poor without having their
8 —  
own groundi:" The implications of the Shah’s weakness were also
financial, for in another letter Spring' Rice wrote that "The governors
9
who are not afraid of the central government, send in no money whatever”. 
The inability of the Shah to exercise effective control over the provinces 
was not due solely to his weak character - other factors such as the 
poor state of the army, and the consequent lack of coercive power at 
the disposal of the government, also played their part;^ but the fact 
that Muzaffar al-Din was a timid man meant that the way was open for 
others to oppress his subjects„
It was Kalmykow1s view that Muzaffar al-Din "wanted to stay at 
peace with his own people and with the rest of the w o r l d " . T h e . r e a s o n s
7. E. De Lorey and D c Sladen, The Moon of the Fourteenth Night,
London 1910, p.22.
8. Letter to Stephen, 15 September 1899, in The Letters and Friendships
of Sir Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, edited by S. Gwynn, London, 1929, I,
p.290o
9. Letter to V. Chirol, 15 September 1899, ibid., p.288.
10. The state of the army is discussed in Chapter III.
11o A.D. Kalmykow, op.cit., p.46.
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for this probably lie in the personality of the Shah, but they were 
also reinforced by the poor state of Muzaffar al-DinTs health. He
was already ailing when he was in Tabriz, Kalmykow noted that he was
1 2 .  . . .  
"sickly" and "prematurely aged". Sir Thomas Sanderson, writing in
1898 about Persia1s need for a new loan, noted the two aspects of the
Shah1s weakness when he wrote that one of the most important causes
the government^ poverty was that the Shah "is not disposed, and does
not have the strength to practise, the cruel money-raising expedients
13
of the previous Shah"0
The state of the Shah’s health was certainly a matter of great 
concern to the British Legation in Tehran and regular reports on it 
were sent to London. Much of the information was derived from a first­
hand source, Dr. H. Adcock, who had become Consulting Physician-in-Chief 
to the Shah in 1896, after having served earlier as personal physician 
to Muzaffar al-Din in Tabriz. The Shah appears to have suffered from
a number of different ailments, including gout and recurrent inflammation
14of the kidneys, as well as from the effects of a weak heart. The 
illnesses had cumulative results in that they each served to enfeeble the 
Shah. When Adcock reached the conclusion in December 1900 that any 
long-term improvement in the health of the Shah could come only from 
adherence to a strict regimen, he had also to admit that Muzaffar al-Din 
probably already lacked the stamina to follow such a course of treatment. 
This proved to be an accurate assessment, for the recovery in health
12. A.D„ Kalmykow, op.cit., p.67.
13, P.O. 60:601. Memorandum by Sir T. Sanderson. Not numbered.
16 July 18980
140 F.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Noo160, 17 October 1901,
15. F.Oo 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.127, 12 December 1900,
2 7
which the SKah enjoyed in the early months of 1901 was lost when 
Muzaffar al-Din showed himself incapable of keeping to the necessary 
diet.
It was gout which caused Muzaffar al-Din the greatest pain and
discomfort, but the weakness of his heart was the most important factor
. . .  . 17
limiting physical and mental exertion. This cardiac weakness was so
serious that Adcock warned the British Minister in December 1899 that
18
he should be prepared to hear of the Shah’s death at any time. There
seems to have been little that the doctors- could do about this condition
19 .
apart from trying to restrict the Shah’s activities. Such restrictions 
reduced still further the chances of Persia getting what it most needed - 
effective rule by a strong and determined monarch. At the VlMC- w/He-ru 
internal and external problems were growing in number there was a man 
on the throne who, for medical reasons, was advised not to exert himself.
It must be added, however, that even if Muzaffar al-Din had enjoyed 
good health, his natural inclinations do not appear to have been in the 
direction of his being a forceful ruler. During the period in Tabriz 
he had shown little interest or ability in managing the affairs of 
government. When he became ShSh this failing had much more serious 
implications; for while he had been in Tabriz his father had had recourse 
to the old practice of appointing a strong deputy-Governor who could
ensure that revenues were collected and some degree of order was
20 . .
maintained,. After the assassination of Nasir al-Dm there was no one
who could save Muzaffar al-Din from the damaging consequences of his 
own weaknesses.
16. F.O. 60:636. Fardinge to Lansdowne, No065, 27 April 1901.
17. Ibid.’
18. F.O. 60:610, Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.99, Telegraphic, Secret,
29 December 1899.
19. F.O, 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.117, 23 July 1901.
20. A.D. Kalmykow, op.cit., p.48.
2 3
Evidence concerning the Shah's lack of interest in the affairs of
state comes from many sources. In January 1899 NTlsir al-Mulk told a
British diplomat that the reason for the delay in the settlement of a
particular matter was that the Shclh would listen to his officials for
only a few minutes before pleading illness or fatigue as the reason
21
for terminating the audience. In a private letter in 1900 Spring
Rice wrote that the Shah was Mortally afraid of business talk", while
22
noting that this was due in part to his want of experience - a factor
to be treated later. In the autumn of 1901 the Shah showed his lack of
interest in the governing of Persia when he expressed the wish to spend
a full year in Europe and to pass the winter on the Mediterranean 
23
coasto In February 1902, when Hardinge had an audience with Muzaffar 
al-DTn to discuss arrangements for the forthcoming royal visit to 
England, the ShSh made it plain that he regarded the occasion as a 
holiday, and that he had no wish whatsoever to engage in political talks 
while he was in London.^
Even before he began his visits to Europe Muzaffar al-Din had
shown that he preferred to spend his time away from the palace and
. . .  . . 2 5
administration and to live in camp and go hunting. The only time when
21. F.O. 60:608. Enclosure No0l (Memorandum from Preece to Durand,
5 January 1899) in Durand to Sanderson, no number, 12 January 1899.
22. F o0. 60:617. Spring Rice to Sanderson, private letter, no number,
2 April 1900.
23. F.0o 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.163, 23 October 1901.
24o F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.25, 15 February 1902. In
a later despatch (F.O. 60:650, Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.38,
4 March 1902), the British Minister reported that Muzaffar al-Din 
had insisted that his party should not be on French soil on 14 July. 
250 A.D. Kalmykow, op.cit0, p.83, and Spring Rice, private letter to 
Henry Adams, 30 November 1899, in Letters and Papers of Sir Cecil 
Arthur Spring' Rice, edited by S. Gwynn, London, 1929, I, p.296.
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the Shah apparently expressed resentment against the restrictions
imposed by his doctors was when they wished to confine his expeditions
26
to the lower slopes of the Alburz mountains. In this respect at least 
Muzaffar al-Din shared something with his father - and indeed with most 
of the previous Qajar rulers. The circumstances surrounding these 
hunting trips foreshadow the controversies which were to accompany the 
later European journeys. The lengthy absence of the Shah from Tehran 
during the summer meant that the conduct of state affairs became an 
even more difficult and lengthy process than it was at other times; 
while the need to pay for these expeditions placed additional burdens 
on an already almost empty treasury. In both 1898 and 1899 the Sadr-i 
/&am had to raise loans from his relatives, and from merchants in the
m f
bazaar,in order to meet the expenses of the journey, and of the
27 . .
establishment and maintenance of the camp. The opposition to these loans
was but a portent of that which would be expressed when much larger
international ones were needed and were used to pay for royal
visits to Europe.
Those visits undoubtedly served to reduce the prestige of the Shah
and by doing this they helped to create that climate of opinion in which
some Persians, however few, would seek changes which went beyond promises
of reform in the existing pattern of royal rule. The issue of these
28
visits and of the foreign loans is complex. It is necessary to remember
26. F.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.117, 23 July 1901.
27. F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.91, 29 July 1898
F.O. 60:609„ Durand to Salisbury, No.74, 26 July 1899
F.O. 60:609. Durand to Salisbury, No.79, 27 July 1899
28. There is a useful discussion of the loans and of the diplomatic 
background to them in F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 
1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism, New Haven, 1968, particularly 
Chapter 5o The two major loans were both from Russia, in January 1900 
(22.5 million roubles, approximately equal to £2.25 million), and in 
April 1902 (10 million roubles, approximately equal to £1 million). 
Both loans were for a period of 75 years and they carried interest
at 5 per cent.
30
that some of the proceeds of the loans were spent for purposes other
than to meet the costs of the royal journeys to Europe. In 1901 the
payment of arrears of salaries to the army and the bureaucracy was
necessary if serious disorders were to be prevented, and in this respect
29
the loans did help in preventing the collapse of government; but the
use of the funds for the Shah’s foreign journeys was widely resented
and opposed. The Shah’s doctors did advise him to make such visits
in order to improve his health, but at the same time not a few Persians
believed that the monarch was m e r e l y  Signing illness in order to escape
30
from his responsibilities in Persia. The fact that the Sh&h himself
could become the direct object of public criticism shows how great had
been the loss of royal standing. The external source of the loans
served only to strengthen the view that Muzaffar al-Din had no shame or
compunction in selling Persia to the foreign powers in order to gratify
his personal desires.
Direct criticism of the Shah seems to have appeared first in the
several clandestine broadsheets which were issued during the summer of
1901. These gave much attention to the granting of the Russian loan,
and they accused the government, and particularly the Sadr-i A czam (Amin
* *
al-Sultffn) of having sold the country to the Tsar. Such was the depth 
of public suspicion about the role of external powers in the internal 
affairs of Persia that this expression of hostility to Russia was 
immediately seen by some Persians as proof that the broadsheets had been
29. See Chapter III. e > $ tins
30. F.O. 60:650o Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.48, 22 March 1902.
31
31
published with help from the British authorities. Some of these
broadsheets, such as Lisan al-Haqq (Tongue of Truth), in addition to
criticising the purposes for which the loan had been sought, went on
to ask how Persia was going to be able to afford the repayment of such 
32loans. A different broadsheet entitled Ghayrat (Zeal) said that
Russian control of the Tehran-Rasht road was an example .of how Russia
33
was seeking to reduce Persia to subjection.
Some of the broadsheets repeat a criticism of Muzaffar al-Din 
which has already been noted, his weakness and incapacity as compared 
with his father. The second issue of Lisan al-Haqq praised the fact
that Nasir al-Din spent money on public works, on the improvement of 
Tehran and on the provision of a well-equipped army; whereas under 
Muzaffar al-Din the treasury had been recklessly depleted and money 
squandered on frivolous amusements. That same broadsheet said that the 
Russian government had been able to gain by the loan that which they had 
not been able to achieve earlier in the century by war - control of 
Persia. The authors of the broadsheet, who signed themselves "the 
patriots of the country", begged the Shah "to base your rule on justice", 
and said that "your Majesty owns nothing but the name of a king".
31. F.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.124, Confidential,
18 August 1901,
32. F.O. 60:637. Enclosure No.l in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.124,
Confidential, 18 August 1901.
33. F.O. 60:637. Enclosure No.3 in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.124,
Confidential, 18 August 1901. This broadsheet also mentions other 
causes of popular unrest such as the extent of bribery, debasement 
of the coinage, the hoarding of grain to increase its price and 
the fact that some landowners were taking all the available water 
and not allowing any to reach the areas where the peasants grew 
their cropso
34. F.O. 60:637o Enclosure No.2 in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.124,
Confidential, 18 August 1901.
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The impact of these publications was, according to Hardinge, 
sensational. They certainly caused much alarm when copies reached the 
camp where the Shah was on a hunting expedition. When they were read 
out to him Muzaffar al-Din recalled the way in which his father had 
died and he expressed great reluctance to return to Tehran at the end 
of the trip.^
Some of the broadsheets said that the poor state of the country
was due to the fact that the Shah was ignorant of what was happening.
The second issue of Lisan al-Haqq begged the Shah to find out for himself
about the true state of affairs in his realm, for "A king who is not
aware of the conditions of his country is like a shepherd who does not
36
know the numbers of his flock" 0 In part the ignorance of Muzaffar
al-Din stemmed from the long period which he had spent in Tabriz
37
isolated from the affairs of state; but Hardinge drew attention to
another important reason for the Shah's ignorance when, in discussing the
political impact of the broadsheets, he noted that the criticisms had
been all the more disturbing to the Shah because he was "unaccustomed to
38
hearing any language but that of flattery". This was no new situation 
in Persian history; all regimes dependent on one man are open to this 
defect, but the character of the ruler is again shown to be of great 
importance. A ruler interested in government is more likely to seek 
information, while an experienced ruler is more likely to be able to 
accept criticism. Muzaffar al-Din was neither interested nor experienced 
and when he heard the views of the broadsheets his natural bewilderment 
and timidity were increased.
35. F.O. 60:637, Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.124, Confidential, 18 August 1901,
36. F.O. 60:637. Enclosure No.2 in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.124, 
Confidential, 18 August 1901.
37. A.D. Kalmykow, op.cit., p.46.
38. F.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 124, Confidential, 18 August 1901.
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There are several Incidents which show that Muzaffar al-Din was
indeed ignorant about events in Persia. The British Consul in Tabriz,
who met the Shah in May 1900 as he passed through Azarbayjan en route
to Europe, reported that Muzaffar al-Dm was "surprised and incensed
on hearing that a number of Russian railway engineers were carrying
39
out surveys on Persian territory. When the Shah returned from this
journey abroad there was great discontent in Tehran because a grain
ring had been operating and bread prices had risen very sharply. The 
Governor of the capital and the Commander-in-Chief of the army were 
believed to have organised the ring, and when the Shah gave honours to
both those men the discontent became even greater. Various members of
the diplomatic corps discussed the advisability of informing the Shiah 
about what had happened in his absence, and Hardinge agreed to raise 
the matter with the Minister of Posts, a man who was known at that time 
to have the ear of the monarch. That Minister later confirmed the 
impression that Muzaffar al-Din had been ignorant about the whole affair, 
and Hardinge was later informed that various telegrams which had been
40
despatched to the Shah about those circumstances had been suppressed.
The need for external help to remove the Shah’s ignorance was emphasised 
by Mukhtar al-Saltana in an interview with a British diplomat in February
1902. The Persian politician begged the British authorities to "put 
heart into the Shah for he has none. Throw a stone, wake him up, he is 
asleep",^*
390 F.O. 60: Enclosure No.l (Wood to Spring-Rice, Secret, no :
number, 23 Junfe 1.900', in Spring Rice to Salisbury, No. 77, 25 July 1900.
40„ F.O. 60:bl8. spring Rice to Salisbury, No.127, 12 December 1900.
(Among those who had tried to send messages to Muzaffar al-Din about 
this matter was his brother, Zill al-SultSn.)
41. F.Oo 60:650. Enclosure No.l in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.19,
4 February 1902.
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The reasons for the ShaVs ignorance were many and two are to be
found in the circumstances already described - Muzaffar al-Din1s lack«
of previous administrative experience, and the fact that he was not 
naturally inclined to concern himself with affairs of state. Another 
reason, which reinforced those, was referred to in one of the broad­
sheets when the Sadr-i A czam was accused of deliberately keeping the
42
Shah m  ignorance of the state of the country. Mukhthr al-Saltana
also indicated that few of those who surrounded the Shah had much
interest in making him aware of the country's plight; hence the need
43for action by the foreign powers. This again is no new feature of 
Persian history; but under Muzaffar al-Din when so many matters needed 
royal attention lack of knowledge had more serious consequences than at 
earlier times.
Several British diplomats certainly believed that on some matters 
the Shah had been kept in ignorance by his Ministers. In April 1900 
Spring 'Ri.ce expressed the view that the Sadr-i Aczam had not given
o *
certain important documents to the Shah, and that as a result Muzaffar
al-Din had not been aware that the Persian government had given a pledge
in 1897 (which had been repeated two years later), not to alienate the
44 c c
customs revenues of the southern ports. Shu a al-Saltana told 
Durand earlier in 1900 that he was sure that the Sadr-i Aczam had 
deceived the Shah about the willingness of Britain to consider granting 
a loan to the Persian government, and the British Minister did not
42. F.O. 60:637. Enclosure No.3 in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.124,
Confidential, 18 August 1901.
43. F.O. 60:650. Enclosure No.l in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.19,,
4 February L902.
44. F.Oo 60:617. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.28, 5 April 1900.
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dissent from this view. Mr. G.P. Churchill, recalling the turbulent
events of 1905 in Tehran, stated that it was difficult for any diplomat
to approach Muzaffar al-Din because 'his courtiers put a wall around
him and that the Sh^h was to all intents and purposes run by his 
46entourage 0
The seriousness of the situation was increased by the fact that
some of the courtiers surrounding Muzaffar al-Din had reputations which
were far from enviable. Kalmykow had known many of those men in Tabriz
and his views about them were scathing. He described the new Shah’s
courtiers as "exulting at the prospect of the coveted treasures of Tehran
falling an easy prey to them" when they heard of the death of Nasir 
•p 47 .
al-Din, and their journey to the capital was likened'to the descent of
48
a swarm of locusts. Kalmykow had little doubt as to the major cause
of Persia's subsequent political decay: "It was the party of Tabrizians,
reactionaries of the worst type, who ruined the monarchy after Mozaffar
49
ed-Din mounted the throne".
There is much evidence in British sources to support the view that 
the Shah's courtiers were very greedy. In July 1899 Durand devoted a 
despatch solely to the description of the obloquy incurred by the SKah's 
entourage because of their speculation and p r o f i t e e r i n g . I n  a private 
letter of September that same year Spring Rice wrote in a similar vein
45o F.O. 60:619. Durand to Salisbury, No.33, telegraphic, 5 March 1900.
46. Personal interview in London, 13 May 19690
47. A.D. Kalmykow, op0cito, p.6 8 .
48. A.D. Kalmykow, op.cit0, p.71.
49. A.D. Kalmykow, op.cit., p c48. Kalmykow was transferred to the
Russian Legation in Tehran after the accession of Muzaffar al-Din 
because he knew the new Shah and his entourage. (Ibid, p.71.)
50. F.O. 60:609. Durand to Salisbury, No„76, 25 July 1899.
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and described the Shah, as "surrounded by Turks from Turkey, savage,
51avaricious and very ignorant". In another private letter Spring
Rice went into greater detail, "He [the Shah] brought up to Teheran
with him from Tabreez, where he lived as heir apparent, a whole tribe
of hungry courtiers, who insisted, when he became king, on his giving
them property: and he parted with most of the crown lands to them, so
that he is absolutely indigent and has to beg money when he wants to go
on a journey. The consequence is that the wheat grown on the former
crown lands is garnered and stored by the courtiers, who corner it too
for the rise. Now, after a fair harvest, bread is twice what it was the
52
year before and three times what it was two years before,," The 
organisation of such grain rings was by no means solely in the hands of 
the Tabriz court party, but the existence of such corruption so close 
to the Shah could not but damage royal prestige.
Muzaffar al-Dinfs first Grand Vazir, Amin al-Sultcin, is reported
to have made determined efforts to shield the reserves in the treasury
53 . . .
from the Tabriz courtiers; but he fell from power within six months
of the new ShaVs accession to the throne, partly as a result of the
54
intrigues of that group. His successor, Amin al-Dawla, was a weaker 
man; but he too aroused the opposition of the members of the court 
party by his tentative schemes for financial reform,, In particular 
that group wished to prevent the proposed creation of a Civil List for
51. Letter to V, Chirol, 15 September 1899, in S. Gwynn, op.cit., p.288.
52. Letter to Henry Adams, 30 November 1899, ibid., p.296.
53. AoDo Kalmykow, op.cit., p o80o
54. F„0. 60:698o Memorandum by GoP. Churchill dated 25 January 1905.
This memorandum is primarily concerned with the contemporary 
groups and factions at Court but it also provides a brief history 
of the earlier rivalries. See also F„ Kazemzadeh, op.cit.,
pp.302-3 for other details of the plot and for details of the 
immediate incident whioh may have precipitated the fall of Amin 
al-Sultan.
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the Shah."*^ Another source of opposition to Amin al-Dawla was his
failure to secure a loan with which to finance a royal visit to Europe.
He told Durand that if he did get such a loan he would probably be
unable to prevent the subsequent plunder of the treasury by the Shah’s
entourage. The British Minister acknowledged that this was likely to
happen and he advised Lord Salisbury that if the loan were to be raised
on the London market, then very strict conditions should be laid down
concerning the way in which the money was to be paid to the Persian
government . ^  When Amin al-Sultan returned to power in August 1898,
he too was faced with the need to secure a loan and, like his predecessor,
he admitted to Durand that the court party would immediately claim part
57
of any money which was raisedo
As has already been noted, these loans were highly unpopular and 
they caused great resentment against the SK3.h, but it would be wrong 
to say that they were caused by royal greed. Several observers note 
that Muzaffar al-Din was not a covetous person; Kalmykow pointedly
contrasts his lack of avarice with the grasping nature of both his father
58 —
and his son„ Rabino observed that Muzaffar al-Din had been very prompt
in paying his father’s debts when he arrived in Tehran, and the same
observer had little doubt that the; new Shah cared very little about the
59 7
value of the royal jewels. It was the fact that Muzaffar al-Dm could
not assert himself and control his courtiers which allowed their
55. F.Oo 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.65, telegraphic, 5 June 1898.
56. P.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.61, 22 May 1898.
57. F.O, 60:608o Durand to Salisbury, No.39, 5 May 1899.
58. A.D. Kalmykow, op.cit., p.790
59. Letter from Rabino to Picot, 14 May 1898. To be found in F.O. 60:601.
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cupidity to go unchecked, and thereby to become the object of such 
great public opposition. It has been seen that in the case of the 
Shahfs physical health each separate illness served to weaken him and 
prevent him from being able to accept the rigorous treatment necessary 
for a sustained recovery; similarly with regard to his political 
position each failure to exercise authority meant that his standing 
was again reduced, and the chances of establishing just and effective 
government in Persia became ever more remote0
Even Muzaffar al-Din could not avoid the need to make some
decisions but these were usually marked by vacillation followed by
impetuosity - characteristics which provide further evidence of his lack
of administrative experience and skill. Several of the Europeans who
had personal dealings with the Shah refer to the fact that the advice
which he had received last was that which he was most likely to follow.
The Belgian Director of Customs,Naus, the Russian Minister and Dr. Adcock
all agreed with Hardinge’s view that Muzaffar al-Din’s mind was very
easily changed and that it was difficult, if not impossible, to get him
60
to make firm decisions. This failing had serious effects on the 
efficiency of government, not least because it encouraged those tendencies 
to intrigue which already existed. Again it must be remembered that 
this is not a new feature in Persia’s history; but the cumulative effects 
of so many failings and weaknesses were so much more damaging at a time 
when the country needed firm and decisive government.
The fact that the Shah was so fickle meant that there was intense 
and continuous competition for his ear. Hardinge, who had had relatively
60, F.O. 60:638o Hardinge to Lansdowne, No,51, Telegraphic,
9 September 1901; and F.O. 60:640. Hardinge to Lansdowne, N0 .6A 
Commercial, 28 February 1901.
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little success in making personal contact with the Shah in Tehran,
supported the idea of inviting Muzaffar al-Din to England in 1902 in
the hope that it would be easier to gain access to the Shah in London;
for there the number of courtiers surrounding him would be fewer and
61
Russian influence on him would also be reduced.
If difficulty in obtaining access to the Shah was disquieting for 
the British Minister it was a much more serious matter for Persian 
officials; because for them the potential consequences of loss of 
influence and fall from political favour were very great indeed. In an 
interview with Hardinge in September 1901 Amin al-Sultan put the matter 
very succinctly, "After all if you were to be dismissed tomorrow from 
your post as British Minister in Persia, your life and your family’s
62
private property would be safe; but if I fall I stand to lose both",
Amin al~Sultan’s fears were by no means exaggerated or unfounded^for
when he had lost office in 1896 it had taken the combined efforts of
63
the Russian and British Ministers to save his life.
Amin al-Sultan’s great political rival, Hakim al-Mulk, also 
recognised the possibly dire consequences of loss of position. He had 
approached Hardinge in great confidence in June 1901 to ask how he could 
open a bank account in London, and whether the Persian Legation there 
would get to know if he did take such a step. In this particular case, 
however, it was not the possibility of immediate loss of influence which 
Hakim al-Mulk feared so much as the dangers he would face on the possibly
61. F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.11, 29 January 1902.
62, F.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, no number, Commercial, 
Secret, 2 October 1901.
63„ A.Do Kalmykow, op.citQ, pp.82-3.
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premature death of Muzaffar al-Dm. What Hakim al-Mulk knew was that
just as he had profited from being a member of the Valicahdfs entourage
on the death of Nasir al-Din Shah, so now there were other men waiting
with the current heir apparent in Tabriz for their opportunity to acquire
the spoils of office in Tehran. (The effects of Muzaffar al-Din1s
fragile state of health on the conduct of business by other officials,
particularly provincial governors, will be discussed below.)
By September 1901 Hakim al-Mulk was much more concerned about the
possibility of an immediate loss of position at Court for Amin al-Sultan
had attempted to link his name with the seditious broadsheets which had
appeared in Tehran during the summer and which had so alarmed the Sh3h.
Hardinge thought that these intrigues were sufficiently serious for him
to ask Adcock, who was at the Shah's hunting camp, for any information
which he might have about the affair,, The English doctor confirmed the
fact that the Sadr-i Aczam had indeed made such an attempt to blacken
the name of Hakim al-Mulk, but that the Shlih had promised to stand by
6 5his Persian Physician. Adcock was at pains on this occasion to remind 
Hardinge that the Shah's fickle nature meant that such royal promises 
were in fact worth very little.
In this particular, and prolonged, struggle for influence Hakim 
al-Mulk had the advantage that his position as one of the royal doctors 
required that he remain near to the Shah. Amin al-Sultan and other 
Ministers did not have such an excuse; yet it was necessary for them
64. P.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.107, Confidential, 6 July 1901.
65. F.O. 60:638, Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.51, Telegraphic, 9 September 
1901, Hakim al-Mulk1s fears of the possible consequences of having 
his name associated with the broadsheets were not without justifi­
cation; those whose names were linked with the broadsheets suffered 
heavy fines and, in some cases, banishment from Tehran (F.O. 60:637. 
Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.142, 19 September 1901).
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to retain their influence with the Shah and this meant that they were
very reluctant to be absent from Muzaffar al-Din*s presence for a
prolonged period of time. As a consequence, the processes of
administration were often very slow for ministers were reluctant to attend
to affairs in their offices, feeling that time spent away from the Shah
was likely to be used by rivals to undermine their position. In January
1902 Amin Al-Sultan had to abandon plans to make a long-promised
pilgrimage to Qumm because, in Hardinge’s words, "he fears for his
66
position and is daily at the Shah*s side"p The effects of this wish
to remain close to the throne were most noticeable, however, when the
Shah went on his summer hunting expeditions, for Ministers were then
sometimes absent from their offices for weeks at a time.
The competition to secure Muzaffar al-Din's attention and favour
became even more intense than usual when decisions were being made about
the allocation of places in the parties to accompany the Shah on his
European visits. In the early months of 1900, for example, Amin al-
Sultan made great but unsuccessful efforts to prevent Nasir al-Mulk,
a protege of Hakim al-Mulk, from accompanying the Shah to Europe, for
the Sadr-i A*zam did not wish Muzaffar al-Din to have an interpreter
67
who was not under his, the Amin al-Sultan's, influence.
Examples of such court intrigues are included in almost every 
monthly summary of events compiled by the British Legation in Tehran, 
and their effects on the conduct of government were considerable. At 
the most obvious level the intrigues distracted the attention of high
6 6 . F.O. 60:650o Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.5, 8 January 1902.
67. F.O. 60:617. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No,37, Secret, 2 July 1900.
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officials from their regular duties as well as absorbing much of their 
time. In an interview with Spring Rice in January 1901 - the frankness 
of which impressed the British diplomat - Amin al-Sultan said that the 
outstanding need in Persia was for financial reform, and he went on:
"But what is the good of .speaking of schemes for 
improving the country. I have no time for anything 
except self-defence. I am surrounded by enemies 
and there is not a single soul I can trust. All 
the time I was in Europe it was a continual 
struggle; if I told the Shah he must smile at a 
wedding someone was sure to tell him it was his 
duty to cry".
Spring' Rice noted on this occasion that "the Shah listens to every
accusation against his chief Minister and attends to no suggestion for
general reform. The whole energies of the Ministers are taken up in
68
mutual intrigues for each other’s destruction". Again this was not 
a new situation in Persia’s history; but what was needed in the reign 
of Muzaffar al-Din was an improvement in the conduct of the affairs of 
state, not a further deterioration„
As well as absorbing the time and energies of high officials, 
intrigues at court had other harmful effects on the quality of government. 
This was not least because appointments were regarded as a means of 
securing and extending influence, and therefore the question of who was 
selected for a particular post depended less on qualifications, experience 
and suitability than on the outcome of some often quite remote intrigue. 
The fact that appointments were made on this basis - and that such 
intrigues were frequently prolonged, with temporary victory being 
achieved by rival parties - meant that tenure of office was often brief. 
Therefore the possibility of achieving stable administration, let alone 
that of implementing sustained reforms, was greatly diminished.
6 8 . F.O. 60:636. Spring. RiGgt to Lansdowne, No.7, 9 January 1901.
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A further harmful consequence of appointment by intrigue was that
holders of office were known to be the proteges of greater personages,
and therefore any reform which required the active co-operation of a
particular official for its success usually had to gain the prior
approval of the superior official through whose influence the appointment
had been gained,, All of these circumstances militated against any
improvement in the government of the country. One example of the harm
which could be caused under such circumstances can be seen in an episode
in the career of \yn al-Dawla. In order to increase his influence at
court Amin al-Sultan sought in the early months of 1899 to have cAyn
al-Dawla, one of Hakim al-MulkTs strongest supporters, removed from
Tehran. He was able to persuade Muzaffar al-Din to appoint CAyn al-Dawla
as Governor-General of *Arabistan - a province that was remote and
69
currently turbulent. Hakim al-Mulk immediately set to work to have 
his protegts recalled to the capital, and he succeeded in this aim in 
May 1900P In March of the following year Hakim al-Mulk was able to 
secure for ^ yn al-Dawla the post of Governor of Tehran. The serious 
implications of these machinations became obvious at the end of 1901 
when Naus was trying to begin to reform the taxation system by introducing 
new and more accurate assessments of the revenues of each province. Naus 
told Hardinge that he had decided that the process should start in the 
capital because it would be easier for the Belgian experts to exercise 
close supervision there; but when the plan was put before Amin al-Sultan 
there was much procrastination on the part of that Minister. Naus
69. F.O. 60:608. Durand to Salisbury, 3 May 1899.
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discovered that this was because Amin al-Sult&n did not wish in any way
to antagonise cAyn al-Dawla at that time as he was trying to win him away
70
from the Hakim al-MulkTs group0 Under such circumstances the plan for 
tax reform was to all intents and purposes abandoned in Tehran*
The fact that officials were not infrequently known to have been 
appointed as a result of intrigues gave rise to resentment and criticism 
within Persia, and this was exacerbated by the belief that external powers, 
notably Russia and Britain, were also involved in the machinations. When 
the very highest officials in the land felt that they needed the 
protection, or at least the support, of a foreign government, then yet 
another obstacle had been placed in the way of reform; for such 
officials were reluctant to proceed with policies which they believed 
the external powers would not approve. In the second issue of Lisan al- 
Haqq Amin al-Sultan was accused of cherishing the desires of Russia above
those of his own country and of preparing the way for the total subjection
71 . . .
of Persia to Russia. Another broadsheet also accused him of being in
league with the Russian government, of plotting with the Armenian
community, and of conspiring to hide large quantities of weapons in
72
Armenian churches, as a prelude to the Russian conquest of Persia.
It is difficult to make a firm judgment about the extent to which
Amin al-SultUn was pro-Russian. His sentiments were probably more in
that direction than they were pro-British; but Hardinge?s view was that
he was certainly not as pro-Russian as the authors of the broadsheets
73
wanted their readers to believe. The changing circumstances at Court
70. F.Oo 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 4 February 1902.
71. F.Oo 60:637. Enclosure No *2 in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.124,
Confidential, 18 August 1901.
72. F.O. 60:637o Enclosure No,3 in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No0124,
Confidential, 18 August 1901 <>
73. F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.19, 4 February 1902.
4 a
were doubtless responsible in large part for the extent to which the
Amin al-Sultan showed either pro-Russian or pro-British sympathies.
The most difficult issue concerned foreign loans. Newell, the Manager
of the Imperial Bank in Tehran, gave an accurate summary of the situation
which existed in the latter months of 1901 when the proceeds of the
first Russian loan were all but exhausted. On the one hand a loan was
needed to satisfy the Shah’s wish to travel, to meet the greed of some
of the courtiers, and to pay some of the arrears of salaries owed to
the army and the bureaucracy. On the other hand, Amin al-Sultan was
well aware that the previous loan had aroused great opposition,
particularly from the religious leaders, and that that opposition had
been directed at him personally. Not to raise a loan would mean loss
of office, with potentially very harsh consequences; while to secure
a further Russian loan would cause even greater condemnation of him
by a very influential section of the population. Amin al-Sultan also
knew that Russia’s terms for a new loan would be even more unpopular
than the previous ones had been. The only way he could possibly hedge
his bets was to seek an English loan - but this too would arouse 
. . 74
opposition. In the event, A m m  al-Sultan was compelled to accept a
loan from Russia, and although the amount was less than half that of
the 1900 transaction, the opposition to it was more serious. Resentment 
at foreign influence in the affairs of Persia did not begin during the 
reign of Muzaffar al-Din. It had been an important feature of the 
protest movement against the Tobacco R^gie in 1891/92; but under Muzaffar 
al-Din the granting of more concessions, the increasing number of foreign 
loans, and the employment of Belgian officials greatly exacerbated this 
cause of discontent.
74. F.O. 60:643. Griffin to Sanderson, ho number (London) 20 September 
1901. This letter contains the information from Newell in Tehran.
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It was not only in the matter of loans, however, that Anglo- 
Russian rivalry increased the political difficulties facing the government. 
Amin al-Sultiln knew that if he took any action which was unpopular then 
unscrupulous rivals had the opportunity to arouse opposition to it by 
saying that the Minister had done what he had done at the behest of a 
foreign power, or with the interests of a foreign power rather than those 
of Persia in mind. Suspicion of British and Russian aims and motives 
was sufficiently widespread to provide a ready-made basis for opposition 
to almost any action taken by the government; whether that action was 
undertaken in response to an immediate incident or in support of a long­
term programme of reform.
In February 1901 a mulla incited a crowd in the Tehran bazaar to 
attack Jewish and Armenian property and Amin al-Sultan ordered that 
troops should be used to restore law and order,, The incident was a 
small one, but Hakim al-Mulk was quick to take advantage of it to harm 
Amin al-Sultan’s relations with the Shah by saying that the Sadr-i A^zamQ * •
had ordered the deployment of soldiers in the hope of securing foreign
intervention; and that the foreign power which had been given the excuse
„ 75
to intervene would then reward Amin al-Sultan, That such accusations
could be made— and made with a realistic hope of their belief, that such 
suspicions could be harboured, and such deceptions practised, provides 
further evidence of the difficulties facing the government in the conduct 
of affairs of state.
The depth of suspicion about the intentions and activities of the 
British and Russian governments in Persia did more than just increase 
the difficulties in the way of firm and decisive administration; it also
75. F.O.60:638. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.51, Telegraphic, 9 September 
1901. (The incident took place during Ramadan.)
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served to distract attention from indigenous causes of decay. Such 
were the origins of a notable feature in Persia’s history later in 
the twentieth century - a tendency to blame foreign governments, 
particularly the British - for many of the ills which have afflicted 
the country.
There are three other aspects of administrative decay under the
reign of Muzaffar al-Din which need to be considered. The first of
these was the recourse to the selling of offices, a not unfamiliar
practice in earlier times. When Muzaffar al-Din came to the throne
the selling of provincial governorships was stopped, but shortage of
76
revenue caused the practice to be revived within two years. It was
not, however, the re-introduction of this custom which did the harm so
much as the circumstances of its renewal. If the purchaser of an office
could be sure of government support, particularly with regard to the
provision of troops for maintaining security, and if his tenure of
office was sufficiently lengthy for him to have an interest in the
continuing prosperity of his province and its population; then
governors who purchased their posts were no less likely to administer
their areas well than those appointed in other ways.
Under Muzaffar al-Din neither of these conditions prevailed. In
the first place the means of maintaining security were sadly deficient
and governors were reluctant to accept posts in turbulent areas.Irt
Nizam al-Saltana was reported to have paid some 80,000 tumans (equivalent
to approximately £16,000) to the Shah and to Amin al-Sultan not to be sent
77to a remote and troublesome province. In the second place as less and
76. F.O. 60:608. Durand to Salisbury, No.16, 12 February 1899.
77. F.O. 60:636. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.95, Confidential, 24 June 
1901. The report does not name the province - but the post of 
Governor-General of &rabist1fn.was vacant at that time.
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less revenue reached the central treasury the rate at which offices
were sold rose sharply, and this in turn meant that governors were
left with a much shorter period of time to recoup their outlay for the
78
purchase of office and to make a profit. The intensity of rivalries
at Court and the use of appointments as a weapon in those struggles also
tended to increase the frequency with which posts were changed. The
fact that Muzaffar al-Din1 s health was known to be fragile, and that
the Valleahd's followers would seek a redistribution of lucrative posts
on the death of the Shah, decreased still further any sense of security
of tenure. This again meant that the pressure became ever greater to
amass money as rapidly as possible, and few governors gave much attention
to the long-term prosperity of their provinces. To reimburse themselves
for the cost of their offices, and to make a profit, the governors often
sought to extract money from the rich and then left them in turn to make
7 9 ,
good their losses from weaker members of society.
Prospective governors not only paid for new posts, or to avoid 
unpopular appointments, they sometimes offered money to the Shah to 
postpone loss of office or to prevent a recall to Tehran. Much depended 
upon the conditions prevailing in the particular province. Posts in 
turbulent areas were by no means as popular as those in provinces which 
were lucrative and relatively quiet. One such was Khurasan and in 1901 
there was intense rivalry for the Governor-Generalship. The office was 
held by Nayyir al-Dawla and the two men seeking the post were Asaf al-Dawla
78. F.O. 60:636. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.78, Confidential, 20 April 1901.
79. F.O. 60:636. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.78, Confidential, 20 April 1901. 
Al-GhazAli had observed some eight centuries earlier the likely effects 
of weak rule: "If, God forbid, the Sultan in their midst were weak,
universal ruin would befall the religion and the [whole] lower world; 
for a century, say, of unjust rule by Sultans will not cause so much 
damage as one hour of the injustice of subjects to one another". 
Ghazffll^s Book of Counsel for Kings (Nagifoat al-Muluk), translated 
by F.R.C. Bagley, London, 1971, p.77.
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and Ayn al-Mulk - followers respectively of Amin al-Sultan and Hakim
al-Mulk. cAyn al-Mulk is reported to have offered 140,000 tumans for 
the post, while Asaf al-Dawla tried to cause disturbances in Mashhad 
against the incumbent governor to have him removed. Nayyir al-Dawla 
was aware of these plots against him, and he paid part of the arrears
of revenue which were owing to the Shah in a successful attempt to
, . , , 80 retain his job.
At the same time Hakim al-Mulk and Amin al-Sultan were both
endeavouring to secure the Governorship of Slstan and Tabas for one
of their proteges; but the incumbent official Hashmat al-Mulk was able
to retain office from 1901 to 1904 by sending regular gifts to the Shah
and to Amin al-Sultan. In this particular case there was foreign
involvement; for Hardinge provided discreet support for Hashmat al-Mulk
because his was a sensitive border province where there were disputes
concerning water rights between Persia and Afghanistan, and British
officials were trying to reach a settlement. It was HardingeTs view
that if Hashmat al-Mulk was to lose office, the post would probably pass
to his brother, Shawkat al-Mulk, and there were suspicions that he might
81
be pro-Russian in his inclinations.
It was not only governors who provided money when changes of 
appointment were about to be made. In 1905 Salar al-Dawla was appointed 
Governor-General of Kirmanshah, his reputation for cruelty and oppression
80. F.0. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.49, 18 March 1902. In
1903 Nayyir al-Dawla did lose office partly as a result of 
disturbances in Mashhad but there is no evidence to indicate that 
these riots were encouraged by rivals for his appointment.
81. See Hashmat al-Mulk in Biographical Notices of Persian Statesmen 
and Notables August 1905, compiled by G.P. Churchill, Calcutta, 
Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 1906, 
p.25.
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went before him, and the leading citizens of Kirmanshah immediately
sent a cable to Muzaffar al-Din offering to pay 3000 tumans if His
82
Majesty would kindly appoint someone else. The ploy did not succeed.
A second aspect of administrative decay - a growth in the levying 
of extra-ordinary taxes - stems from the lack of security in the tenure 
of office, and from the inability of Tehran to exercise effective central 
control. Such taxes were generally imposed by officials seeking quickly 
to recoup the expenditures needed to gain appointment^and to make the 
expected degree of profit. If continued tenure of office was uncertain, 
speed was essential. When Sykes returned to Persia early in 1903 after 
an absence of three years, he drew attention to the decline in the 
standards of provincial government which had taken place in the south­
east of the countryo He quoted a recent example of extortion in Kirman, 
where the Governor had been ordered to make a special payment of some £20 
to Tehran to celebrate the fact that the Shah had had the good fortune 
to shoot a leopard. The Governor had immediately ordered that the owner 
of a wine shop should be seized and imprisoned until he paid a fine of 
£20. In Sykes’ telling phrase, Persia had been like a lemon being
squeezed by hand, now she resembled that same fruit about to be placed
- 83rn a lemon press.
In conclusion then it is fair to say that administrative decline 
reached serious proportions during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din. Many 
of the causes of this were no-fc new, but in almost all respects matters 
got much worse during that period. What was happening was that the 
government was not fulfilling its essential task - that of providing
82. F.0. 248:866. Grant Duff to Gray, No.ll, 4 January 1906.
83. F.0. 60:665. Enclosure No.l (Sykes to Hardinge, 23 February 1903) 
in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.37, 12 March 1903.
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conditions in which the Muslim could lead the good religious life.
The reasons why these conditions were not being maintained were many 
and varied, but it was the failure to provide them that lay at the 
heart of the discontent which was so widespread in Persia.
Tradition demanded personal supervision of affairs by the Shah 
as one of the essential qualities for that office. Muzaffar al-Din was 
neither physically able, nor had he either the experience or the 
inclination, to exercise the necessary degree of control. He was 
vacillating and weak at a time when resolution and strength were needed. 
The defects which characterised the Qajar administrative system were 
many - tendencies to intrigue, to rivalry, to corruption - these were 
not new and even a strong Shah could face serious difficulties, A weak 
Shah who, by default, allowed such tendencies to grow unchecked was in 
effect helping to sow the seeds of his own destruction. The protests in 
Persia\V0^g Nothin essence, directed against the system of government 
so much as against the failure of that system to maintain the necessary 
conditions of peace, security and justice. An effective^traditional 
system of rule which, under a strong Shah, would have met those 
requirements, might have been able to survive; but the administration 
of Muzaffar al-Din was incapable of meeting the demands made upon it.
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CHAPTER III 
THE CONDITION OF THE ARMY
"Keep your troops always contented and if you wish them not 
to grudge their lives on your behalf do not grudge them food."
A Mirror for Princes:
The Qabus Nama
by Kai Ka\5s Ibn Iskandar.
Translated from the Persian
by R. Levy. New York 1951, p.221.
The writings of European travellers who visited Persia during the 
reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah show great diversity, but almost all 
those books share three common features: complaints about the
insecurity and hardships of internal travel, a sense of wonderment at 
the beauty of the mosques (particularly those in Isfahan), and reports 
of the miserable plight of soldiers and road guards throughout the 
country0* The first and third of those matters are related, and the 
fact that security along the roads was so bad is in great part explained 
by the poor state of the troops. The issues to be considered in this
1. Although the descriptions of travellers are graphic, they were not 
always skilled observers of military matters. The fact that Persia 
was an area of political rivalry between Great Britain and Russia 
meant that both governments took considerable care to keep themselves 
informed about military affairs within Persia - and to do so by 
using trained expert observers0 The reports of the various British 
Military Attaches in Tehran have been invaluable in this study, so 
too have some of the consular reports, for it should be remembered 
that the posts which were staffed from India were usually in the 
charge of men who had had professional military training and 
considerable experience of army matters. On several occasions the 
British Military Attache established a good professional relationship 
with the Russian commanding the Cossack Bridgade, and 
men - in particular Kossagowski and Chernozaboff' - seem to have been 
very willing to allow the British Attach^ to visit the Cossack 
Brigade and to discuss the state of the Persian army in*general.
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chapter are the size of the Persian army, its equipment and training, 
its morale and effectiveness; the enquiry also includes a separate 
examination of the state of the Cossack Brigade under Muzaffar al-Din.
One of the most frequent comments by European travellers concerns 
the small number of men who appeared to be available for the task of 
maintaining security. This impression was certainly an accurate one 
and it is substantiated by the figures given in a detailed and 
valuable report on the Persian army which was drawn up in January 1900 
by the British Military Attache in Tehran, Lieutenant-Colonel H.P. Picot. 
In that report there are three categories used in discussing the 
number of men in the Persian army. The first is the nominal strength, 
or the numbers which should exist according to the official government 
list. The second figure, somewhat misleadingly called the effective 
strength, concerns the number of men actually on the rolls of the various 
branches of the army - but the majority of them in fact were not 
serving. The third category refers to the actual strength under arms - 
men who were believed to be present with their regiments. The figures 
are given below, and in brackets alongside them are some broadly 
comparable figures given by Curzon for the state of the Persian army 
in 1891.4
2. The Cossack Brigade is worthy of separate treatment for it was 
the only unit in the Persian army to have been successfully 
established on European lines and to be officered by foreign 
nationals. It was small, but its importance was much greater than 
its size, and it had been responsible for maintaining law and order 
in Tehran from the death of NSsir al-Din until the accession of 
Muzaffar al-Din.
3. A Report on the Persian Army by Lieutenant-Colonel H.P. Picot, 
Secret and Confidential, January 1900. Copy in F.0. 881:7364. 
Enclosure in Durand to Salisbury, No.l, 18 January 1900. After­
wards cited as Picot Report.
4. G.N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, London 1892 I, 
pp.590-91. A direct comparison is not possible in all cases.
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Picot (1899/1900)Infantry ________
Nominal strength (79 regiments) 78,500
Effective strength (maximum) 35,000
Number actually serving 10,700




Cavalry (excluding the Cossack
Brigade)
Nominal strength 






















5. Picot Report, pp.105-7.
6 . Ibid.„ pp. 106-7 and 117.
7. Ibid. , pp.124-5.
8 . Ibid., pp.106-7 and 130-2.
In addition to the artillery units discussed above, Picot also 
refers to the existence of the camel corps which comprised some 
40 to 50 camels and old swivel guns. The corps was "quite 
obsolete and useless". (Picot Report, p.138.) Curzon 
believed that the corps had an effective strength of 80 men, and 
that it had 164 guns, but he did not give a figure for the number 
of men in the corps who were under arms. (G.N. Curzon, op.cit., 
p.590.)
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At first sight there does not seem to be much difference in 
the total numbers of men under arms in 1891 and 1899, the decline 
apparently being from 14,800 to 13,600. However, this simple 
comparison may be misleading for Curzon refers to the existence of 
some 2,000 militia in 1890 (though they are not included in his foot­
note for 1891, which seems to refer only to infantry and artillery). 
Picot states that the number of militiamen was insignificant in 1899 and
that regular troops and members of the Cossack Brigade now undertook
. . .  9
the guard duties which had earlier been performed by the militia.
If the 2,000 men are added to Curzon’s total (of 14,800) then the 
decline during the following 8 years amounted to some 3,200 men - or 
a reduction of about one fifth - in the total number of men under arms. 
It seems clear from the above table that regardless of what happened 
to the militia, the artillery forces did suffer a sharp decline in 
the 8 year period between the two reports.
Curzon makes it very clear that the Persian army was in"a poor 
condition in 1891, and it seems to have got worse by 1899 when Picot 
drew up his report. Unfortunately there is no comprehensive survey 
of the whole army available again before the death of Muzaffar al-Din, 
but, as will be seen, other evidence points to even greater decline 
after 1900. In brief it seems fair to say that although the Persian 
army was in a poor condition on the accession to power of Muzaffar al- 
Dln, that monarch did nothing to halt the decline which had already set 
in; and almost certainly the army was in an appreciably worse 
condition at the end, than at the beginning, of his reign.
9. Picot Report, p.138, and G.N. Curzon, op.citX, p.590.
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The results of the very great gap between effective strength and 
actual strength were to be seen through the rule of Muzaffar al-Din 
Shah; and there is not a single year of it that is without British 
consular reports of a shortage of troops in at least one province.
Over the reign as a whole every province seems to have suffered 
from this at one time or another. In some provinces - such as SistTan - 
the shortage seems to have persisted, and indeed to have got worse, 
throughout the reign. In other provinces the situation changed as 
strong governors succeeded weak ones;^ and as temporary military forces 
were collected for brief campaigns which were designed either to 
collect revenues or, less frequently, to try to suppress disorders 
on the border with Turkey. The following representative reports 
indicate how serious the situation was in certain provinces at 
particular times„
In 1898 the Governor of Isfahan, Zill al-Sultan, had less than 
400 men available to maintain security in the city and its immediate 
environs. There should have been 2 regiments of infantry (each of 
1,000 men) and 500 cavalry stationed in Isfahan.^ The following year 
there were only 200 soldiers in the city, and the Governor admitted that 
he could not maintain security even on the most important roads in his
10. See for example the discussion in Chapter Vf on Affairs in Tars, 
where it is seen that some Governors did provide better conditions 
for the troops and that security in the province usually improved 
as a resulto Even Tehran was on occasion short of troops, but 
the Cossack Brigade was stationed there and it was able to 
maintain a fair measure of law and order in the capital.
11. F.0. 248:676. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.8 , 9 April 1898„
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province - those to Tehran, to Yazd and to Shiraz. in October 1899
the Governor of Qazvin had only 5 soldiers at his disposal, and when
. . 13
an anti-Armenian riot broke out all 6 men rapidly went into hiding.
In that same year Sykes returned to make a tour of Sistan after
an absence of 6 years from that province, and he reported that all
the garrisons which he had previously visited were now manned by far 
14fewer troops. One of the regiments which he had seen there before -
the Birjand regiment - now existed only on paper.^ Sykes pointed to
one of the most important reasons for the decline in the numbers of
troops actually under arms when he explained that the few cavalry who
remained at Nasratabad were refusing to act as escorts for the caravans
16
to Bam because they had not been paid. Other evidence shows that in
1899 there were less than 300 troops stationed in Sistan when there
17should have been at least 1,600 in the province.
12. F.0. 248:699. Preece to Hardinge, No.l, 23 January 1898, and
Preece to Hardinge, No.9, 26 February 1898. There is no evidence 
of any consistent improvement in the size of the forces at the 
disposal of Zill al-Sultan throughout the rest of Muzaffar al-Din 
Shah’s reign. Picot's Report put the total number of troops in the 
province at 550 in 1899 - consisting of 400 infantry, 100 cavalry and 
50 artillery (Report p.107). The British Consul made an extensive 
tour of the Bakhtiyari country in the early summer of 1902 and he 
estimated that the chiefs of that tribe could put into the field
a force of some 15,000 armed men of which one third could be mounted. 
The ilkhani of the tribe, Isfandiyar Khan, had attended a review of 
the Cossack Brigade in Tehran and he told Preece, rather boastfully, 
that with 500 of his own picked men he "could do what he liked with 
the Cossacks", F.0o 60:651, Enclosure in Des Graz to Lansdowne,
No.l14 Confidential, 11 August 1902.
13. F.0. 60:609. Enclosure in Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.99,
17 October 1899.
14. F.0. 60:648. Sykes to Salisbury, No.l, 11 January 1899.
15. F.0. 60:612. Sykes to Salisbury, No.7, 11 May 1899.
16. F.0. 60:612. Sykes to Salisbury, No.12, 18 December 1899.
17. Picot Report, pp„106-7.
53
Sykes returned to the south-east of Persia in 1903 and he noted
that there had been a further decline during his second absence, and
- c
that, for example, the caravans on the road from Kirman to Bandar Abbas,
which had previously been regarded as safe, were now under constant
18
threat from Bashakirdi tribesmen. Again Sykes drew attention to a very 
important, and not uncommon, feature of the situation when he noted 
(someeighteen months later) that although less than half the proper 
number of road guards were employed in his province, the Governor of
Kirman continued to draw sufficient money to pay the full complement of
. . . 1 9
men; and that he and other officials pocketed the difference.
In the course of a long report written in February 1899 comparing
current conditions with those which had prevailed in 1895 the British
Minister in Tehran noted that whole regiments in the array had simply
disbanded themselves during the intervening four years because of lack 
20of pay — —  . this process was to continue for the rest of Muzaffar al-
Din’s Shah’s reign. In May 1904, the Commander-in-Chief of the Persian
army visited Mashhad and he ordered a parade of the troops stationed in
the city. As none of them had been paid most had returned home; the
Governor instead gathered together a number of townsmen and quickly put them
21
into uniform so that a parade could be held. In December 1905, the 
Governor of Yazd had only 40 soldiers available to maintain law and order 
in a town of some 60,000 people, and when demonstrations were held
2
against the Christian school there he found it impossible to repress them.
18. F.0. 60:665. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.37, 12 March 1903.
19. F.0. 248:820. Sykes to Hardinge, No.62, I September 1904.
20. F.0. 60:608. Durand to Salisbury, No.16, 12 February 1899.
21. F.0. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.92, 24 May 1904. The men were
given 2 qirans for the day of the parade, but the deception was 
discovered by the Commander-in-Chief, and the Colonel in charge of the 
troops was arrested. He had to pay 2,000 tumans for his release.
22. F.0. 248:845. Baggaley (Yazd) to Preece, No.16, 12 December 1905.
The shortage of troops, particularly in turbulent provinces, meant
that newly-appointed governors were sometimes reluctant to proceed to
—  c , -
their posts. In the summer of 1899 the new governors of Fars and Arabistan
both took detachments of soldiers from the Cossack Brigade with them as
23
personal guards when they left Tehran to assume office. In that same year
Nizam al-Saltana offered a sum equivalent to £14,000 not to be appointed 
• •
as the Vazir of Azarbayjan because that province was so turbulent and
24 c -
there were so few troops there. In December 1901 Ala al-Mulk, who had
recently returned from Turkey, was appointed Governor of Baluchistan and
Kirman. .When he was informed of conditions in that region, he refused
to leave Tehran for his new post until he had received funds with which
25
to pay the rebellious soldiers there.
The fact that so few troops were available, and that they were so 
infrequently paid meant that provincial governors sometimes had to resort 
to a number of devices in order to maintain any kind of law and order.
One of these involved the temporary raising of a local irregular force to
26 c
accomplish a specific task. This technique was used by Ayn al-Dawla
- 27
m  1899 to collect arrears of revenue m  Luristan. In February 1902
the Governor of Astarabad, whose troops were without rifles, raised an
irregular force of.some 2,000 to 3,000 armed tribesmen, including many
Kurds, to inflict a defeat on Turkoman groups who had been causing trouble 
— 28
near Bujnurd. The victory, however, was short-lived and raiding was
29
again 'prevalent in the area within a year. During disturbances
23. F.0. 60:610. Durand to Salisbury, Telegraphic No.50, 7 August 1899.
24. F.0. 60:608, Durand to Salisbury, No.35, 3rd April 1899.
25. F.0. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No<>J92, 11 December 1901.
26. This was by no means an innovation in the history of Persia.
27. Picot Report, p o106,
28. F.0. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.40, 4 March 1902.
29. F.0. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.78, Confidential, 26 May 1903.
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against the Belgian Customs administration in Tabriz in the summer of 
1903 to Valicahd sought military help from Rahim Khan, a leader of the 
Qaradagh tribe, who had previously been - and who was subsequently to 
return to being - a notorious brigand.^
Local governors usually had to borrow money to pay for such 
temporary forces. In November 1901 the Valiahd obtained a loan of 
some £50,000 from the Imperial Bank to meet the cost of an expedition 
by a temporary irregular force against tribesmen who were raiding to the
- 31 . . .
north of Tabriz. In June 1903 at the time of serious disturbances 
against the Babis in Yazd the Governor of Isfahan, Zill al-Sultan, was
» » i
ordered to proceed to that town with troops to restore order. He too
had to borrow money to pay the irregular force which he had to raise
32 . . .
to accomplish the taskD On occasion money alone succeeded m  achieving
the desired objective without the use of force„ In September 1901 a
group of Baluchis who had seized the fort at Minab could not be expelled
as the local governor had no troops available, neither could he raise a
temporary force. His solution was to pay the rebels to hand back the
33
fort to the proper authorities„
30. F.0. 60:666. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.101, Secret and
Confidential, 6 July 1903. Rahim Khan had been captured by a ruse in
the autumn of 1902 and had been held in prison in Tabriz, He was 
released in June 1903 to take charge of an irregular force of 
cavalry raised by the Valicahd to restore order in the city. Most of 
the regular troops had not been paid and had disbanded themselves.
(F.0. 60:666 Stevens (Tabriz)to Hardinge, No.7, Secret and Confidential, 
25 June 1903.) The British Consul in Tabriz described how, in 1904, 
the local authorities lacked the troops necessary to punish the 
Begzadeh Kurds who had been responsible for the murder of Mr. Labaree,
an American missionary working at Uriimiyya. The leaders of the tribe
were ultimately captured by trickery. (A.C. Wratislaw, A Consul in 
the East, London 1924, pp.191-203.)
31. F.0. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.192, 11 December 1901.
32. F.0. 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Noo101, Secret and Confidential,
6 July 1903.
33. F.0. 60 637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.142, 19 September 1901.
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Examples of the recognition of weakness by local officials also
occurred in ^Arabistan in the spring of 1903, and again in the autumn of 1905.
On both occasions the Governor of the province was ordered to recover
v 34
arrears of taxation which were owed by the Bani Turuf tribte. On neither
occasion did the Governor have more than 850 men at his disposal for the
whole of that unruly province, and because of the hostility of the local
t  . 35
Arab population, no troops were stationed south of Band-i Qir m  1905.
What each of the Governors did was to seek the assistance of Shaykh Khazcal
of Muhammara for he could call upon nearly 16,000 armed followers from among 
36
various tribes. The Shaykh was certainly willing to provide such help; for the
Bani Turuf had previously refused to pay their taxes through him, and he was
37 . . .keen to show them the error of their ways. By assisting m  the successful
recovery of taxes by the local Governor, Shaykh Khazcal was able both to
assert his influence and to gain concessions from Tehran over the way in
38
which the Belgian customs officials were operating in Muhammara. On the
second occasion the Belgians were ordered no longer to concern themselves in
v any way with the Shaykh’s export trade in dates. That trade was considerable
«
and lucrative, and Shaykh Khaz al had tried on numerous occasions to prevent
39the Belgians from being involved with it.
34. F.0.60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.26, 3 March 1903, and F.0.60:700. 
Giant Duff to Lansdowne, No.207, 12 September 1905. In 1905 the 
expedition sent against the Bani Turuf oomprised some 2,000 armed men and 
it would appear that Shaykh Khazcal's followers made up a higher percentage 
of the force than they had in 1903. (F.0.371:105, India Office to 
Foreign Office, Document number 3074, 25 January 1906.)
35. F.0. 416:17. Enclosure in India Office to Foreign Office, 26 April 1904.
36. F.0. 60:651. Enclosure in Des Graz to Lansdowne, No.100, 18 July 1902.
The number quoted was 15,725 men, and this figure excluded tribes in 
the areas of Shushtar and Dizful.
37. F.0.248:843. Cox to Hardinge, No.74, 16 June 1905. The Bani Turuf were
reluctant to pay their taxes through Shaykh Khazeal for that would have
been tantamount to recognizing his authority over them.
38. F.0.60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.65, 28 April 1903.
39. F.0.248:842. Persian Gulf Diary, 29 December 1905. The Belgians had
already been instructed not to tax the export of dates, but they tried
to collect statistics on the trade and Khazcal wanted to prevent that too.
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With regard to the defence of Persia’s territorial integrity also,
the army under Muzaffar al-Din was inadequate. Two examples will serve
to indicate the extent of that weakness. In the summer of 1900 there
were a series of incidents on the central section of the border with
the Ottoman Empire around Mandali. One of them began with a dispute
about a water supply which was shared by an Ottoman and a Persian village.
40
The quarrel resulted m  a brief Turkish invasion of Persian territory.
When the British Military Attachd discussed the matter with the Russian 
Commander of the Cossack Brigade, Kossagowski, the latter said that there 
were insufficient Persian forces to maintain surveillance of the western 
border; and that the government relied on the temporary recruitment of 
local irregular tribal forces if it needed soldiers in a particular area. 
It was the Russian’s view that reliance on such ad hoc forces was 
extremely dangerous for they were very difficult to control, and they 
served only to provoke the Ottoman authorities who did have regular troops 
at their disposal. According to Kossagowski, there could be no hope of 
securing Persia's frontiers until the frontier tribes were brought under 
control.
In 1905 there were more incidents on the border with the Ottoman 
empire, this time in the area near Lahijan, to the west of Sawj Bulagh.
The immediate cause of the trouble on this occasion was the building of 
a new customs post on the orders of Belgian officials. The Ottoman 
authorities argued that the post was in their territory, and a small group
40. F.0. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.84, 21 August 1900.
41. F.0. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.86, 23 August 1900.
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of Turkish soldiers arrived and demolished it. The local Kurdish
tribesmen were, according to the British Consul in Tabriz, Sunni Muslims
- 43
and they welcomed any extension m  the domain of the Sultans
Those Kurds had, earlier in the year, caused much trouble for the 
local Persian authorities by their raids; and the government in Tehran 
had endeavoured to subdue them by using an irregular forms of Qara Papakh
"(j—
cavalry. (The Qara Papakh were Shi is.) That cavalry force had,
however, been too small to deal effectively with the Kurds, and the
result was that the situation in the area remained very dangerous and
45
insecure for many months as raids and counter-raids persisted. The
Turkish force which had demolished the customs post remained in the area
for some months, and the Persian government was not able to re-establish 
• * A6 ♦ •its authority there. Such border incidents were not, of course, a new
feature in the history of Persia; but Muzaffar al-Din’s failure to defend
Persian territory undoubtedly increased the sense of discontent within the 
47country.
42. F.0. 60:7000 Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.223, 11 October 1905.
43. F.0. 60:700. Wratislaw to Grant Duff, No.46, 10 October 1905.
44. F.0. 60:700. Wratislaw to Grant Duff, No.46, 10 October 1905.
45. M. Jewett, My Life in Persia, Cedar Rapids 1909, pp.150-1.
46. F.0. 248:866, Grant Duff to Grey, No.ll, 4 January 1906.
47. The inability of the Shah to defend the frontier against the 
Turkish incursion of 1905 was bitterly criticised by the Persian 
language newspaper Habl a1-Matin, which was published in Calcutta 
(F.0. 371:114, IndiA Office to Foreign Office, Document number 30314,
4 July 1906). There are several consular diaries which show that 
the paper had an extensive circulation in Persia, though it was 
officially banned. The British Consul in Mashhad noted in February 
1901 that the post office authorities were under orders to confiscate
any copies of Hab1 al-Matin which arrived in the mail, but he also
remarked that it was "more widely circulated than any other news­
paper in Khoras’an" (F.0. 60:642, Meshed Diary, 1 March 1901). In 
September 1904 Hardinge observed that Habl al-Matfn is "extensively 
read in this country", and that it was virtually in free circulation 
(F.0. 60:683, Hardinge to Lansdowne, Confidential No.174, 11 September 
1904). For fuller details of the general nature, importance and 
contents of Persian language newspapers of the time, see E.G. Browne 
The Press and Poetry of M o d e m  Persia, Cambridge 1914.
The fact that the Persian army was under-manned was certainly
known to the authorities in Tehran. Amin al-Sultan told Hardinge in
March 1903 that he was well aware that the real strength of the army
was much less than half the official figure. His wish was to compel
those responsible for the regiments either to maintain their forces at
full strength, or to disband them once and for all. He cited a case in
which he had written to summon a regiment from Azarbayjan to Tehran only
to discover that, although full pay was still being drawn by the
commanding officer, the regiment had virtually been disbanded and the
troops who were still on the regimental roll were in fact working as
labourers. When the summons to the capital city arrived, the commanding
officer had bribed the Vali*khd in Tabriz to tell the Shah that the
regiment could not possibly be spared from its vital task of defending
48
the Turkish frontier. In the same despatch Hardinge reported that a
similar set of circumstances had been reported from Qa m  m  eastern
Persia, where a commanding officer was drawing pay for some 800 men, but
49he was able to muster only 150.
In seeking the causes of the plight of the Persian army under 
Muzaffar al-Din Shah, several contemporary observers rightly draw 
attention to the central issues of the inadequate provision of funds, and 
of very poor standards of financial control which prevailed. Lack of 
money meant that m o d e m  equipment was not purchased; while failure to 
supervise the administration of such funds as were available meant that 
fraud could flourish, and abuses went unchecked. Both of these factors 
contributed to the persistent failure to pay the troops. But the second
48. F.0. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.41, Very Confidential, 
30 March 1903.
49. F.0. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.41, Very Confidential, 
30 March 1903.
is probably the most important, for although official levels of pay 
were inadequate, it was the fact that the proper amounts were not being 
paid promptly that gave rise to much of the prevailing sense of 
discontent.
In this respect the army shared the fate of the civilian bureaucracy; 
and its poor state reflected the general deterioration which affected 
nearly all branches of government<, The causes were often common ones; 
a failure to maintain, in good order, established systems of 
administration, an inability to prevent corruption, and to stop the 
misappropriation of funds. All these elements can be seen in the matter 
of the non-payment of the troops. In looking at the way in which the 
government sought to remedy that situation, we also see one of the 
paradoxes of Persia’s history under Muzaffar al-Din Shah: for the very
factor which exacerbated many of the difficulties facing Persia, Anglo-
Russian political rivalry, was also to make it easier to raise those loans 
which helped to stave off the total collapse of the state.
Several instances of the non-payment of troops have already been
mentioned, and many others are to be found both in consular diaries and 
in reports from other informed sources. As in the matter of shortage of 
troops, the evidence concerning arrears of pay is to be found throughout 
the whole of Muzaffar al-Din's reign; it comes from every province of
o
Persia, and it refers to every branch of the army. The greatest volume 
of evidence refers to the troops which were stationed in and around the 
capital. Conditions there can be studied in greater detail and over a 
longer period of time than those which prevailed in other parts of Persia; 
but the circumstances described below are far from being unique during the 
reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah.
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According to Rabino, the Manager of the Imperial Bank in Tehran,
non-payment of soldiers and civil servants was already a very serious
matter in May 1898, The banker emphasized that the amount needed to
settle those arrears of pay was relatively small; and that a loan of
some £1,200,000 would enable the government both to meet those immediate
commitments, and to pay off the £500,000 which had been borrowed six
years earlier to pay the compensation for the cancellation of the
50
tobacco concession. The British Minister, Durand, confirmed the
gravity of the situation which prevailed at that time when he reported
that the soldiers in Tehran were sullen and rebellious because they had
not been paid, that they were refusing to attend parades, and that the
Commander-in-Chief was afraid to venture out of his home for fear of
51
being attacked by his starving troops. By mid-July 1898, Rabino was 
sufficiently alarmed to send a telegram to his superiors at the Imperial 
Bank in London telling them that troops throughout Persia were refusing to
perform their duties, and that the situation was becoming more dangerous
52 . . .
each day. Soldiers had begun to sack food shops in the capital during
53 t  .
July, and in Tabriz the troops refused to fire on, and then quickly
54joined forces with, bread rioters m  August. During the autumn, as the
harvest came in and food prices fell, the situation became a little
55
easier, but discontent was still rife.
The reason why the decline in food prices reduced discontent in the 
ranks was that the pay of men in the infantry was divided into three 
parts - basic pay, ration allowance (jira); and home allowance (khana-Vara)
50. P.O. 60:601. Rabino to Picot, 14 May 18980
51. F.0. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.58 Telegraphic, 18 May 1898.
52. Copy of telegram, Rabino to Imperial Bank, London, 26 July 1898, in 
F.0. 60:601.
53. F.0. 60:601o Durand to Salisbury, No.91, 29 July 1898.
54. F.0. 60:598. Wood (Tabriz) to Durand. No date, but written in early
September 1898.
55. F.0. 60:608. Durand to Salisbury, No.17, 16 February 3 899.
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When he was under arms the soldier was entitled to all three payments;
the first two being received by him personally, while the home allowance
was paid to his family.^ According to Picot, when the soldier was away
from his regiment his ration allowance was no longer paid, his basic pay
was reduced by half, while the home allowance remained at its former 
57level. Curzon, however, had reported m  1891 that only the home
58
allowance was paid to the soldier who was not under arms.
In 1899 the private (sarbaz) was supposed to receive 70 qirans per
year both in basic pay and in home allowance; while his annual ration
. - 59
allowance was supposed to be paid at a rate of 91.1 qirans. There
were two basic sources of complaint by the troops; namely that all
varieties of pay were in arrears, and that the ration allowance was too
low to buy a sufficient quantity of food at prevailing prices. (Curzon
60
had noted in 1891 that home allowance was often not paid at all,
Picot, on the other hand, reported in 1899 that home allowance was paid
61
regularly, but that basic pay was often in arrears. ) The soldier was 
supposed to get one year's leave out of three, and Picot noted that 
basic pay was often not disbursed at all until the soldier was about to go 
on leave. Then he would usually receive a cash payment to the value of 
six months’ service, and he would possibly also be given a draft on the 
Governor of his native province for the balance. "Whether such orders 
are duly honoured is problematical", wrote Picot.
Complaints about arrears of basic pay are widespread and persistent, 
and the level of that pay was also a source of discontent. Houtum
56. G.N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, London 1892 I, p.598.
57. Picot Report, p.109.
58. G.N. Curzon, op.cit., p.599.
59. Picot Report, p.110.
60o G.N. Curzon, op.cit., p.598.
61. Picot Report, p.109.
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Schindler (who was responsible for the historical part of Picot's
report) stated that rates of basic pay for both officers and men had
not been increased since 1810. He estimated that the purchasing power
of money had declined by some 80 per cent over that period, so all men
serving in the infantry were getting only about one fifth of what they
62
were originally intended to receive.
A sharp decline had also taken place in the value of the ration
allowance and that was an immediate cause of discontent in the army.
According to Picot, the ration allowance of a private in 1899 (which was
paid in cash) should have enabled him to purchase half a mann, or some
6 3
3.25 pounds of wheat per day. At the prices which prevailed in Tehran
when he wrote that report the ration allowance was sufficient to purchase
only one quarter of a mann of wheat, and Picot observed that in many other
parts of the country too, the value of the ration allowance had failed to
keep pace with the rise in the price of foodstuffs. The insufficiency
of the ration allowance was in itself a source of grievance, but when it,
like basic pay, began to fall seriously into arrears, the lot of the
soldier became well nigh intolerable.
General Wagner, who had accompanied the second Austrian training
expedition to Persia in 1879-81, and who had returned to take charge of 
65
the artillery, told Durand m  January 1899 that most of the troops m
62. Picot Report, p 088.
63. Picot Report, p 0110. The mann referred to was almost certainly the
mann-i Tabriz, equivalent to 6.49 pounds (see Picot Report, p.9).
64. Picot Report, p.ll0o It would seem that soldiers in some parts of 
Persia received their ration allowance in kind and not in cash.
According to Rabino's report on Hamadan in May 1902 (Rabino to
Imperial Bank, 1 May 1902, in F.0. 60:651), a private in that town _ 
received one mann-i Tabriz of wheat per day when under arms. In Hamadan 
wheat was cheap-, while transport costs were high. According to a 
slightly later report (F.0. 60:651, Des Graz to Lansdowne, No.99,
17 July 1902), grain crops in'Hamadan were sold for one third of the 
price which they would bring in Tehran.
65. Picot Report, p.82.
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the capital had not received their basic pay for over 3 years, and that 
their ration allowance had not been distributed for 7 months.^ Many 
of the men had already gone off to seek jobs in the bazaar, and the 
officer corps was contemplating taking bast en masse in the British 
Legation.^ Matters came to a head when a regiment of troops mutinied 
and attacked their officers at a parade. The rebels then threatened to
march on the Shah’s palace, and the situation was saved only by a
“  —  68
distribution of 18,000 tumans to the mutinous regiment on January 8th.
Most of the soldiers in that regiment returned to their homes in the 
provinces as soon as they had received their share of that money, and
69
the number of soldiers under arms m  the capital declined still further. 
The example of that particular regiment was quickly noted by others in and 
around the capital, and they too threatened to rebel. On January 10th 
a sum of 35,000 tumans was paid to the men in those regiments. Picot 
observed that in both cases only a small proportion of the total arrears 
of pay which were owed to the men had been disbursed, but the distribution 
was sufficient to remove the immediate threat of insurrection.^
Discontent remained rife throughout the spring and summer of 1899, 
and the Shah was able to hold parades only after the troops who were due 
to take part in them had received further installments of their pay. The 
government had meanwhile purchased wheat supplies from Russia, and some
66. P.O. 60:608. Durand to Salisbury, No.2, 9 January 1899.
67. F.0. 60:608. Durand to Salisbury, No.2, 9 January 1899. Durand
expressed the fervent hope that he would not have to welcome such
a large, and potentially embarrassing group of guests.
68. F.0. 60:614. Picot to War Office (Intelligence Department),
10 January 1899.
69. F.0. 60:614. Picot to War Office (Intelligence Department),
10 January 1899.
70. F.O. 60:614. Picot to War Office (Intelligence Department),
10 January 1899.
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of these were sold to the troops at prices lower than those which
71prevailed on the open market. This helped to reduce the level of 
dissatisfaction in the summer and autumn, but the situation was again 
ominous when the ShahTs proposed visit to Europe was under discussion 
in December. Durand expressed the view that an essential pre'-requisite 
for that journey would be further payments to the troops in the capital,
for otherwise there would undoubtedly be great unrest during the Shah’s
72 . .
absence. When the Russian loan agreement was signed m  February 1900,
73
some of the proceeds were set on one side for the payment of the army.
In June the Commander-in-Chief received funds with which to establish
74a camp near Tehran while the Shah was abroad; but the main
responsibility for preserving law and order in the capital lay with the
Cossack Brigade; and the its Commander, Kossagowski, did not leave for
a long-promised visit to Russia until the Shah had returned safely to
. . 75
Persian soil m  September after his European visit.
During the summer of 1900, the soldiers in the camp near Tehran 
were dissatisfied because their ration allowance was again inadequate, 
and each man was paid a "gratuity" equivalent to four shillings in July.^ 
According to General Wagner the amount disbursed was less than 10 per 
cent of the sum which the Commander-in-Chief had received for the payment 
of the troops The discontent was exacerbated by the fact that grain
71. F.0. 60:608, Durand to Salisbury, No.46, 3 May 1900.
72. F . 0 ,  60:617. Durand to Salisbury, No.4, 18 January 1900.
73. F.0. 60:617. Durand to Salisbury, No.9, 5 February 1900. Some of
the proceeds were also used to meet arrears of pay owing to the 
civilian bureaucracy.
74. F.0. 60:6l7o Durand to Salisbury, No.39, 2 May 1900.
75. F.0. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No,103, 29 September 1900.
76. F.0. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.79 Secret, 25 July 1900.
The official rate of pay for a private in 1899 was equivalent to 
£1.8.0. per annum (Picot Report, p.88).
77. F.0. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.Ill, 18 October 1900.
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prices were rising because of the operation of a grain ring; and one
of the prominent members of that ring was the Commander-in-Chief 
78himself. The camp which had contained some 4,500 men in early July 
held less than 1,500 troops in early November. Inadequate accommodation
there, and the desire to gain jobs in the city bazaar, and so to earn
79
wages, had both been responsible for this decline.
In January 1901 another emergency payment had to be made to the 
troops in the capital to prevent renewed rebellion and on this occasion
too only a small proportion of the money set aside for that purpose
80
actually reached the men for whom it was intended. In early May a
large number of men from the garrison in Tehran took bast in a mosque
81
to protest about the irregularity of their pay. By July the situation
had become sufficiently serious for Rabino to grant, on his own
responsibility, and at a moment's notice, a loan equivalent to £10,000
to the government with which to pay the troops in the capital. Hardinge
commended the banker's initiative, for otherwise he believed that
82
rebellion would certainly have occurred.
When a new loan agreement was signed with Russia in April 1902, some
of the funds were again set on one side to pay off part of the arrears
83
owing to the army and the bureaucracy. This helped to keep the
situation relatively quiet throughout that year. By March 1903, when
the proceeds of that second Russian loan had been exhausted, the Shah
had to use what Hardinge called "private Palace funds" to pay the troops 
84
m  Tehran. Later that year Muzaffar al-Din had to abandon plans to
78. F.0. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.127, 12 December 1900.
79. F.0. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No. 119 Confidential",
15 November 1900.
80. F.0. 60:636. Spring Rice to Lansdowne, No.7, 9 January 1901.
81. F.Oo 60:636. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No,72, 2 May 1901,
82. F.0. 60:637, Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.112, 14 July 1901.
83. F.0. 60:650o Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.69, 16 April 1903.
84. F.0. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.26^ 3 March 1903.
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make a journey to Mashhad, for the money set aside for that journey had 
to be used to pay the soldiers in order to prevent a new insurrection 
in the capital. The Shah had to be content with a hunting trip into the 
Alburz mountains.
In the autumn of 1903 some of the soldiers in a regiment stationed 
near Tehran were ordered to go to Isfahan to help suppress the serious 
anti-Babi riots that had broken out in that city. Most of the men
86
refused to leave until they had received some of their arrears of pay,
and the man who was put in charge of the expedition, Nasr al-Saltana,
• «
also refused to set off for Isfahan until he had received money with
8 7
which to pay the troops during the proposed operation. During the
summer of 1903 the Russian Minister told his British colleague that his
government had secretly lent the Persian government a sum equivalent
to approximately £60,000 in order to pay the army, but most of the money
88
had disappeared before it had reached the troops. It was later believed 
that some of the funds had been used to pay for the hunting expedition 
into the mountains and for the pilgrimage which Muzaffar al-Din made,
i *
89
with a large entourage, to Qumm m  late November. The policy of making
temporary payments to prevent impending insurrection was repeated
throughout the rest of Muzaffar al-Din's reign, but the number of troops
in Tehran continued to decline, and by 1905 shortage of funds had begun
90
to affect even the Cossack Brigade (see below).
85. F.0. 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.107 Confidential, 21 July 1903.
86. F.0. 60:666, Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.126 Confidential, 17 August 1903.
87. The force was never sent to Isfahan for the necessary money could not
be raised by the government. F.0. 60:666, Hardinge to Lansdowne,
No.126 Confidential, 17 August 1903.
88. F.0o 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.126 Confidential, 17 August 1903.
8 9 .  FoO. 6 0 : 6 6 6 .  Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.126 Confidential, 17 August 1903,
F . 0 .  6 0 : 6 6 6 .  Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.187 ,  23 November 1903.
90. F.0. 371:105. Grant Duff to Grey, No.276, 28 December 1905.
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All attempts at reforming the army - and they were very few -
failed in the face of opposition by powerful vested interests and because
the Shah was so weak. Amin al-Sultan tried in the early months of 1903
to cut expenditure by reducing the number of people who were entitled to
91
receive pay from the army or to draw military pensions. Picot had
already observed in 1899 that, "the military budget is burdened by an
immense list of officers who bear military rank, but otherwise have no
connection with the army. On this list will be found merchants,doctors,
bankers, and servants - samples, in fact, of all classes. The sale of
rank and pay by successive commanders-in-chief, the grant of rank to the
sons of deceased officers, the patronage afforded to various individuals
92
by the governors of provinces, is responsible for this heavy charge."
Although many of those payments too were in arrears, they were
wasteful and made no contribution to the efficacy of the army. Attempts
to reduce expenditures under this heading were, of course, strongly opposed
by the people who received those payments and the Shah was easily convinced
not to support such schemes. One of the men who was believed to have
profited from the misappropriation of army funds was Amir Bahadur Jang,
the Minister of Court, and Chief of the Shah’s bodyguard. When plans for
fiscal and administrative reform were announced in 1903, that official
told Muzaffar al-Din that the Imam Husayn had appeared to him in a dream -
. 9
and had told him that the proposed reforms would be a disaster for Persia.
91. F.0. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.41 Very Confidential,
30 March 1903. , .
92. Picot Report, p.lll.
93. F.0. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No041 Very Confidential,
30 March 1903. Another courtier told the Sh5h at this time that the 
CaliphcAli had told him in a dream that the reforms would harm Persia.
At about the same time, Muzaffar al-Din himself had a dream in which he 
was saved from drowning by his astrologer. On waking the next morning 
the Sh3h ordered Amin al-Sultan to pay a lump sum and a pension to the 
astrologer for his services. The Grand Vazir was apparently not pleased 
with this further example of royal extravagance. (F.0. 60:665, Hardinge 
to Lansdowne, No.64 Confidential, 27 April 1903).
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In such a way was the Shah discouraged from pursuing them. After the
94
death of a particularly corrupt Commander-in-Chief m  January 1905,
plans were announced for the reorganisation of the army into twelve new 
95corps, but there does not seem to have been any increase m  the numbers
of men actually under arms, and the troops were certainly not better paid
96
after this reorganisation than they had been before it.
The shortage of troops has already been noted and one of the causes of thfs 
is to be found in the way in which the recruitment system was operated. According to 
Picot,'the system had changed little throughout the nineteenth century,
and had its origins in the scheme laid down by ^ Abbas Mirza and Sir Gore
97Ouseley in 1811-12. Each village, district or tribe was under the 
nominal obligation to furnish a certain number of recruits - that number 
being proportional to the local revenue assessment. (There were exceptions 
for crown land^areas and for non-Muslim Persians.) The same report notes, 
however, that the system was only partially in operation and that it had 
very little effect outside those areas from which the best soldiers were 
recruited - Azarbayjan for infantry and artillery men, and Khurasan, Fars 
and Bakhtiyari country for cavalry. In other districts, such as Yazd and
94* F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.16 Confidential, 26 January 1905.
Hardinge reported that the man in question was believed to have made a 
profit of some one million pounds sterling during his tenure of office, 
which had lasted some 8 years. On one tour of inspection in Khurasan 
he was reported to have accepted bribes worth some £20,000 not to 
report the deficiences in the army which he found to exist in that 
province (F.O. 60:682, Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.107 Confidential,
16 June 1904).
95. F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.16 Confidential, 26 January 1905.
96. See for example F.O. 248:850, Shiraz Diary, 29 September 1905, and
A.C. Wratislaw, op.cit., pp.216-26.
97. Picot Report, p*96. A similar scheme seems to have been introduced by
cAbb3s Mtrz3 in Azarbayj3n in 1806 (see A.K.S. Lambton, Landlord and
Peasant in Persia, London 1969, p.138^
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Rinnan the poor quality of the inhabitants meant that recruits were not
98
taken from those areas at all.
Picot maintained that the weakness of the system was that the revenue
assessments were often unrealistic, and a village with 500 inhabitants
would sometimes be called upon the provide the same number of recruits as
99a neighbouring settlement of only 50 people. This was largely due to
the fact that the original revenue assessments, made at the time when
C Abbas Mirza introduced the system, were often still in.force. Little
allowance had been made for subsequent changes in agricultural output,
population or any other change of c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ( T h e  instructions of
1888-90 for a new land survey, and for the recruitment of one man from every •
180 male Muslim villagers and payment of 150 tumans by every 180 male non-
Muslims,^* seemed not to have become effective.) Curzon too had drawn
attention to the fact that the revenue assessments were often out of
date and anomalous, leading to overtaxation of areas where prosperity had
102.
declined and undertaxation of those where it had increased.
Picot stated that the initial selection of recruits was often made
by village notables before the army officials arrived in the area. The
men chosen would be those whom the village could best spare, the poorest
and weakest in physique. When the officer from the regiment arrived he
103
would reject the obviously unfit and select healthy replacements. In
Picot’s own words, ’’Great heartburning naturally follows as military 
service is not popular in the lower ranks, and the richer members of the
98. Picot Report, pp.96-7.
99. Picot Report, p.97.
100. Picot Report, p.97.
101. AoK.S. Lambton, op.cit., pp.168-9.
102. G.N. Curzon, op.cit., II, p.472.
103.Picot Report, p.97.
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community will often pay large bribes to secure exemption. The result
is almost invariably the same, the regiment being recruited with many
of the village failures, who are far from qualified to represent the bone
and muscle of the average countryman".*^ In those areas where it was
impossible to raise the officialy stipulated number of recruits, the
figure called for was usually reduced, and although the senior officer
of the regiment was nominally held responsible for providing the full
complement of men, he was rarely questioned about the means whereby he
105
had met that obligation. As has been*noted already, those m  charge
of regiments were not often required to maintain their forces at full
strength, and this too provided a margin for any deficiencies in 
106
recruitment.
The conclusion which can be drawn from the situation which prevailed 
under Muzaffar al-Din Shah is not that the method of recruitment was 
inherently incapable of meeting the needs of the Persian army, but rather 
that -a. system which was basically sound was not being used in an 
efficient manner. A lack of revenue assessments which reflected current 
prosperity, and the fact that abuses of the system were allowed to go 
unchecked, were the real causes of failure, not any fundamental flaw in 
the system itself.
As well as pointing out the weaknesses and deficiencies in current 
practice, Picot also observed that given time and money, those responsible 
for the regiments were almost invariably able to bring them up to full 
strength. In 1897 the Commander-in-Chief of the Persian army ordered the 
Ardabil and Mishkin regiment, which had not been under arms for 15 years,
104. Picot Report, p.97.
105. Picot Report, p.97.
106. Picot Report, p.98.
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to report for service in the capital. Within six months it had done so
with an almost full complement of officers and men.^^. With good
administration and adequate funds there is no reason why the recruitment
system should not have functioned well; but those essential conditions
were almost entirely absent during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah.
The evidence shows that there was no lack of men in Persia who were
physically fit for military service. The British Consul in Azarbayjan
reckoned that the tribes in that province could have contributed some
108
30,000 armed and able-bodied men to the army. This number included
the Shahsivan tribesmen, whom Houtum Schindler believed to form the best
109
material for military purposes. After an unsatisfactory attempt at 
indirect recruitment, the commander of the Cossack Brigade was permitted 
in 1901 to send one of his own officers to Saveh personally to select 
men from the Shahsivan. Those men later made good members of the 
Brigade. The inadequacy of the recruitment system reflected a lack 
of efficiency in utilising the considerable potential of the Persian 
population, it did not arise from any fundamental shortage of resources. 
Had the system been kept in good order, the needs of the Persian army for 
men could almost certainly have been meto
The failure to recruit troops efficiently, and to pay them regularly 
and adequately, were major causes of weakness; but other reasons for the 
feeble condition of the army are to be found in its poor equipment and 
training. The rifle that was used most widely by the infantry was the
107. Picot Report, p.105.
108. P.O. 60:651. Enclosure in Des Graz to Lansdowne, No.99, 17 July 1902.
109. F.O. 60:651. Enclosure in DeS, Graz to Lansdowne, No.99, 17 July 1902.
110. F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.54 Confidential, 1 April 1902.
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Austrian-made Werndell. Large quantities of these weapons had been 
purchased at various times during the reign of Nasir al-Din Shah.**^
o
According to General Wagner, however, when investigations were made in
1889 it was discovered that some 50,000 of those weapons from the reserve
store were missing, and it was widely believed that they had been sold
at various times by those responsible for the arsenal. The selling of
rifles was not confined to Tehran. The Turkoman raiders who caused
difficulty at Astarabad in 1901 could not be controlled by the local
11 3
soldiers for they had sold their rifles earlier that year. When Wagner
made his investigation in 1899 it was also discovered that the actual
reserves of ball cartridges were much less than the official figure of
3 million rounds, and it appeared as if ammunition, as well as rifles,
had been sold.^^
The question of the quality and number of rifles in the hands of
the tribes is a complex one, and the following description is far from
complete. Evidence from British military observers, however, suggests
that the weapons which were in the hands of the tribes were often better
than the Wemdells used by the Persian army.^^ Most of the tribesmen
in the south were reported to have good rifles, and the Martini-Henry
13 6
carbine was the most popular choice. In the north and north-east,
many tribesmen had Berdan rifles which were the standard issue in the
117
Russian army, and which were also used by the Cossack Brigade. The 
tribes of the north-west seem to have possessed quite large quantities 
of the Peabody-Martini, an American rifle, which was widely used by the
111. Picot Report, p.lll,
112. Picot Report. pp 0111—2.
113. P.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.142, 19 September 1901.
114. Picot Report, p.112.
115. Picot Report, p.ll2„
116c, Picot Report^ p.121.
117. Picot Report^ p.121.
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Ottoman army.*^ The Persian army had some 9,000 modern r i f l e s -
4,000 of which had been seized at Bushire in 1898 as they were being
120
smuggled into the country. But the troops do not seem to have been
issued with them.
Provincial governors who were ordered to quell disturbances in their
provinces usually found themselves faced by groups which were better
armed, as well as being much larger, than those at their disposal. In
December 1897, the Governor of Bushire admitted that he could not have
defended the town against an attack by Tangistani tribesmen for the
latter were greatly superior in terms of numbers and weaponry to the
121
soldiers m  the town. In 1904, the Governor of Kirmanshah was
ordered to punish groups of Lurs who had been creating widespread
disturbances. The Governor had less than 1,500 men at his disposal,
and each man had only 8 cartridges for his rifle. A British officer who
was in the area at the time, reckoned that it would have taken a force
of some 15,000 well-armed men to have subdued the Lurs who were
122
responsible for the disturbances. A lack of m o d e m  weaponry was not,
c . ^
however, an unsurmountable problem as the Governor of Arabistan
demonstrated in 1905. When he arrived in Shushtar he found his soldiers
were without rifles, so he proceeded to buy them m o d e m  weapons from 
123
local suppliers.
As well as lacking m o d e m  rifles, the infantry had little opportunity 
to acquire proficiency with the weapons at its disposal. Picot reported
1180 Picot Report, pp.120-1.
119. Picot Report, p.112.
120. Picot Report. p 01120
1210 F.O. 60:662. Meade memorandum, no number, 13 December 1897.
122*, F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.29, 8 February 1905.
123. F.O. 248:843. Cox to Hardinge, No.74, 16 June 1905.
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that parade manoeuvres were rehearsed, but that field manoeuvres were
124 .
almost unknown. Many of the recruits into the army had not previously
owned a gun, and they needed a full course of training. Supplies of ball
ammunition were, however, inadequate and with an average expenditure of
125
only 5 rounds per man per year, little proficiency was achieved.
There were similar deficiencies in equipment and in training in
the artillery. That branch of the army also suffered from a shortage
of men, and those who were in the artillery regiments also suffered from
irregular and inadequate pay. The nominal strength of the artillery was
over 11,000 men, but the number actually under arms in 1899 was less than 
126800c, Service in the artillery was said to be more popular than that
in the infantry; the period of service in both branches was for life,
but rates of basic pay in the artillery were usually at least double
127
those for equivalent ranks m  the infantry. Illegal sales had
reduced the availability of some equipment in the artillery. For
example, the annual budget allowed for the provisioning of 4,000 horses
(and disbursements were based on this figure), but less than 1,000
128
horses could actually be accounted for in 1899.
The basic equipment of the artillery consisted of second-hand
Euchatius guns of seven, eight and nine centimetre calibre, which had
- . t 129
been purchased m  Austria during the reign of Nasir a l -Dm Shah.
(The Cossack Brigade had two batteries of 8.7 centimetre guns made by
1240 Picot Report, p,108o
125. Picot Report, p.108.
126. Picot Report, p.132.
127. Picot Report, p.135.
128. Picot Report, p.133.
129. Picot Report, p,1340
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130
the firm of Krupp in Germany.) The ammunition for most of those
older weapons had deteriorated in storage, and most of it was virtually 
131useless„ The only artillery supplies which seem to have been
purchased during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah, were some 5,000
132
rounds of 7 centimetre shrapnel ammunition bought m  1897. Picot
believed that for both the 8 centimetre and 9 centimetre guns Persia
133
possessed less than 3,000 rounds of ammunition.
The Euchatius guns were used only for royal parades, and the men 
were issued with only 3 rounds of ammunition per gun per year for training
purposes. All other artillery drill was carried out on antiquated
134 .muzzle-loading guns. The low level of drill m  the artillery was
reflected in the decreasing volume of gunpowder manufactured in Persia.
Evidence for this comes from a report of 1902 which indicated that much
less saltpetre (a vital ingredient of gunpowder) was being mined at
- . t - 135
Saveh than had been the case in the reign of Nasir al-Dm Shah.
A further example of decline concerns the factory which had been
established by Nasir al-Din Shah in 1894 to produce ball cartridges for
the army's Wemdell rifles. This had the capacity to produce some
10,000 cartridges per day; but by 1899 no cartridges at all were being
made, and instead the machinery was being used to produce metal goods
which were later sold in the bazaar by the man in charge, of the factory.
136
The employees, however, were still being paid by the government.
130, Picot Report, pp.134-5.
1310 Picot Report, p.135.
132. Picot Report. p 0135.
133. Picot Report, p o1350
134. Picot Report, p.136. *
135. F.O. 60:651. Enclosure in Des Graz to Lansdowne, No.99,
17 July 1902„
136„ Picot Report, pp.142-3.
Against this sorry background of inefficient recruitment, 
insufficient and irregular pay, inadequate equipment and poor training, 
it is not surprising to find that the appearance and morale of the 
troops were also very bad. Almost all the British Consuls in Persia 
described the unfortunate plight of the soldiers in their area. 
Wratislaw, in Tabriz, observed that the task of guarding the British 
Consulate there was eagerly sought after, for the men who performed that 
duty received a small monthly allowance direct from the Consul. That
sum of money, unlike their army pay, was given to them regularly and in
137 .full. When Grant Duff spoke to one of the ragged Persian sentries
guarding the Legation in Tehran in January 1904, the soldier said he had
138
no cartridges for his rifle and that he had never fired the weapon.
With poor morale went a lack of reliability, and there are several 
reports of Persian soldiers refusing to take action against crowds of
demonstrators. In July 1898, at a time when food prices were very high,
. . .  . 139
some of the troops m  Tehran joined m  the looting of food shops;
and the following month soldiers in Tabriz acted in concert with bread
140 . . 
rioters in raiding bakeries. In March 1903, soldiers m  Mashhad
refused to fire on a crowd which was demanding cheaper food;*^ and in
June of that year Hardinge expressed the view that few Persian soldiers
137. A.C. Wratislaw, A Consul in the Bast, London 1924, p.189.
138. F.O. 60:681. Enclosure in Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.15,
26 January 1904. During the visit_of Viscount Downe to Tehran in 
1903, to invest Muzaffar al-Din Shah with |£ie Order' of The Garter,. >. 
one of the Legation sentries had no rifle and substituted a chair 
lQg when called upon to present arms. (Same despatch by Grant Duff.)
139. F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.91, 29 July 1898.
140. F.O. 60:598. Wood to Durand. No date, but written early 
September 1898. *
141. F.O. 60:665, Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.65, 28 April 1903,
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in any part of the country would obey their officers if told not to do
. . 142
so by members of the religious classes.
During the summer of 1905, following defeat in the war with Japan, 
there was much unrest in Russiae In the Caucasus and in Central Asia 
this took the form of serious anti-Muslim riotingo One of the main
143
centres of those disturbances was Baku where many Persians were working.
As the violence spread, thousands of Muslims - the majority being
Persian - fled to the south. The plight of these refugees caused much
anger and resentment, particularly in the northern Persian provinces
of Azarbayjan, Gilan and Khurasan, where their presence was first felt.
The government in Tehran feared that the disturbances in Russia would
provoke agitations of an anti-Christian and anti-Russian nature throughout
Persia, and several observers thought that the army would side with the
mobs under such circumstances.^^
In fact there is only one incident whose causes can be traced
directly to events in Russia - a violent anti-Christian demonstration 
— 146
m  Ardabil - but news of those outrages certainly added to the general 
sense of unrest and turbulence which prevailed in many Persian towns and
142. F.O. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.98, 29 June 1903.
143o A.D. Kalmykow noted that many Persians had gone to work in 
southern Russia, particularly at Baku, in the oil industry; 
Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat, New Haven, 1971 , pp.40 and 54. 
Further details of the scale of this migration can be found 
in M.L. Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations 1828-1914, 
Gainesville, 1965, pp.59-61.
144. F.0o 60:700 <, Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.207, 12 September 1905:
F.O. 60:700. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.223, 11 October 1905.
and F.Oo 60:701. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.113 Telegraphic,
14 September 1905.
145o F o0. 60:700. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.215, 9 October 1905.
146. F.O. 60:700. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.223, 11 October 1905.
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147cities during the autumn and winter of 1905. Events in Russia had
another indirect effect which was indicated by Grant Duff when he reported
that knowledge of the widespread unrest in Russia, and the fact that the
troops there were known to be disaffected, meant that many Persians in
the northern provinces now felt that there was less chance of military
intervention in Persia by Russian forces. With that restraint removed,
148
Grant Duff believed that disturbances were more likely to occur.
Following the death of Amir Khan Sardar, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Persian army^ in January 1905, a man whom Hardinge had regarded as one of
147. The following examples will serve to illustrate the extent of 
discontent in Persia in the_autumn and winter of 1905. The list 
is not exhaustive. In Shiraz the building of a house by a Jew set 
off rioting (see Chapter VII below). In Yazd an incident at the 
Christian school caused disturbances (F^O. 248:845.' Baggaley (Yazd) 
to Grant Duff, 12 December 1905). In Sistan there were rumours that 
Britain had diverted the waters of the Hirmand river in Afghanistan 
so that no water would reach Persian territory. (F.O. 60:700.
Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.213, 5 October 1905). The river was
in fact very low that_year. It was also rumoured that Britain 
was about to invade Sistan (F.O. 60:700. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, 
No.223, 11 October 1905)^ _Later in October the plan by the 
Russian Consul in Nasratabad to purchase a Muslim graveyard which 
was adjacent to the Consulate there, and to add it to the grounds 
of that building, caused considerable excitement (F.O. 60:700.
Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.244, 11 November 1905). In Mashhad 
the fact that the Russian Bank had recently made a new gate in 
the city wall so as to gain easier access to its premises, and 
had put up an inscription commemorating the name of the Russian 
engineer responsible for the work, enraged the population (F.O.248: 
866. Grant Duff to Grey, No.80, 1 February 1906). In Rasht the 
Russian Bank was believed to have purchased the rice crop very 
cheaply and to be selling it abroad at a great profit (F.O. 248:846. 
Churchill (Rasht) to Grant Duff, No.68, 16 November 1905). Unrest 
in southern Russia also disrupted trade from Rasht and greatly 
increased the price of imported Russian sugar (F.O. 248:846. 
Churchill to Grant Duff, No,69, 29 December 1905).
148. F.O. 60:701. Grant Duff to Grey, No.179 Telegraphic,
22 December 1905.
the greatest single obstacles to military reform, the government
150 ’announced plans to reorganize the army. The scheme did reassign
151
responsibility for many of the regiments to new commanders, but the
vital issues of adequate supervision of the army’s budget and the creation
of strong and effective central control were not faced. When the plan
for reorganisation was being discussed, Naus produced a much more
comprehensive scheme of his own which was based upon the real her at ion
that the official figure for the size of the army (which was now less
than 136,000 men) was both totally fictitious and unrealistic given
152
Persia’s economic plight. Naus looked instead to the creation of a
truly effective force of some 20,000 men who would be mobile and well-
equipped. Regiments of some 1,000-2,000 men should then be stationed
in each of the principal cities of Persia.. Naus freely admitted that
such a force would not be capable of offering determined resistance to
any of Persia’s neighbours - but neither was the existing army. The
advantage of the new force, according to Naus, was that unlike the current
body of men it would be capable of maintaining internal security. He
put the annual cost of such a new force at some three million tumans,
153less than half the amount currently being allocated to the army.
Naus's scheme was a sound one, but it came to nought for it met 
implacable opposition from all those who were profiteering from the prevailing
- - -- - . . J . .   _      -
149. F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.16 Confidential,
26 January 1905.
150. F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, NoQ16 Confidential,
26 January 1905.
151. F.O. 60:698o Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.66 Confidential, 24 March
1905o The plan aroused great resentment among people who lost 
control of regiments by this reorganization. One such was Zill al- 
Sultan, Governor-General of Isfahan (F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to 
Lansdowne, No.66 Confidential, 24 March 1905).
152. FoO. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.66 Confidential, 24 March 1905.
153. F.O. 60:698o Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.66 Confidential, 24 March 1905.
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154 . .system and its many abuses. Another unsuccessful scheme for military
reform was put forward by the Russian government at the same time. This
too called for a reduction in the size of the army but not on so large
a scale as that envisaged by Naus. The proposal would have put the new
army effectively under Russian control, and this aroused the opposition
155
of the Shah to the scheme. The only positive sign of any move towards
improving the condition of the army was the announcement in March 1905**^
that Austrian officers were to be engaged to training purposes; but the
Persian government attached little urgency to the matter, and the men
did not arrive until October 1906.*^
Although therefore, there was much talk of military reform in 1905,
nothing of any substance was achieved, and in early November Grant Duff
repeated Hardinge's earlier warning about the unreliability of the 
158
troops. Events were to show that this was a realistic appraisal. On 
November 25th a group of soldiers in Tehran refused to intervene against
a crowd in the bazaar which was demolishing, at the instigation of a
- . . 159
mulla, a building that was being erected by the Russian Bank d'Escompte.
Mushir al-Dawla, the Persian Foreign Minister, admitted in the aftermath
of that incident that the soldiers in Tehran had received no pay for
160
twelve months, and that the government could not rely on them. The 
troops in the provinces were in no better condition; and by the end of 
1905 the inability of the Persian army to defend the country's borders,
154. F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.66 Confidential, 24 March 1905.
155. F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.66 Confidential, 24 March 1905.
156. F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.66 Confidential, 24 March 1905.
157. F.O. 371:114. Spring Rice to Grey, Document number 33007,
1 October 1906. *
158. F.O. 60:700. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.241, 6 November 1905.
159. F.O. 60:700. Enclosure in Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.252 
Confidential, 2 December 1905.
160. F.Oo 60:700. Enclosure in Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.252 . 
Confidential, 2 December 1905,
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and to maintain internal security, was more obvious than it had been
at any time previously in the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah.
Throughout most of that reign, however, there had been one body of
men which was generally regarded as being both more reliable and more
effective than any other in the Persian army - the Cossack Brigade.
That force had been established in 1878 following Nasir al-Din Shah's
161second visit to Europe. During its early years it suffered several
changes of fortune, but in the summer of 1894 a new Russian officer
arrived to take command, Colonel Kossagowski. He quickly set about
162
improving the strength, organisation and training of the force. When
Nasir al-Din was assassinated on May 1st 1986, the Cossack Brigade was
given responsibility for maintaining law and order in Tehran until
Muzaffar al-Din arrived from Tabriz on June 7th. It carried out that
163
task with notable efficiency. In the summer of 1899 the size of the
164
Cossack Brigade was increased from 1,000 to 1,500 men, and provincial
governors, particularly those in charge of turbulent provinces, had
already begun to take small groups of men from the Brigade with them as
165
personal bodyguards. The Cossack Brigade had also provided men for
the enforcement of a quarantine system against plague entering Khurasan
166
from Afghanistan in 18970
161. On the establishment and early history of the Brigade see
E, Kazemzadeh "The Origin and Early Development of the Persian 
Cossack Brigade", American Slavic and East European Review,
Vol.15, pp.351-63. There are brief details of the Brigade in
G.N. Curzon, op.cit., I, pp.594-7. The Rusrsian government supplied 
the senior officers for the Brigade as well as most of its arms and 
munitions (Picot Report, pp.83-4).
162. Kazemzadeh, op.cit., pp.359-60.
163. Kazemzadeh, op.cit. , pp.360-3. See also A.D. Kalmykow, op.cit., p.69, 
and Picot Report, p.129, *
164. F.O. 60:610o Durand to Salisbury, Telegraphic No.50, 7 August 1899.
165. F.O. 60:610. Durand to Salisbury, Telegraphic No.50, 7 August 1899.
166. F.O. 60:636. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.57 Confidential, 12 April 1901.
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When Picot composed his military report at the end of 1899, he
estimated that the Cossack Brigade had approximately 1,400 members of whom
133 were Persian officers. 132 men served in the 2 artillery batteries,
666 men were in the cavalry, and 480 in the infantry section. In addition
10 officers of the Russian army were at that time serving with the 
1 67
Brigade. The bulk of the men were stationed in Tehran while others
were serving at Shushtar, Astarabad, Shiraz, Saveh, Gulpayagan and Mashhad.
_ _ |
The total annual budget of the Brigade was then 219,000 tumans 
(equivalent to about £42,200). It was Picot's view that:
"The Persian Government possesses in the Cossack Brigade 
a well-equipped and a disciplined force, somewhat 
deficient in military training when judged from a 
European standpoint, but which has already attained a 
remarkable degree of efficiency and is incomparably 
superior to anything Persia can present at the present 
day".169
One very important reason for the high standing and good morale of 
the Cossack Brigade was that the men were paid regularly and in full, and 
no money was wasted on "fictitious" pensioners. Kossagowski had 
reached a crucial agreement in May 1895 with the Shah that the funds for 
the Brigade would be paid to him directly by the Sadr-i A^am, and that 
neither the Minister of War nor any other Persian official would be allowed 
in any way to involve himself with either the financing, or the running,
167. Picot Report, pp.124-5.
168. Ibid., p.128.
169. Ibid. , p.128.
J70. P.O. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.103, 29 September 1900.
The basic pay for a man of the lowest rank in the Cossack Brigade in
^ 1902 was 180 qiransper year, and ration allowance was the same amount.
A private in the_infantry was (supposed to receive 70 qirans in basic 
^ay and 91.1 qirans in ration allowance.” The lowest ranking soldier 
in* the artillery was supposed to receive basic pay of 120 qirans and 
ration allowance of 91.1 qirans annually. F.O, 60:650, Enclosure in 
Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.22, 5 February 1902, and Picot Report, 
pp.110 and 135. As has already been noted, pay in branches of the 
army other than the Cossack Brigade was often badly in arrears.
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of the Brigade. Kossagowski appears to have established quite good
relations with Amin al-Sultan while he was SadrHL !&  am during both his
first period of office (which ended in November 1896) and again when he
172
returned to the post m  August 1898.
During 1900 men from the Cossack Brigade were sent to Isfahan to
- 173
provide an escort for the Governor-General, Zill al-Sultan. Although 
the detachments sent to the provinces were only very rarely accompanied 
by Russian officers, the population often regarded the arrival of a
Cossack detachment as a further indication of Russian domination over
174 .Persia. Nevertheless, the Cossack Brigade performed a vital task in
helping to maintain law and order, particularly in Tehran during the
175
Shah’s two visits to Europe m  1900 and 1902.
Picot had observed in September 1900 that the number of Persian
officers in the Brigade was sufficient to allow a rapid and four-fold
176increase in its ranks. At one point it was believed that the Brigade
would indeed be expanded to some 5,000 men; but shortage of money and
intense opposition by those concerned with other elements of the Persian
177army prevented this. In 1900 an attempt was made to recruit men for
171. Kazemzadeh, op.cit., pp.359-60.
172. Amin al-Sultan fell from power again in September 1903, but by then 
Kossagowski had left the Cossack Brigade (see below).
173. P o0. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.119 Confidential,
15 November 1900.
174. F.O. 248 723. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No. 15, 3 November 1900.
175. On both occasions Kossagowski was requested to postpone leave which 
was owing to him and not to depart for Russia while Mitzaffar al-Din 
was out of the country. (F.O. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, 
No.103, 29 September 1900, and F.O. 60:650, Hardinge to Lansdowne, 
Confidential No.54, 1 April 1902.)
176. F.O. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.103, 29 September 1900.
1770 F.O. 60:618. Spring Rice to*Salisbury, No.109, 19 October 1900.
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the Brigade from the Baghdadi branch of the Shahsivan tribe. This
first experiment was not very successful; , for out of the 300 men
' 178
chosen a tenth quickly deserted, and others returned home later.
Kossagowski wished to pursue and punish the deserters y but Amin al-Sultan
feared that this would provoke the tribe and that disturbances would
179 . . .
result, so he forbade any such actxon, This decision angered
Kossagowski, but the following year he obtained permission to send a
Russian officer to the tribe personally to choose new recruits, and
180better men were thus selected. Those members of the tribe who joined
181on this second occasion later became useful members of the Brigade.
Kossagowski1s task in commanding the Brigade was by no means an easy
one0 Although he had to deal only with the Sadr-i A^am in the matter of
money, payments were not always made promptly. Kossagowski was a man of
some private means, and when the money did not arrive from the government
182
he used funds of his own to pay the men. He told the British Military
Attache, Napier, in February 1902, that he had on occasions encouraged
the Sadr-i A^am to reimburse him by refusing to order his men into action 
• *
when disturbances occurred until the arrears of pay had been met. This
was effective as the government had very few other reliable troops at its
- 183 disposal.
178. F.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.149, 29 September 1901.
This operation, and the desertions, took place while Kossagowski 
was on leave in Russia.
179. F.O. 60:637o Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.190’,^  10 December 1901.
180. F.O. 60:651. Enclosure in Des Graz to Lansdowne. No.99 Confidential,
17 July 1902o
181. F.O. 60:666. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.134, 
Confidential, 3 September 1903.
182. FoOo 60:650. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.22, ~
5 February 1902.
183. F.O. 60:650. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.22,
5 February 1902o
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In February 1902 mo^jt members of the Brigade moved into new
barracks which had been designed by a Russian military architect, and on
184
which some Russian builders had also been engaged. Accommodation
was provided for some 1,000 men, and Napier reported at this time that
the total strength of the Brigade consisted of 1,800 officers and men,
185
of whom 1,400 were serving in the capital. (The largest provincial
contingent at this time was stationed at Astarabad where there had
186
recently been tribal disturbances.) Of the 1,400 men in Tehran some
400 were infantry, but Napier stated that they should really be regarded
as dismounted cavalry, for as soon as horses of adequate quality could
187
be acquired Kossagowski intended to turn them into mounted men. Out
of the 1,600 men in the ranks some 1,300 were volunteers, the remaining
300 pressed men had been drawn from the Shahsivan. Kossagowski expressed
the wish at this time to increase the proportion of pressed men to half
the total strength of the Brigade so that he would not be as dependent
on volunteers. The British Military Attach^ noted that the infantry had
188
fired some sixty rounds of ammunition per man in 1901 for training 
purposes, and that the drill with the artillery batteries looked workman­
like. Napier emphasised that pay was given regularly, that the discipline 
and morale in the Brigade remained very good, and that the men had great
184. F.O. 60:650. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.22, 5 February 1902., p 
The new barracks were adjacent to the former ones. Accommodation
for officers was provided separately.
185. F.O, 60:650. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.22*, 5 February 1902.
186. F.O. 60,:65£L. Hardinge to Lansdowne-y No.40, 4 March 1902.
187., The men in the cavalry provided their own horses. Those used for
the artillery batteries were provided by the government. F.O. 60:650.
Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.*22* 5 February 1902.
18$, In 1899 the other infantry regiments in the Persian army had used 
on average only five rounds per man for training. (Picot Report,
p.108.)
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personal respect £or |Cossagowski. This was an important aspect of
his control over the Brigade, as was the fact that he had served in
Persia since 1894. When in 1903 he left Persia, and Colonel Chernozaboff
arrived to take charge of the Brigade, Hardinge noted that the new
Commander was only 30 years old, and that he had no previous experience
of soldiering in Asia.*^
The condition of the Brigade was still good in August 1903, when
Major Douglas, the British Military Attache, made a visit to the force
before writing a detailed report on it. According to that report the
size of the force was somewhat smaller than it had been in the past,
with a current total membership of about 1,500 officers and men. The
infantry was now regarded as a permanent and regular branch of the
Brigade and no longer as temporarily dismounted cavalry. In Tehran
there were currently stationed some 520 cavalry, 300 infantry and 250
artillery of all ranks; while in the provinces another 400 members of
the Brigade were serving as guards. There were also 9 Russian army
191
officers with the Brigade.
The Military Attache noted that the Shahsivan were continuing to
make a useful contribution to the force, and that members of the
Bakhtiyari tribe, about 100 in number, had recently been recruited for 
192the first time. The men were still being paid regularly and m  full,
and the Commander retained total control of the Brigade1s finances as
189. F.O. 60:650. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, Ho.22,
5 February 1902.
190. F.O. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.45, 1 April 1903.
191. F.O. 60:666. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.134 Confidential,
3 September 1903. *
192. F.O. 60:666. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.134 Confidential,
3 September 1903.
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193well as of its management. Douglas also praised the quality of the
food which was provided for the soldiers, and he said that discipline
was good. Once more the report noted that the number of Persian officers
with the force - representing about one sixth of the total membership -
was such that the Brigade was capable of being expanded quite rapidly if
more troops were to be recruited. Douglas noted, however, that the
funds provided for the Brigade were no longer sufficient to keep it at
full strength all the year round; and that in the winter months economies
were made by allowing men to return home on leave, for then they received 
194
only half pay.
In the autumn of 1903 various changes occurred which were to have
quite serious effects on the Brigade. Amin al-Sultan fell from power in
September, and the new Sadr-i i&am, *A.yn al-Dawla lost little time in placing
• *
the Brigade under the control of his brother Amir KhSn Sardar, who was
195 '
the Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War. Kossagowski had consistently 
refused to le-f the Commander-in-Chief to have any dealing at all with the 
Brigade; and Hardinge regarded it as an ominous sign that the previous 
arrangements, whereby the Commander was directly responsible to, and 
received funds from the Sadr-i Azam had been c h a n g e d , T h e  Brigade 
was still used at this time for guard duties and other tasks in the 
provinceso In the autumn of 1903 members of the Brigade were sent to
193. F.O. 60:666. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.134,
Confidential, 3 September 1903. ’ „ *■
194. F.O. 60:666. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.134,
Confidential, 3 September 1903.
1950 F.O. 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.161, 8 October 1903. Hardinge1s
views on Amir Khan SardSr were scathing. In 1905 he reported that that
official had an "auri'sacra fames" above all other Persians whom h$ 
had met, (F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.16, Confidential,
26 November 1905.)
196. F.O. 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.161, 8 October 1903.
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Khurasan as part of a force which had the task of trying to prevent
197the export of gram.
During the cholera epidemic of 1904 some of the soldiers from
the Brigade who were stationed Tehran, deserted and no attempt seems
to have been made to discipline t h e m . D u r i n g  1904CAyn al-Dawla tried
to reduce the budget of the Brigade, and to tax the salaries of its
199officers, but these attempts were not wholly successful. The Brigade
did begin to suffer financial difficulties during 1905, and by December 
of that year Chernozaboff was complaining bitterly to Douglas of shortage 
of money. The Brigade’s budget was nominally 300,000 tumans (equivalent 
to about £50,000), but a fifth of this amount was now taken out to pay 
’’pensions” , and the Russian Commander expressed doubts about the 
genuineness of some of them.^^ The Brigade too was suffering from the 
fact that payments were now badly in arrears. Chernozaboff said that he 
was owed some 80,000 tumans in December 1905, and that he had had to use 
personal securities to borrow 10,000 tumans from the Russian and English 
banks with which to pay the men. As money was so short he had had to 
send many more men away on leave for the winter; and in Tehran the 
Brigade then had only 400 men under arms, of whom about half were 
infantry and the rest cavalry and artillery. The Commander doubted
197. F.O. 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.145, 16 September 1903.
When grain was in short supply and prices were high, the Persian 
government tried to prevent its export frpm both Khurasan and from
*Arabistan where it was widely grown. During Muzaffar al-Din Shah’s 
reign this policy was put into effect several times, but smuggling 
usually accompanied such an embargo,
198. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.134, 20 July 1904. There had
also been desertions during the 1891/2 cholera epidemic. Kazemzadeh 
op.cit., p.357. °
199. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.107 Confidential, 16 June 1904.
200. F.O. 371:105. Enclosure in Grant Duff to Grey, No.276,
28 December 1905.
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whether he could under any circumstances muster more than 600 men at the 
201maximum. Chernozaboff also told Douglas that he was now doubtful
about the loyalty of his men, and that any appeal to them by members
of the religious classes would probably carry more weight than orders
from his officers.
During 1906 there is relatively little sign of consistent activity
by the Cossack Brigade against the various successive disturbances
which took place in Tehran. In September the Command of the Brigade
changed hands, and Colonel Liakhoff took charge. He told the British
Military Attache that the condition of the Brigade was very much worse
than it had been in the past.^^^
It is clear then that by the end of 1905 the Cossack Brigade, the
pride of the Persian army, was sharing in the general and serious
decline which afflicted those forces. Its condition may not have been
as bad as that of some other regiments, but it was short of men and
money, and its troops could no longer be regarded as reliable. In view
of the very poor state of Persia’s forces, it is not surprising that,
when members of the religious classes who were in bast at the Mosque
of ShahCAbd al-Azim near Tehran, sent a petition to the Shah in January
2041906, one of their demands should have been for reform of the army.
201. F.O. 371:105. Enclosure in Grant Duff to Grey, No.276, 28 December 1905.
202. F.O. 371:105. Enclosure in Grant Duff to Grey, No.276, 28 December 190S
203. F.O. 371:105. Spring Rice to Grey, Document number 36245,
11 October 1905. Liakhoff had according to this report visited the 
Brigade in 1902. (The later very active role of Liakhoff and the 
Cossack Brigade in the Constitutional Revolution is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. It is interesting to remember that at this time 
one of the members of the Cossack Brigade was the future founder 
of the dynasty which succeeded*the Qajars.)
204. F.O. 248:866. Enclosure in Grant Duff to Grey, No.66, 31 January 1906.
That enclosure provides a full translation of the preamble and the 
list of demands contained in that petition.
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The last word might perhaps be left with the Persian who discussed 
the state of the army with the British Minister in June 1904. During 
that conversation the Persian had told a story concerning one of his 
fellow-countrymen who wished to have a large and fierce lion tattooed 
on his arm. The man winced when the tattooist began work, and asked 
what part of the lion was being drawn that it caused so much pain. He 
was told that it was the tail; whereupon he replied that if that was 
so he would prefer to have a lion without a tail. Similar conversations 
took place when the tattooist, in turn, began to draw the eyes, teeth, 
ears and claws of the beast. In the end all that existed was a very 
pale and vague outline of a lion that lacked all the requirements for 
action. That, said HardingeTs informant, was like the state of the 
Persian army - it too lacked everything that it needed to make it 
effective.




THE REFORM OF THE CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION
"One must enquire constantly into the affairs of the tax-collector."
The Book of Government or Rules for Kings:
The Siyctsat-nftma or Siyar al-Muluk'of Nigam al-Mulk, 
translated from the Persian by H. Darke,
London 1960, p.23.
The changes which were made in the Customs administration after 1898 
constitute the most important series of administrative reforms which took 
place during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah. It is the purpose of 
this chapter to trace the course of those reforms and to see why they 
gave rise to such widespread discontent in Persia,
The need for changes in the Customs administration was forced upon 
Persia by the burden of her foreign indebtedness. The payment of the 
interest on the first loan of April 27th 1892 was guaranteed by the 
customs receipts of the Persian gulf ports.* This was because those 
receipts constituted "the sole reliable and convenient security for
2
repayment of foreign loans which the Persian Government had to offer".
One of the major problems facing the Persian government under Muzaffar 
al-Din was how to increase the funds at its disposal; for, as has been 
noted in Chapter II, although taxes were being collected in the provinces
1. The first loan had been raised to pay the .compensation for
the cancellation of the tobacco c o n c e s s i o n S e e  A.K.S, Lambton, 
The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to Revolution (II) Studia Islamica,
23 (1965), pp.71-90.
2. J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, *0man, and Central 
Arabia, Calcutta 1915 (I), p .2115.
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very little money was reaching Tehran. The idea for improvement of
the Customs administration as a preliminary step towards wider reforms,
was part of Arnxn al-DawlaTs scheme for the reorganization of government
11
which was put forward in April 1897. The first Belgian experts
5
arrived to undertake this task in March 1898.
Before the Belgians began tKeir work, however, control over the 
Customs at Kirmanshah and Bushire had passed briefly to agents of the 
Imperial Bank of Persia. The circumstances surrounding this affair are 
interesting and they help to illuminate some of the factors which were 
to influence events later under the Belgians. In November 1897 the 
Persian government had failed to raise funds on the French market, and 
it turned instead to the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia for a 
loan of £400,000, The Persian authorities requested an interest rate 
of 5 per cent, and the suggested repayment period was 15 years. Security
3. In the course of a long despatch on PersiaTs finances in September 
1900 Spring Rice noted that there were, in theory, three sources of 
income for .the government: customs revenue, payments from
concessions, and taxes on land. The first then produced about 
£350,000 per year. The second source should have provided about 
£110,000 annually, but the returns were much lower_because some 
concessions - such as the forestry concession in Mazandaran - had 
earlier been sold for a lump sum. The latter category of taxes 
should have produced at least £900,000 per year, but much common 
land had been sold by Muzaffar al-Din Shah and his father, and 
very little of the revenue raised from taxes on land was being 
remitted to Tehran by provincial governors. Spring Rice doubted 
whether the government "received any appreciable benefit" from 
what should have constituted its major source of income. F.O.60:618. 
Spring Rice to Salisbury, Noo90 Confidential, 18 September 1900.
4. F.O, 60:601. Hardinge to Salisbury, No. 141 ,“ 24 October, and 
Lorimer, op.cit., p.2111.
5. A, Destree, Les Fonctionnaires Beiges au Service de la Perse 
1898-1915, Tehran-Liege 1976, pp.33-41. Naus was given full 
charge of the Customs administration on 21 March 1899.
Destr&e, op.cit., p.44. *
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for the loan was to be a second charge on the customs receipts of the
Gulf ports, and in addition the receipts of Muhammara and Kinnanshah
were also pledged. The Persian government was prepared, reported
Hardinge, to allow the customs dues at Bushire and Kirmanshah to be
collected by European agents of the Bank. The annual amount paid to
the Persian government by the men who farmed the Customs at those two
places came to over £88,000, said Hardinge, and he urged the British
government to encourage the Imperial Bank to make a loan on the suggested 
7
terms.
The British Minister stressed that the money was sorely needed by 
the Persian government, and that a loan would probably be offered by
Q
Russia if the negotiations with the British bank were not successful.
Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, consulted the 
directors of the Bank in London, and he then informed Hardinge that 
inspection of the accounts of the Customs would be an essential pre­
condition; but that if this was to be agreed it might prove possible
9to raise a loan on the London market for the Persian government.
Negotiations continued slowly in London and in Tehran. In early March
1898 Hardinge once more stressed the serious and urgent need of the Shah’s 
government,for money as salary payments to the army and the bureaucracy 
were badly in arrears, and that much unrest had been caused because of
this. The British Minister again.emphasized the adequate nature of the security
  . . . .  ^
6. F.O. 60:601. Hardinge to Salisbury, No.85, Telegraphic Secret,
17 December 1897.
7. F.O. 60:601. Hardinge to Salisbury, No.85, Telegraphic Secret,
17 December 1897. A
8. F.O. 60:601. Hardinge to Salisbury, No.85, Telegraphic Secret,
17 December 1897.
9. F.O. 60:601. Salisbury to Hardinge, No.80, Telegraphic Confidential,
23 December 1897.
10.' F.O. 60:601. Hardinge to Salisbury, No.35, Telegraphic, 2 March 1898.
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which was being offered. The only customs collection points of
importance outside northern Persia were, he said, Bushire and
Kirmanshah. The offer to include the Muhammara receipts could be
dismissed, as the Customs there was "at present without organization".^
On 11 March 1898, the Chairman of the Imperial Bank wrote to
Salisbury stating that the loan negotiations had failed because of the
persistent hostility of a small but influential group of members of
the London Stock Exchange who had not forgotten the Lottery failure of 
12
1889. The Chairman did, however, confirm Hardinge's view that the
security offered was amply sufficient, and he went on to ask the British
13
government to act as guarantors of a loan to Persia. The Chancellor 
of the Exchequer refused this request, and a week later the Bank's 
Chairman wrote again to the Foreign Office saying that in view of the 
Persian government's urgent need for money, an advance of £50,000 had 
been arranged by the Imperial Bank in Tehran. In return the Bank was 
to receive the customs dues of Kirmanshah and Bushire until the end of 
August.^ Hardinge welcomed this news and expressed the hope that the 
collection arrangement might become a permanent one in the expectation 
that bribery and other abuses could then be eradicated from the Customs 
administration. As long as the charges were levied fairly, and
11. F.O. 60:601. Hardinge to Salisbury, No.37 Telegraphic, 7 March 1898.
12. Letter from Keswick to Salisbury, 11 March 1898; copy in F.O.60:601.
On the details of the Lottery concession, see F. Kazemzadeh,
Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914: A  Study in Imperialism,
New Haven 1968, pp.241-47, and H. Algar, Mirza Malkum Khan: A Study 
in the History of Iranian Modernism, Berkeley 1973, pp.168-184.
13. Letter from Keswick to Salisbury, 11 March 1898. Copy on F.O.60:601.
14. Letter from Keswick to Salisbury, 18 March 1898. Copy on F.O.60:601.
iOi
injustices were not committed, Hardinge believed that the Persians
would not object to the involvement of British officials in the
15collection of the dues.
16The Bank1s agents began work at both places in April 1898.
There was an initial expression of hostility in Bushire when the rumour 
went around the town that native merchants would have to pay the same
17tariff as European merchants (i.e. 5 per cent ad valorem) on their goods.
But this commotion quickly subsided when it became known that the new
officials would not be introducing any changes in the level of payment.
In Kirmanshah too, the collection of the dues by the Bank's agents went
ahead smoothly. The key factor again was the continuity in the levels
of dues collected, with no attempt being made to increase them in any 
18
way. When the Belgian officials took charges of the Customs later, 
however, they received orders to unify the system of dues and to charge
15. F.O. 60:601. Hardinge to Salisbury, No.48, 22 March 1898.
16. F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.67, 29 April 1898.
17. Under the terms of the Treaty of Turkomanchay of 1828, taxes on 
imports into and exports from Persia were effectively limited
to 5 per cent ad valorem. European merchants were usually charged 
the full amount, and they were then supposed to be exempted from 
taxes on trade imposed within Persia. (This provision was not 
always effective.) Persian merchants usually paid dues of less 
than 5 per cent, but they also had to pay various internal taxes 
which, in total, could amount to more than a 5 per cent ad valorem 
rate. See F.O, 60:611, Durand to Salisbury, No.2 Commercial,
11 February 1899, and F.O. 60:620, Spring Rice to Salisbury, No,25 
Commercial, 22 August 1900. The text of the Treaty of Turkomanchay 
is reproduced in C.U. Aitchison (compiler), A Collection of Treaties, 
Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, 
Calcutta 1933, Volume XIII, Appendix No.VII/, pp.XXII-XLI.
18. F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.67, 29 April 1898.
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native as well as foreign merchants a uniform rate of 5 per cent
ad valorem. As will be seen, this imposition of heavier dues was to
be the first major source of discontent.
The approbrium for such a measure might, however, have been laid
at British instead of Belgian feet; for in May 1898, the Persian
government sought a new loan of over £1,000,000 from the Imperial Bank.
The Manager of the Bank in Tehran, H.L. Rabino, expressed the view that
if it were to provide such a sum the Imperial Bank would have to take
charge of the whole Customs administration outside of northern Persia,
and it would also have to raise the dues paid by Persian merchants to
5 per cent ad valorem, with exemptions only for the importation of rice
19and wheat at times of scarcity. The question of providing such a loan
was taken seriously in London, and the Admiralty was consulted about the ease
with which British gunboats could enter harbours such as Bandar cAbbas,
Bushire, Lingeh and Muhammara if British collectors were to be appointed
20and then needed support. An affirmative reply was given. The Russian
government soon began to hear of these new loan discussions, and Durand
reported its objection to the prospect of British control of so many
21customs houses m  Persia.
The political situation in Tehran had been altered by the fall of
— _ 22 
Amin-al Dawla as Sadr-i Aczam on June 5th 1898. The new administration
led by Mushir al-Dawla, was unable to meet the Shah's need for money;
— 23
and m  the summer A m m  al-Sultan returned to power. The new Sadr-i
*• *
19. F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.61 Telegraphic, 22 May 1898.
20. Letter from Admiralty to Foreign Office, 23 June 1898. Copy in
F .0. 60:601. a
21. F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.84 Telegraphic, 18 July 1898.
22. F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.65 Telegraphic, 5 June 1898.
23. F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.85 Telegraphic, 21 July 1898.
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Azam was strongly opposed to any foreign control over the Customs; 
for he had, reported Durand, previously farmed part of that service 
and was believed to have received an annual income of over £70,000
from the venture. He was therefore keen to re-establish personal control
24 v - tas quickly as possible. Amin al-Sultan also knew that Muzaffar al-Dm
* •
regretted that the employment of agents of the Imperial Bank had been
permitted; for the Shah was fearful that the Russian government would
soon demand a similar - or even greater - concession. Amin al-Sultan
therefore joined . in the criticism of Amj.n al-Dawla for allowing foreign
interference with the Customs administration. The new Sadr-i Aczam
hoped that this would put him in good favour with the Shah, as well as
preparing the way for his own eventual resumption of control of the 
25
Customs. This policy did not, however, meet the immediate and pressing
need for money. The expedient of squeezing provincial governors' was
26
tried, but little revenue was raised this way.
As the terminal date for the withdrawal of the Imperial Bank’s
collecting agents from Bushire and Kirmanshah approached, there was some
)
discussion in British circles - both in Tehran and in London - that even
if the March loan was repaid in full and promptly by the Persian
27
government, those agents should remain at work. Durand suggested that
in the case of Bushire the argument of assisting with control of arms
28smuggling could be used. Rabino, however, was opposed to this, and
24. P.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.91, 29 July 1898.
25. F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.84 Telegraphic, 18 July 1898, and
F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.85 Telegraphic, 21 July 1898.
26. F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.91, 29 July 1898.
27. F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.91 Telegraphic, 15 August 1898.
28. F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.99 Telegraphic, 3 September 1898.
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said that Russian counter-claims would certainly be made if Britain 
insisted on the continued employment of the Bankfs collecting agents.
The very least Russia would demand, said Rabinq, would be control of the
Customs at Rasht and Tabriz, and this would greatly alarm the already
- 2 9  t  -
very nervous Shah. Amin al-Sultan was meanwhile trying to raise a
loan from the Russian Bank with which to pay off the outstanding British
30
one, and in August 1898, he succeeded. The amount borrowed on this 
occasion was £150,000, and after the Imperial Bank's loan had been repaid
its collecting agents were withdrawn from Bushire and Kirmanshah in mid-
31 .
September. The centre of attention, with regard to Customs
administration and reform, was now to be Naus, and his group of Belgian
assistants.
When Naus arrived in March 1898, he admitted to Hardinge that a
period of at least six months would be needed before his labours could
32
produce any tangible results. The first provinces chosen for reform
were Azarbayjan and Kirmanshah and Belgian officials were sent there in
33
the spring of 1899. It was Naus's declared aim to increase as soon as
possible the dues paid by native merchants to the 5 per cent ad valorem 
which foreign merchants had to pay under the provisions of the 1828 Treaty 
of Turkomanchay. In Tabriz, however, the attempt to implement this
29. F.O. 60:601. Durand to Salisbury, No.99 Telegraphic, 3 September 1898.
30. Letter from Keswick to Sanderson (Foreign Office), 26 September 1898. 
Copy on F .0. 60:601.
31. Letter from Keswick to Sanderson (Foreign Office), 26 September 1898. 
Copy on F.O. 60:601.
32. F.O. 60:601. Hardinge to Salisbury, No.46, 27 March 1898.
33. Destr^e, op.cit., pp.44 and 50.
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policy soon produced serious opposition. The closure of the bazaars
was threatened, and in August 1899 sporadic rioting occurred in that 
3 Acity. Durand reported how a combination of religious and mercantile
pressure forced the government in Tehran to abandon Naus’s policy and
to reduce the rate of dues paid by native merchants to their previous 
35levels. Despite these setbacks, however, Naus was soon able to 
report a marked improvement in revenues. Receipts for the first nine 
months of 1899 were £80,000 greater than those for the whole of the 
previous year, and Naus ascribed this improvement solely to the
prevention of "leakage", for none of the higher dues which he wanted to
36levy had yet been imposed.
By now Amin al-Sultan had begun to realize the seriousness of
Persia’s economic position and he renounced, at least temporarily, his
earlier hopes of again farming the Customs. In an interview with Durand
in late April 1899, he admitted that his only hope of retaining his
position, when faced with the intrigues of the group of courtiers led
by Hakim al-Mulk, lay in increasing the revenues at the disposal of the
government. For the Shah was insisting on making a visit to Europe, and
the pay of the army and the bureaucracy was again very seriously in
arrears. Unless he raised money to satisfy these demands he would be
dismissed; therefore he had decided to give all possible support to 
37Naus.
Support in Tehran did not guarantee success in the provinces. A 
long despatch from Wood gives some idea of the difficulties faced by
34. F.O. 60:609. Durand to Salisbury, No.87, 24 August 1899.
35. F.O. 60:609. Durand to Salisbury, No.87, 24 August 1899.
36. F.O. 60:609. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.113, 14 November 1899.
37. F.O. 60:608, Durand to Salisbury, No.43, 2 May 1899.
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M. Theunis, who had been appointed Inspector of Customs for Azarbayjan 
38in March 1899. Wood knew the problems of the province well (he had
been Consul-General in TabrTz since June 1892) and drew attention to
two major weaknesses with the prevailing system; the farmer of the
Customs was at the mercy of the next highest bidder for the post
(because the terms of the farming contract had become less and less
secure). At the same time, the low rates of pay of the lesser officials
in the administration had encouraged them to supplement their incomes
by imposing extraordinary charges. Even foreign merchants, who had the
recourse of appeal to their Legations in Tehran about such charges,
preferred to compound with the local officials rather than to follow
the slow and cumbrous procedures involved in any such appeal. For the
Persian merchant, however, the problem was even worse. He might pay a
lower rate of ad valorem dues, but he was also liable for other charges
such as road tax (rahdari) and octroi dues in each town through which his
goods had to pass. The latter dues were not calculated on an ad valorem
basis, but were levied on the number of loads, cases or bales of
merchandise. Wood noted the recent introduction of a new levy - "the
salamatlik" - which was collected for the safe arrival or despatch of
goods. Such irregular impositions in the province of Azarbayjan had,
reported Wood, been responsible for the diversion from Tabriz to
39Bushire of the export trade in tobacco with Turkey.
TheunisTs first task, said wood, was to institute an orderly system 
of administration and to stop the levying of extraordinary dues. The
38. F.O. 60:612. Wood to Durand, fto.l Commercial, 1 June 1899.
39. F.O. 60:612. Wood to Durand, No.l Commercial, 1 June 1899.
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Belgian was handicapped by his lack of knowledge of Persian and by
what Wood described as "the peculiar turn of the Eastern way of
thought, which admits of these people's bearing with the utmost
complacency, and during long years, abuses and exactions surreptitiously
introduced, whilst their susceptibilities are aroused and alarmed by
40
openly made innovations tending to their advantage". The idea of paying
a flat 5 per cent ad valorem, and then being free from the other dues,
did not appeal to the Persian merchants who were doubtless suspicious -
and understandably so - of promises that payments previously imposed
would no longer be collected. Their mistrust was all the greater because
Persia's central government was known to be so very weak and to have
so little power to implement its decisions in the provinces.
Theunisfs attempts to reform the Tabriz Customs administration also
met with Russian-inspired opposition. According to Wood some Russian
Muslims joined with a group of Persian merchants in making an offer of
62,000 tumans for the privilege of farming the Customs at Astara and
Ardabil. The object of the move was, having obtained possession of the
Customs in those places, to force the payment there of all entry and
export dues; leaving little or nothing to be collected at Tabriz. (The
current arrangement was for merchandise entering or leaving Persia to
pay only road taxes at these points and to pay the major ad valorem dues
on arrival at, or on departure from, Tabriz.) Theunis, however, reacted
promptly and firmly to this attempt. He pointed out to the authorities
*
in Tehran that the revenues they received would be greatly reduced if
such an offer was to be accepted, and by this argument he ensured
41rejection of the bid. *
40. F.O. 60:613. Wood to Durand, No.l Commercial, 1 June 1899.
41. F.O. 60:613. Wood to Durand, No.l Commercial, 1 June 1899.
Naus had decided in 1899 that his first task was to secure 
control of trade at Persia’s borders before he could proceed with the 
two long-term aims of abolishing internal dues on trade, and of revising
the tariff schedule so that the rates of duty payable could vary from
42 . . .
commodity to commodity. It was m  pursuit of that first objective
that Naus decided, in the light of his initial - though partial - success
in Azarbayjan and Kirmanshah to extend Belgian control of the Customs
administration to the southern points of entry to Persia, in other words,
to ports along the shores of the Persian Gulf and in ^Arabistan. His
initial proposal was to concentrate the payment of dues at Bushire and
43to close all other collecting points along the Gulf. Durand believed
that that was not a practical proposition, for there were many points
of entry for goods along the southern shore of Persia and on the Karun
river, and that to funnel all international trade through Bushire would'
44seriously harm the prosperity of the other ports. Naus soon abandoned
his initial scheme and when Simais was sent to the south in March 1900,
he was instructed to make Bushire his headquarters, but to establish
45agents at other ports too.
This was to be no easy task, for the nature of these ports varied and
the situation along the Gulf c o a . p t  and in *Arabistah reflected the great 
diversity of economic and political circumstances prevailing in Persia. 
The Belgian officials made their first and greatest efforts at Bushire,
for that was Persia’s major port on the Gulf. As irt the case of Tabriz,
42. F.O. 60:609. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.113, 14 November 1899,
and Destree, op.cit., p.55.
43. F.O. 60:609. Durand to Salisbury, No.l17, 14 December 1899.
44. F.O. 60:609. Durand to Salisbury, No.l17, 14 December 1899.
45. F.O. 60:617. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.16, 27 March 1900.
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both native and foreign firms were engaged in trading activities there.
The European companies had been very pleased to see the arrival of
collecting agents from the Imperial Bank in April 1898, and they were
dismayed at their withdrawal the following September. After Persian
control had been re-established in the autumn of 1898, the representatives of 
six European trading companies operating in Bushire sent a letter toHajc?r M»J*
Meade, the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, outlining their 
46
complaints. These were concerned largely with the unsatisfactory arrangements 
which existed for the lightering, landing, storage, clearance and delivery of 
cargoes. The letter also contained a series of suggestions for improvements. The
most important of these were that the Governor-General of Bushire and
47
and the Gulf Ports should no longer be allowed to farm the Customs,
and that the Hammal Bashi should not be allowed to hold simultaneously
48
the post of Kalantar. Meade investigated the matter and agreed that
46. F.O. 60:611. Meade to Durand, No.2, 7 January 1899.
47. The reason for this was that any appeals from decisions made by the
head of the Customs administration were referred to the Governor- 
General, and when the same man held both posts it was unlikely that 
such appeals would succeed. The administration of the Customs was 
very corrupt according to the representatives of the European 
companies. _ _
48. The post of Hammal Bashi at Bushire had apparently been created in 
the middle of the nineteenth century. That official was responsible 
for the lightering of goods to and from ocean-going vessels, and for 
their landing and loading on the shore (see letter from Anglo-Arabian 
and Persian Steamship Company to Sir Thomas Sanderson (Foreign Office)
12 March 1902, copy in F.O. 60:658). That official was answerable
to the Kalantar of Bushire. The duties of the Kalantar, a municipal
official, in late Qajar Persia varied from town to town. (See A.K.S. 
Lambton, Kalantar in Encyclopaedia of Islam (second edition)i Leiden 
(proceeding) IV, pp.474-6, and W.M. Floor, The Office of Kalantar in 
Qajar Persia in Journal of the Economic and Social History of the 
Orient 14 (1971) pp.253-68. The merchants complained that the 
Hammal Bashi was corrupt and that as the same man also held the post of 
Kalantar they had no redress against him._ For details of the complaints 
against the activities of the Hammal Bashi, see various letters from 
Sassoon and Company (who traded in Bushire) to the Foreign Office in 
1898/99, in F.O. 60:600.
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the complaints were justified and that the proposed reforms would be
beneficial. Meade also informed Durand, in Tehran, that the European
firms would be prepared to pay additional levies, as long as these
were not too large, if they could be sure that the proceeds would be
49used for improvements m  the go-down. Durand proceeded to urge the 
Persian government to act upon these complaints; but he was told that 
as the Belgians would soon be taking charge in Bushire, matters would 
be left for them to deal with; and the British Minister saw this as a 
reasonable reply.^
When the Belgians did arrive in Bushire they were met with 
considerable opposition from the Governor-General, the Hammal Bashi and 
by many local merchants. The latter were dismayed to learn that the 
Belgians intended to levy uniform rates of duty of 5 per cent ad valorem, 
while the two Persian officials were concerned about loss of income.
The-house occupied by Simais in Bushire was attacked by a mob in August, 
and discontent was seen at other ports along the Gulf,"^ The agitation 
spread inland to Shiraz and to Isfahan, where members of the religious 
classes supported the protests. The Persian traders in Bushire refused 
to land goods, or to despatch those which had arrived, to their 
destinations inland. The embargo was initially very effective, and co­
operation by local muleteers and porters prevented the European firms too
49. P.O. 60:611. Meade to Durand, No.2, 7 January 1899.
50. F.O. 60:608. Durand to Salisbury, No.43, 2 May 1899. *
.51. F.O. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.81, 25 July 1900, and
F.O. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.87, 23 August 1900. In
July 1901 Naus succeeded in persuading the central government to 
dismiss the Governor of Bushire and the Gulf Ports, F.O. 60:637. 
Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 115, -5 7 July 1901.
Ill
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from conducting business normally. Simais, who had visited Shiraz
to see the effects of the boycott there, agreed not to levy dues at
the full rate of 5 per cent immediately; but to increase the level
of dues gradually. As a result of this decision trade began to revive
53 .
after about three months. Even though Simais was not able m  1900
to increase very greatly the level of dues paid by local merchants, the
amount of revenue collected and transmitted to Tehran by the Customs
administration showed an improvement similar to that already observed
- 54
m  the case of Azarbayjan.
The Belgians had many and diverse problems to face in southern Persia,
and these often arose from the lack of control exercised by the central
government. Despite the fact that the power of that government was weak
in the north, the idea of control from Tehran was better established in
— , 5 5
Tabriz, for example, that it was in many areas of the south. Along the
F.O, 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.81, 
F.O. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.97, 
Lorimer, op.cit,, I, p.2596.
Total net customs receipts for all Persia
25 July 1900. 
20 September 1





1900-1901 1 ,700,630 +20.9






From Lorimer, op.cit,.I.p.2609. The reasons for the fluctuations from 
1903 onwards will be discussed below.
55. That is not to say that the tribal areas in the northwest were not 
often unruly and turbulent.
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Gulf the administration of the Customs had become more a matter for
tribal shaykhs and local notables than it had in the northern provinces.
The outstanding example of this was ^ Arabistan, and although a full
discussion of affairs in that province is beyond the scope of this
thesis, some of the salient features of the situation there are worthy
of attention. It has been seen that in Hardinge1s view the Customs
56
administration at Muhammara was entirely without organization. This
statement is not quite accurate. A more precise description would have
said that administration of the Customs was in the hands of Shaykh
Khazcal, not in those of the central government.
Khaz^al was the head of the powerful Muhasayn tribe, and many
57
other Arab tribal groups also acknowledged his paramountcy. It was 
essential for Khazfal, if he wished to retain such a position, that his 
authority, and not that of the Persian government, should be seen as the 
effective one in ^Arabistah. He made great efforts to that end. Khazcal 
saw the proposal to introduce Belgian customs officials into the 
province as a device on the part of the central government to limit his
powers, and this was the fundamental reason for his opposition to the
58 # —■
scheme. Khaz^.1 knew that the tribesmen of Arabist an would undoubtedly
56. F.O. 60:601. Hardinge to Salisbury, No.37 Telegraphic, 7 March 1898.
57. For further details on Khaz*al, see A.T. Wilson, A Precis of the 
Relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Sheikhs of 
^rabist'Snl Typescript Bushire 191 1 (copy in British Library) after- 
wards cited as Wilson Precis, and R.M. Burrell, Khaz%l in 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, Leiden (Proceeding) IVpp.1171-2.
58. F ,0. 60:636. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.57 Confidential, 12 April 1901. 
There had been an unsuccessful attempt by Nasir al-Din Shah to establish 
control of the Customs in *Arabistan in 1884 when the Shaykh of the 
Muhasayn was Miz^l, an elder brother of KhazSal. (Lorimer, op.cit.,
I p.1748). In July 1898 Khazcal prevented the establishment of an office 
of the Persian Customs administration at Muhammara (Wilson Precis p.48 
footnote 1). Naus first mentioned to Spring*Rice his desire to take 
charge of the Customs there in November 1899 (F.O. 60:609. Spring Rice 
to Salisbury, No.113, 14 November 1899).
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resist any attempt by the Persian government to exercise greater
authority in that province; and that if he was not successful in
defending their interests, it was likely that he would be overthrown,
59and possibly killed.
The matter was not exclusively political, for Khazcal knew that if
the Belgians were to be put in charge of the Customs, certain vital
foodstuffs that had previously not been taxed at all would then be
subject to duties, and that this would also cause great resentment
60
and would lead to turbulence. The Belgians were also seeking to 
control, if not to eliminate, the trade in arms and Khazcal knew that 
the tribesmen of CArabistan would object to such a policy.^ Wilson 
referred to both elements in Khazcal*s objections when he wrote that the 
proposal to introduce Belgians "was more than a mere administrative
59. Khazcalfs apprehensions about the designs of the central 
government had been strengthened by the institution of quarantine 
arrangements against plague at Muhammara in 1896. Those arrangements 
were for all practical purposes under British control (see Lorimer, 
op.cit., I, p.2547). When Khazcal first learnt of the proposed 
sending of Belgian experts to cArabistan in 1900, he discussed the 
matter with the British Consul in Muhammara, McDouall, and he drew 
an analogy between his position and that of the Caliph al-Amfn b. 
Harun al-Rashid some twelve centuries earlier. When al-Amxnrs 
brother, al-Ma?mun was advancing with an army against him, the 
Caliph is reported to have said "what is left is enough" said Khazcal. 
Al-Amin went on repeating^these words until only Baghdad remained
in his possession. Al-Amin then said "Baghdad is enough" reported 
Khazcal - but Ma^nun went on to capture the city and to kill his 
brother. Khazcal had no wish to share al-Amin's fate. (This 
incident is reported in Wilson Precis, p.50.)
60. Wilson Precis, p.48.
61. F.O. 60:642. Kemball to Hardinge, No.50 Confidential,*■ 9 March 1901, 
and F.O. 60:662. Kemball to Hardinge,* No.152, 2 November 1901.
114
reform, it was a revolution involving a sudden and serious increase
in the cost of the necessaries of life".^
Shaykh Khazealfs fears that the Persian government might endeavour
to use the Customs reform as a pretext for exercising greater authority
over him were not without foundation. Naus had told Spring Rice in
March 1900 that the authorities in Tehran recognized that effective 
. c  .
control of trade m  Arabist3n would require the use of an armed
vessel on the Karun river and in the Shatt al-CArab. The government
■ •
knew that the introduction of such a vessel would certainly be seen 
by the indigenous population of ^Arabistan as a sign of the declining 
authority of Khazcal, and of the increasing power of the central
4- 63government.
The issue of Belgian control of the Customs administration in 
v CArabistanhad involved the British from the early stages, for Khazcal
asked the Consul in Muhammara, McDouall, whom he knew and respected,
6A- * • *for help m  resolving the matter. Hardinge, m  Tehran, recognized
» 65 .
that the problem was a difficult one0 On the one hand the Persian
government desperately needed more revenue; but on the other hand, any
attempt by it to exercise effective control in cArabistan would certainly
lead to great turmoil for the tribesmen there were numerous and well- 
66
armed. There were lengthy and complex discussions on this issue
62. Wilson Precis, p.48.
63. F o0, 60:619. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.-38 Secret, 1 \  March 1900.
64. P.O. 60:617. Spring Rice to Salisbury, .No.35 Telegraphic, 10Marchl900.
65. F.O. 60:636. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.57 Confidential, 12 April 1901,
and F.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.117, 23 July 1901.
66. FoOo 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.l16, 15 November 1900. In
August 1901 Kemball estimated that the Shaykh could call on at least
10,000 armed followers to join him in resisting the entry of Belgian 
officials. (F.O.60:637* Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.128, 2 1 :August 
j901.) McDouall made-a more detailed estimate in 1902, and he 
concluded that Khazal’s supporters probably amounted to.some 16,000 
qrmed men. (F.O. .-60:651 . Enclosure in Des Graz to Lansdowne, No.100, 
18 July 1902.)
u s
involving Naus, the Persian government, Hardinge and emissaries of KhazSil.
Not a few problems were caused, in Hardinge’s view, by the inability of .
some of the Belgian officials to appreciate the delicacy of Khazcal's
6 7
position - and the strength of his following. At the same time, the
British Minister recognized that the Belgians had a difficult task to
perform, and he later admitted that some British officials in the Gulf
were not well-disposed towards the Belgians, and that some of them might
have been more co-operative on certain occasions,^
Khazcal made several offers to increase the amount of money which he
paid to the central government from the customs dues which he did
69
collect, as long as their collection was left m  his hands. Finally a 
compromise was reached during 1902 in which Khazcal was given the title 
of Director-General of Customs in ^Arabistan, while it was also agreed 
that the Belgians would be allowed to send one of their men to Muhammara. 
That official was under instructions to accept Khazcal’s advice about 
how regulations which had been drawn up in Tehran would be put into 
effect in ^Arabistan. The result was that the Belgian officials dealt 
with the trading activities of European firms - Khazcal showed little 
reluctance at being relieved of the responsibility for having to deal'
67. Naus and the Persian government contemplated on at least two 
occasions having recourse to the traditional policy of using one__ _ 
tribe to subdue another: in this case making use of the Bakhtiyaris
against Khazcal and his followers0 (F„0. 60:637. Hardinge to
Lansdowne, No.128, 21 August 1901, and F.O. 60:654. Hardinge to 
bansdowne, No.71 Confidential, 17 April 1902.) Naus al*so proposed a 
blockade of the port of Muhammara, without* apparently, thinking either 
how this could be achieved or how much opposition it would arouse among 
the tribes of ^Arabistah who imported and exported much food through 
that port (F.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.128 , 21 August 1901.
6 8 . F.O. 60:681. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.67 Confidential, 15 April 
and F.0„ 60:682. Private letter from Hardinge to Sanderson, 4 June 
See also Destree, op.cit., pp.62-65 for a discussion of relations 
between British and‘Belgian officials in'south and south-eastern 
Persia,
69o F.O. 60:642. Kemball to Hardinge, No.50 Confidential, 9 March 1901.
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with such troublesome people - while matters involving the native
population were left in the hands of the Shaykh. Khazcal also obtained
guarantees that certain popular foodstuffs such as tea and coffee, could
continue to be imported free of duty, and that no taxes would be imposed
on exports of dates and fruit, for they too had not previously been '
70taxed. These latter conditions were to prove very advantageous, for 
they were maintained when other parts of Persia had to suffer higher 
prices after the introduction of new import tariffs in 1903 (see below).^ 
No agreement could guarantee that relations between Khazcal and the 
Belgian officials would always be harmonious. In December 1903 the 
Shaykh complained that the Belgians had introduced more than one of their 
officials into cArabistan, and Britain supported Khazcal*s successful
plea in Tehran that only one Belgian should be permitted to operate in
72 . .the province. In the autumn of 1904 officials of the Gustoms
administration began to search locally-owned boats which plied on the 
Shatt al-cArab. Khazcal had previously given an undertaking that his 
men would police that waterway, and he objected most strongly to this
usurpation of his authority. In this matter too the Shaykh received
. . . 7 3British support, and the matter was resolved m  his favour. Later
that same year the Belgian customs official in Muhammara tried to impose
70. F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.82 Confidential, 11 May 1902. 
Khazcal remained .deeply suspicious of the motives of the Persian 
government throughout the negotiations, and at one stage he had demanded 
that any agreement reached should be guaranteed by the fcing of Belgium. 
(F.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.128, 21 August 1901.)
71. Wilson Precis, p.53.
72. Lorimer, op.cit., I, p.1751-2.
73. F.O. 60:683. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.198, 8 November 1904.
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a kind of stamp duty on documents accompanying shipments of dates which
left that port. Once more Khazcal sought British support, and again he
74received satisfaction in Tehran. In each of these cases Khaz al
showed great energy in defending his position and the rights of his
followers against any encroachment by the' central government. The
fact that he received British support on each occasion did not help to
improve relations between British and Belgian officials in the area.
Before leaving the question of Khazcalfs relations with Belgian
officials, one further aspect of his attitude is worthy of note; that
is his view that the proposed reform of the Customs administration in
CArabistan was not only an attempt by the central government to expand
its authority there, but that those changes also masked efforts by the
75
Russian government to extend its influence throughout Persia. This
was not an isolated response. A traveller who visited the minor port
of ^salu in 1902 described the reaction of the Shaykh there to the new
system: "In the establishment of Belgian officials over the customs of
76the country he saw clearly the finger of.Russia". Sykes had previously
noted similar reactions to the opening of new Russian consulates in the
south, and the signature of the loan agreements of 1900 and 1902 greatly
increased the suspicions of Russia that existed along the Persian shores 
^ 77of the Gulf. The association of the Belgians with the Russian government
74. Wilson Precis, p.53.
75. P.O. 60:637. Enclosure No.2 in Kemball to Hardinge, No,57,
2 July 1901.
76. H.J. Whigham, The Persian Problem, London 1903, p.45.
‘77. F.O. 60:641. Sykes to Lansdowne, no number, 12 January 1901. See 
also Chapter VI of this thesis.
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was made easier by the fact that when they were operating in remote
areas, the Belgian officials were often accompanied by small
78detachments of the Cossack Brigade.
Not all issues in the Gulf were as complex or as sensitive as those
which existed in ^rabistan, but even when matters were simpler, to
reach a solution often required that the Belgian official involved should
be knowledgeable about local conditions, and flexible in his approach.
This was not always so. A particular case occurred at Lingeh over the
proposal to impose the 5 per cent ad valorem rate'of duty on imports and
exports. Although the introduction of that new rate at the Gulf ports
was postponed in 1900, Simais was able to introduce it gradually during
1901. That regulation had disastrous implications for Lingeh as almost
all the commercial activity in that port consisted of entrepot trade.
The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Colonel C.A. Kemball, noted
in 1901 that "Lingah’s prosperity depends on its existence as a
distribution centre for the Arab coast and in the past the Persian customs
administration levied dues at a special rate on goods re-exported from 
79
Lm g a h  . Simais had promised that he would take note of Lingeh’s
special circumstances and that he would not insist on the full 5 per cent
80
rate being levied at that port. But Simais died while on leave from
78. For example, Belgian officials who were trying to prevent the export 
of grain from Khurasan to Russia in the summer of 1903 were 
accompanied by a detachment of troops from the Cossack Brigade.
(F.O. 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.145,-6 September*1903.)
79. F.O, 60:650. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.42,
7th March 1902.
80. F.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, N0 .II4.O, 18 September 1901.
*
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Persia in the summer of 1901, and his replacement C. Dambrain adopted
a different policy (see below). Many local merchants distrusted Simais's
promise and began to make alternative arrangements to send goods direct
to their destinations on the Arab coast without first trans-shipping
them at Lingeh. Other merchants considered using the nearby harbour at
Basidu as a new entrepot, for at that time there was no Belgian official 
81at that port. In 1901 Lingeh had been exempted from the gradual
introduction of the 5 per cent ad valorem dues on imports and exports,
and there was little apparent discontent there. In the early months of
1902, however, Dambrain imposed a new trans-shipment duty of one eighth
of a qiran per package on every package landed and re-exported within
twenty days. Most goods which were moved after having been in the port
for more than twenty days had to pay the full dues of 5 per cent on
export, having already paid that amount on import. Some goods that were
re-exported had to pay even higher dues, that on rice and clarified butter
was levied at a rate of 10 per cent, while some cargoes of wheat were
82taxed at 15 per cent. The bulk of those commodities which were trans­
shipped through Lingeh came from India and by March 1902, when forwarding 
of goods to the Arab ports had virtually ceased, there were no less than
15,000 bags and packages of Indian origin destined for customers across 
the Gulf lying uncleared in the go-down. The export of these packages 
was eventually allowed free of duty; but the confidence of the merchants 
had been badly shaken and, as steamers switched,their routes to ply,
directly between India and ports on the Arabian coast, the trade of
83
Lingeh declined sharply.
81. H.J. Whigham, op.cit., pp.51-52.
82. J.'G. Lorimer, op.cit., p.2611.
83. J.G. Lorimer, op.cit., p.2611-2. On later difficulties at Lingeh see
Destree, op.cit., pp.94-5.
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Despite the difficulties in ^Arabistan, at Lingeh, and at several
r . 84 . . .
other minor ports such as Rig and Qishm, the new Customs administration
was working quite well by the end of 1902. From the government’s point
of view the success of the reform was evident in the greatly increased
85
revenues which were being collected. This increase was due to several
factors in addition to the gradual increase in the level of dues paid
by native merchants. There was less corruption, and the general level
of administration was much better. A further important element was the
insistence of Belgian officials that all dues should be paid in specie.
In the past over half the dues had been paid by means of Persian
government bills, and these could be cashed in the bazaars only at a
86
discount, which varied between 30 and 50 per cento
There were, however, many complaints from the merchants, both native
and European that none of the money which was being collected was being
used to improve either services and facilities in the ports, or to
87maintain better security along the roads inland. Such complaints were
made even more frequently after the new, and usually higher, import
88tariffs were imposed in 1903 (see below). There was little that Naus
84. J.G. Lorimer, op.cit., p.2597.
85. See table in footnote 54 of this chapter. Whigham reported that
receipts at Bushire rose by over 60 per cent in 1900-1901, despite
the fact that Simais had not been able to increase the dues paid by 
native merchants at 5 per cent ad valorem. H.J. Whigham,
op.cit., p.159. '
86. Lorimer, op.cit., p.2608. When the Anglo-Persian Trade Declaration
was signed in February 1903, it was agreed- that British^merchants could
pay their dues in sterling as long as the Bank of England continued
to back that currency with goldD Lorimer, op.cit.,~X? p.2600.
87. F.O. 60:650o Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.42, 7 March 1902. Kemball
said that the merchants in Bandar cAbbas wanted better pier 
facilities and more covered storage for their goods.
8 8 . F.O. 60:682o Private letter, Hardinge to Sanderson, 4 June 1904.
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could do about this for all the revenues that were being collected
were absorbed in Tehran, either in payments to the army and bureaucracy,
or to help pay for the extravagances of the Court. In general, however,
Naus was widely praised by European observers for his efforts in trying
to reform the Customs, and for increasing the revenues at the disposal
89
of the central government. In March 1901 he was awarded the Order
of the Lion and the Sun by the Shah, and this was said to be "in every
90
respect a well-merited honour". Not all the Persian merchants
continued to be opposed to the Belgian administration of the Customs
when they found that the system operated fairly and impartially. Other
Persian voices, however, particularly those of members of the religious
classes, were raised against the idea of Christians collecting taxes 
92
from Muslims. This was to be an increasingly important factor in the 
opposition later shown towards Naus and his colleagues.
While his agents were establishing control of Persia's trade on the 
borders, Naus was proceeding with the other aspects of his reform: 
abolition of internal dues on trade, and revision of the tariff schedules 
to permit the levying of specific dues on different commodities. In the
89. See J. Rabino, An Economist's Notes on Persia, in Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Vol.LXIV (1901), pp.267-8, and L. Griffin,
The Present Condition of Persia, in Journal of the East India 
Association, 31 (1900), p.18.
90. Lorimer, op.cit., I, p.2596. In November 1901 Naus was promoted to the
rank of VazTr, and Hardinge reported that this honour was justified in
view of the Belgian's many labours to reform the Customs and to reach
a commercial agreement with Russia. (F .0.60-:637. Hardinge to 
Lansdowne, No.183, 29 November 1901.)
91. F.O. 60:640. Hardinge to Lansdowne, N0 .6A Commercial, 28 February 1901.
F.O. 60:642. Meshed Diary, No.9, 1 March 1901. F.O. 60:665. Hardinge
to Lansdowne, No.26, 3 March 1903. This report indicates that 
telegrams had been exchanged between leading members of the religious 
classes in Mashhad, Tehran and Karbala'* about whether it was permissible 
for Muslims to pay taxes to Christians.
92. H.W. Maclean, Report on the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade 
in Persia, Accounts and Papers, Vol.XCV (1904), paper number Cd.2146, 
p. 18.
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former aim Naus was greatly handicapped by the lack of authority of 
the central government in the provinces, and there is evidence through­
out the latter years of the reign of Muzaffar al-Din of illegal dues 
being imposed on trade. For example, Maclean reported in 1904 that
illegal charges were being levied on caravans by the Governor of 
- - 92
Kirmanshah; while Gleadowe Newcomen made many references to the
continued collection of illegal taxes from caravans carrying goods to
/ 93
and from Bandar Abbas m  the autumn and winter of 1904-5.
In pursuit of his second objective, of introducing specific dues
on different commodities, Naus had opened negotiations with the Russian
government in 1900, and in October 1901 a Russo-Persian Trade Declaration
was signed. That document was-ratified in December 1902, and it was
94agreed that it would be put into effect on 14 February 1903. The 
negotiations were conducted in secret, and when news of them reached 
the British Minister in Tehran great consternation arose. Hardinge knew
that the Russian government would be seeking to gain the most favourable
>
terms for its exports, while Naus's objective would be to increase the 
revenue accruing to the Persian government. The danger which Hardinge, 
and the British government, saw was that the new tariff might impose high
dues on Persian imports of British origin, and that this would reduce
. . .  95British trade with that country. Hardinge opened negotiations with
Naus in 1901, and agreement was reached on the terms of the new tariff
93. A.H. Gleadowe Newcomen, Report on the British Indian Commercial 
Mission to South East Persia during 1904-5, Calcutta 1906, pp.23-27
and 38-39. See also Chapter VI of this thesis.
94. For a resume of these negotiations see Lorimer op.cit., I, 
pp.2597-2602.
95. F.O. 60:640. Hardinge to Lansdowne, N0 .6A Commercial, 28 February 1901,
and detailed correspondence in F.O. 60:644.
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The details were similar to those of the Russo-Persian Declaration and
it was arranged that the new rates of duty on British goods would also
96
be introduced on 14 February 1903.
The details of the new schedule were very complex, but some 
imports from. Russia were subject to lower dues than they had previously 
been. Petroleum and kerosene, for example, were now taxed at a rate 
equivalent to 4 per cent ad valorem, and the dues on sugar of Russian 
origin were also reduced. Cotton piece goods were subject to a series 
of different rates, but the ad valorem equivalents were lower for the
97lighter varieties of cotton and most of these were of Russian origin.
The major change, however, concerned the rate of duty to be levied on 
imports of tea. According to the proposed new tariff the rate of duty
payable on white tea was to be eighteen qirans per mann, and on black
. - 98tea the rate was twelve qirans per mann. Hardinge objected very
strongly to these proposed rates on the grounds that tea was widely 
drunk in Persia and that the burden would fall most heavily on the poorer 
classes. He calculated that the new rates would cause such an increase 
in the price of tea that the additional cost per year for the average 
family would be equivalent to the monthly earnings of a labourer in
96o A copy of the Anglo-Persian Commercial Convention signed on February 
9th 1903 is to be found in E. Hertslet, A Complete Collection of the 
Treaties and Conventions and Reciprocal Regulations at Present Existing 
between Great Britain and Foreign Powers, Volume 23, London 1905, 
pp.1213-1239. The accompanying code of regulations, dated August 29th 
1904 can be found in the same work, Volume. 24, London T907, pp.819-925.
97. For a discussion of the effects of the new tariff on Russian trade 
with Persia see M.L. Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations 1828- 
1914,.Gainesville 1965, pp.53-59.
98. F.O. 60:640. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Commercial No.20,
■26 June 19010 ' - +
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Tehran. Naus admitted that tea, was very popular, and that the
new level of dues would increase the price; but he reckoned that the
increase would be less severe than Hardinge had e s t i m a t e d , T h e r e
were lengthy negotiations about the rates of duty to be levied on tea,
and the Persian government finally agreed that when the new tariff rates
were introduced dues would be levied on that commodity at less than the
maximum levels permitted under the new schedule. The rate to be charged
was ten qirans per mann on white tea, and six qirans per mann for the
black variety. At a later date a rate of seven qirans per mann for
mixed teas was introduced.
Hopes that these lower levels might reduce opposition to the new
tariff were quickly shown to be false. Estimates of the extent of the
increase in dues varied; , but it was generally reckoned that whereas
the tea had previously paid the general rate of 5 per cent ad valorem
import duty, the new level of tax was equivalent to an ad valorem
102
impost of some 75 per cent. The effect on the price of tea was
— 103
considerable. In Tabriz the increase was some 30 per cent, and in
- . 104
Hamadan it appears to have been even greater. There was much dismay
and discontent at these new higher prices and demonstrations occurred
105m  many Persian towns.
99. F.O. 60:640. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Commercial No,36, 4 October 1901,
100. P.O. 60:640. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Commercial No.36, 4 October 1901.
101. Lorimer, op.cit,, I, p o2602. - *
102. H.W. Maclean, op.cit., pp.30-31.
103. Report for the Years 1902-04 on the Trade of Azerbaijan, Accounts and
Papers, 1905, Volume CXI, Paper Cd.2236-52, p.6 .
104. H.W. Maclean, op.cit,, p.32,
105. In one single despatch Hardinge reported disquiet or disturbances about 
the new.tariff in the following, placesc Isfahan, Shiraz, Astarabad, 
Bushire, Tehran, Tabriz and Mashhad. *P.0.60:665. Hardinge to 
Lansdowne, No,43, 31 March 1903.
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Some of the most violent protests took place in Tabriz, where
the Belgian Director of Customs for Azarbayjan, J. Priem, was compelled
to leave the city for almost a month in early June 1903. The incident
which began the rioting was an attack by religious students on an
Armenian-owned wine shop, but the demonstrations quickly grew and
turned into a protest against the new tariffs, and the presence of
Belgian officials in Persia. Telegrams were exchanged between the
religious leaders of Tabriz and their colleagues in Tehran, Najaf and
Karbala*. These messages reflected the general nature of the discontent,
for as well as condemning the new tariffs, they criticised both the
increasing influence of Europeans in Persia and the country's growing
107
indebtedness to Russia0
The Vali ahd, Muhammad Ali, was not very active in suppressing 
the disturbances in Tabriz. • In part this was due to a lack of troops.
The British Consul also pointed out, however, that the Vali^hd had 
reasons of his own for wishing to see Priem removed from Tabriz, 
for the Belgian had refused to lend Muhammad ‘Ali money from the customs 
receipts. Priem had also seized a quantity of rifles which were being 
imported illegally from Turkey. The ValiVhd was believed to have
accepted a bribe to allow their entry, but Priem had discovered the
108 —
weapons and had impounded themD Another cause of the Tabriz riots
was the desire by some Persians, who had previously worked for the
Customs administration, to secure the dismissal of the Belgian officials
106. F.O. 60:665o Hardinge to Lansdowne, Very Confidential No.85,
10 June 1903.
107. F.O, 60:665o Hardinge to Lansdowne, Confidential No.94, 23 June 1903.
108. F.O. 60:665. Stevens (Tabriz) to Hardinge, No.7 Very Secret,
25 June 1903,
126
and so to regain their former lucrative posts. The violence in 
Tabriz was considerable, and the ValTcahd finally had to pay a local 
brigand, Rahim Khan, and his followers to help restore order.
Although the new levels of duty were introduced less than a week 
after the Anglo-Persian agreement was signed in February 1903, the 
mercantile community in Persia had been aware that the negotiations were 
proceeding; and many merchants had taken the precaution of importing 
greater quantities of goods than was usual before the new tariffs were 
introduced. By this means they tried to avoid, at least temporarily, 
paying the new higher rates of import tax. As a result of this action, 
there were considerable stocks of certain commodities in the country, 
and the introduction of the new tariff did not lead to an immediate 
shortage of goods0 It should also be noted that although some import 
dues were reduced, the merchants do not appear to have lowered their 
prices correspondingly for those commodities, so from the consumer's
point of view there was no advantage at all to be seen in the new
«- 111arrangements 0
As a result'of the introduction of the new tariffs, legitimate
commercial activity along the Persian Gulf declined. The Political
Resident pointed to one of the consequences of the new tariffs when he
wrote, "In the Persian Gulf heavy duties are synonomous with heavy 
112smuggling". Although the amount of tea imports declared to the
109. FoO. 60:665. Stevens (Tabriz) to Hardinge, No.7 Very Secret,
25 June 1903. _
110. F.O. 60:665. Stevens (Tabriz) to Hardinge, No.7 Very Secret,
25 June 1903o
111o F o0o 60:681o Hardinge to Lansdowne, No,26, 10 February 1904.
112. Report for the Year 1904-05 on the Trade and Commerce of Bushire, 
Accounts and Papers 1906, Volume CXXVI, Paper No.Cd02682-106, p.7.
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Customs administration declined greatly, there does not seem to have
been a prolonged and corresponding shortage of that commodity on the
market. Much smuggling did take place, some of it occurring along
the Tangistani coast; where it was reported that smuggled tea was
on sale at a price 40 per cent, less than that which was charged in
113nearby Bushire for tea which had been imported legally.
The Customs administration had few means of suppressing such
illicit tradec The Persian government bought a Belgian steam yacht, the
Selika and, after she had been equipped with two small guns and renamed
114
Muzaffar, she began anti-smuggling patrols in the spring of 1903.
 o
One vessel, however, was not sufficient for the task of patrolling the 
whole of Persia's southern shores, and in 1905 the government ordered 
five armed sea-going launches from the Royal Iridian Marine Dockyard in
Bombay. The first two of these vessels were delivered at the end of
- 1151906, just before Muzaffar al-Din died.
The introduction of the 1903 Tariff Agreement certainly increased
the price of many foodstuffs and other essential commodities throughout
Persia. It is difficult to reach any conclusion about the precise
degree of that increase because the evidence is fragmentary; moreover,
the high costs of transport in Persia meant that the price of goods
often varied considerably from one region of the country to another
making comparison difficult,, In the case of Isfahan it seems clear that
113. Lorimer, op„cit., I, p.2610.
114. F.O. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.26, 3 March 19030
115. Lorimer, op„ci1 0, I, p.2604-5.
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prices were rising before 1 903. -The reasons for these earlier price rises 
were many and varied; but as far as the population was concerned the 
introduction of the new tariff was an immediate and obvious cause of 
higher prices. The fact that the Belgians were in charge of the 
Customs administration gave a distinctly anti-European and anti- 
Christian flavour to the protests. There seems little doubt that the 
introduction in 1903 of new levels of import dues caused considerable 
opposition among the population at large, it was condemned by members 
of the religious classes, including leading mujtahids in Najaf and 
Karbala*; and it reawakened the hostility of Persian merchants to the 
Belgian officials which had gradually subsided since the disturbances 
of 1900.
The immediate response of many of the'merchants to the imposition 
of the new tariff was to reduce imports. The impact of this was not 
initially serious because, as has already been noted, stocks of many 
commodities had earlier been increased and smuggling also took place 
on a considerable scale. The reduction in. legitimate trade during
1903-4 was not reflected in the customs receipts, however, for the 
higher level of dues more than compensated for the reduced volume
116o See Chapter VII of this thesis. From other provinces too there 
is evidence of rising prices and of the hardships suffered by, 
the poorer classes. "There seems little doubt that the population 
is becoming more and more impoverished." Report for the Year
1904-5 on the Trade of Azerbaijan, Accounts and Papers 1906,
Volume CXXVII, Paper number Cd.2682-32,.p.4. "It is^a matter of 
common knowledge that the wages which would formerly support a 
family now hardly suffice to support a single member of it."
Report for the Year 1905-6 on the Trade of Khorassan, Accounts 
and Papers 1906, Volume CXXVII, Paper No.Cd,2682-249, p.18.
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of trade m  that year; but the commercial recession was to
continue for much longer than Naus had expected. This was because
of external factors.
There were some signs of a revival in trade at the Persian Gulf
ports by the late months of 1903, and one of the reasons for this was
that the tariff schedule was very complex and it had not proved easy
to operate. Some of the Belgian officials in the Gulf ports were
reported to be putting it on One side as far as certain commodities were
concerned and levying instead a straight ad valorem duty of around 8 per 
118
cent. This certainly helped the partial revival of trading activity 
the Gulfo In 1904, however, there was a serious reduction in commerce 
because of the cholera epidemic. Trade was further damaged by the 
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese in February 1904' and by the later 
disturbances within Russia. That war had differential effects on the 
trade of Persia. Russian demand for some commodities, such as wheat 
increased, while demand for cotton declined. The overall result was a 
notable reduction in the volume of trade, and with it a decline in the
190
level of Persian customs receipts.
117. See aggregate table under footnote 54.
118. Lorimer, op.cit., I, p .2611. It is not evident from this
source which specific commodities were being so treated, but 
difficulties were greatest on some of the commodities taxed b y ' 
weight for there were disputes about the actual weight of the 
goods being imported as opposed to the total weight of the 
goods plus their packaging. See Report for the Year 1903-4 on 
the Trade and Commerce of the Persian Gulf, Accounts and Papers 
1904, Volume C, Paper No.Cd.1766-116, p.3T ---
119. See Chapter V of this thesis.
120. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge by Lansdowne, No.118 Confidential,
21 June 1904.
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The Russo-Japanese war had a greater impact on Persia’s trade
across her northern borders than it had on trade in the Gulf; but
a change of circumstances there also resulted in a decline in Persia’s
maritime trade in 1905 and 1906. This was because of the arrival in
May 19Q5 of a new Belgian Director of Customs at Bushire, J.B. Heynssens.
That official refused to continue the ad hoc arrangement of levying
dues on many commodities at the rate of 8 per cent ad valorem, and he
121
insisted instead on applying the full tariff regulations of 1903. There
was much opposition to this, particularly to the levying of a 50 per
cent rate of duty on imported dates - an important local foodstuff.
Members of the religious classes led protests in Bushire against this
new policy, and trade at that port came to a halt for more than two
122
months m  the summer of 1905o
In brief, then, the new tariff agreement of 1903 caused considerable 
and persistent discontent. It drew attention to the position of the 
Belgians in Persia, and it made them the,focus of much opposition.
Because of external factors, the new agreement did not increase the 
income at the disposal of the central government to the extent which had 
been hoped, and it did little to help alleviate the many economic 
difficulties faced by Persia.
The early successes achieved by Naus had led to his taking charge 
of other branches of the bureaucracy in addition to the Customs 
administration. Hardinge had described the Belgian in 1901 as being
121. Report for the Year 1905 on the Trade and Commerce of Bushire, 
Accounts and Papers 1906, Volume CXXVII, Paper Cd.2682-106, p.6 .
122. Lorimer, op.cit., I, p.2615. *
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virtually the finance minister of Persia. In October 1903, Naus
. . 124was made Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. In a land as large as
Persia, where the geographical barriers to communication are considerable,
the maintenance of an efficient and secure governmental messenger system
had long been regarded as essential for effective administration* The
introduction of the telegraph had not yet replaced that need during
the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah. When Naus took over responsibility
for the Post that service was in a very poor condition* The Persian
official who had previously been responsible for it, Vazir-i Humayun,
had accompanied Muzaffar al-Din on his visit to Europe in 1900 and had
spent much money there. On his return he had proceeded to restore his
personal finances by selling many of the horses belonging to the Post.
In several parts of Persia only donkeys were available for use by the
125
couriers at the end of 1900*
Naus put forward many schemes for financial reform but few were
implemented* Attempts to reduce the expenses of Muzaffar al-Dinfs Court
126met with little success. Several plans for reform of the taxes on
land had to be abandoned in the face of great and persistent opposition
from landowners, some of .whom were also influential members of the
. . 127
religious classes. Proposals for the payment of stamp duties on
123. P.O. 60:640. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No,56 Commercial Secret,
7 July 1901*
124. Destree, .op.cit., p*344, and F.O.60:650* Hardinge to Lansdowne,
No.72, 17 April 1902*
125. F.O* 60:618. Spring Rice to Lansdowne, No.134, 13 December 1900.
126* F*0. 60:640. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.20 Commercial, 26 June 1901j
F*0* 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.41 Very Confidential, 30 March
1903, and P.0.60:681. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.15, 26 January 1904. 
127, FoOo 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.18, 4 February 1902:
P.O. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No*26, 3 March 1903;
F.O. 60:665* Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.41 Very Confidential,
30 March 1903; F o0* 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No*141 Secret,
14 September 1903; F*0. 60:681. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.15,
26 January 1904*
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certain documents also met strong resistance by religious leaders who
resented what they saw as interference with their responsibility for
the conduct of legal matters; and that scheme too had to be 
128
abandoned. Naus also proposed to increase the rate at which certain
taxes in kind were commuted for cash payments„ This too aroused much
129opposition by those whose tax payments would have been increased,.
The failure of these schemes reflected the weakness of the Persian
government; but the very fact that Naus had proposed them greatly
increased the degree and extent of hostility to him.
During 1904 Belgian officials did take partial charge of the
payment of salaries and pensions in some provinces. This led to
considerable resentment by those who had previously profited from
130
carrying out that task. NausTs early success in increasing the 
amount of customs revenues collected aroused feelings of covetousness 
among some Persian officials who tried to get the Belgian dismissed so
1 O I
that they could take control of that potentially lucrative service.
As part of the criticism against him, he and other members of his staff 
were accused of peculation, but there is no evidence in the British
128. F.O. 60:683. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.240 Confidential,
31 December 1904, and F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.10 
Confidential, 6 January 1905.
129. Some landowners who paid taxes in wheatjwere apparently compounding
their payments on the basis of one kharvar of wheat being worth the 
equivalent of five shillings. In fact, one kharvar of wheat, in the 
particular area quoted by Naus to Hardinge (which is not named in 
the despatch), had a market value equivalent to £1.4.0. Naus wished 
to increase the cash payments of those landowners by a corresponding 
amount. (F«0, 60:681. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.40, 20 February 1904.)
130. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.150, 16 August 1904, and
F.O. 60:683. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.173, 11 September 1904.
131. F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansflowne, No.40 Confidential,
28 February 1905.
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132archives which would support such a charge. Naus was also accused
of employing Armenian Christians rather than Muslims; and when anti-
Armenian feeling rose sharply throughout Persia during the massacres
of Muslims in southern Russia in 1905, this charge was levelled against
133him with greater frequency.
The fact that the Belgians were undertaking often difficult tasks 
meant that they were exposed to considerable criticism. This was 
particularly true in the case of officials who tried to enforce quarantine 
procedures on Persia's western frontier in 1904 against the entry of
1 Q/
cholera. Later moves to limit the spread and effects of that disease
were also misunderstood and resented. There were several other
incidents too in the Customs administration and in other areas which
aroused popular opposition to the Belgians; sometimes because of the
lack of sensitivity on the part of these officials to local custom and 
135practice.
In Khurasan, for example, Belgian officials endeavoured on several
136
occasions to impose a tax on sheep entering Persia from Russia. The
132. Tn 1903 Naus and his compatriots had been accused of increasing 
import tariffs so as to raise the money with which to purchase the 
Crown Jewels of Iran. F o0. 60;666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.128, 
18 August 1903. On accusations against the Belgians, see also 
Destree, op.cit., pp. 121 and 130.
133. F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.40 Confidential,
28 February 1905.
134o See Chapter V of this thesis, and Destree, op.cit., pp.117-119.
135. Naus had recognized that it was very difficult to recruit officials 
who were willing to serve in Persia and" who possessed the desirable 
characteristics for work in that country. F.O.60:637. Hardinge to 
Lansdowne, No.57, 7 July 19010 See also Chapter VII of this thesis 
for problems arising from the actions of a Belgian official in 
Isfahan in 1905.
136. F^O. 60:682o Hardinge to Lan,sdowne, No. 120, 22 June 1904.
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flocks in question were not being imported in the usual sense of
that word, for they were owned by Persians and were sent to Russia to
graze for part of the year. Such movements of animals across the border
were well established. Some of the flocks in question were quite large -
on one occasion the Belgians tried to impose a tax of 1 qiran per head
137on a flock of some 130,000 sheep. The activities of the Belgian
officials in endeavouring to introduce such new taxes were bitterly
resented by the herdsmen and owners of the flocks. Attempts to collect
such levies at Quchan in 1904 led to violent protests and the
138
destruction of the customs post there. The fact that agriculture in
this region was suffering at that time from attacks by locusts made the
. . 139imposition of new taxes even less acceptable.
Earlier attempts to impose new taxes on flocks had been made in
south-eastern Persia0 The proposals there also involved the levying of
a tax on the estimated amount of wool removed from the fleece of each
140
sheep while it was grazing outside Persian territory. Such proposals
aroused much resentment on the part of the Baluchi herdsmen. Attempts 
such as these to introduce new imposts were regarded by the local 
population as repressive, and as unwarranted acts of interference; in 
the absence of sufficient troops such schemes were also unworkable. 
Another source of discontent was the Belgian attempt to introduce pass-
137. F.0o 60:688. Meshed Diary, 14 May 19040
1380 F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.i20, 22 June 1904.
139. FoO. 60:688. Meshed Diary, 18 June 1904o
140. F.O. 60:650. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.42,
12 March 1902; and F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.66, 
12 April 1902o
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. . - — 141ports for people living on the borders of Sistan. Many of the
people in that area were accustomed to moving freely into and out
of Afghan territory, and they could see little reason why foreign
officials should be allowed to impose restrictions upon them.
Belgian officials were also responsible for the introduction, in
1901, of new cupro-nickel coins of low denomination. The poorer classes
of Persia had been much afflicted in earlier years by a shortage of
copper coinage, and by its poor quality. The latter factor meant that
coins of low denomination were often exchangeable only at a considerable
1^2
loss against the higher value silver coins. There had been great
141. Naus had taken charge of the Passport Department in 1903. On the 
problems caused in Sistan, see F.O. 60:666. Grant Duff to Lansdowne,. 
No.182, 11 November 1903; and F.O. 60:688. Seistan Diary, 16 July
1904. On relations between the Belgians in south-east Persia and
the British officials there see Destree, op.cit. , pp0108— 111.
142, There are several reports from British Ministers in Tehran and from 
consular officials in the provinces about the hardships suffered by 
the poorer classes during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah because 
of the depreciation in the value of copper coins. The problem was a 
recurrent one in the nineteenth century (see Report on the Trade of 
Persia, Accounts and Papers 1884, Volume LXXIX, Paper No.C.3868, p.79). 
The issue turned on the fact that the qiran was a silver coin but the
shahi was a copper oneD Theoretically 20 shahis were equal to one
qiran, but much of the copper coinage was debased and the rate of 
exchange of the shahi against the qiran varied according to I the 
quality of the copper coin. Muzaffar al-Dinfs government had tried
in the early months of his reign to buy in much of the debased 
coinage and to mint and issue new shahis of a weight and fineness that 
would guarantee their value at 20 shahis equal to 1 qiran. This 
policy did not operate for very long, and debased copper coins were 
again issued. The post of Master of the Mint was a much coveted 
office because of the profits which could be made by issuing debased 
currency (F.O. 60:608. Des Graz to Salisbury, No.58, 31 May 1899) .p_
At Isfahan in December 1898 the rate of exchange was about 44 shahis 
per qiran, with an agio of an additional shahi per qiran being taken 
by the sarrafs (money changers) on all exchanges. (F.O. 248:676. 
Aganoor to Durand, Noo50, 8 December 1898^) In May 1899 the rate of 
exchange in Tehran was 75 shahis per qiran. In the late^months of 
1900 the government began to issue new cupro-nickel shahi coins0 
These had been struck under Belgian supervision. Many Persians 
viewed them with great suspicion, believing that they too, like the 
earlier copper coins, would fluctuate in value. (F.O. 248:742.
Aganoor to Spring Rice, Noc2, I February 1901.) On the general back­
ground to this issue, see E. Lorini, La Persia Economica Contemporanea 
e la sua Questione Monetaria, Rome 1900, ppo308-l8, and h<,W. haclean, 
op.cit,, p.95*
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distress caused to the poorer classes by these fluctuations, and
they were understandably suspicious of the new coins. The fact that
the Belgians were responsible for their introduction rendered those
officials the object of much mistrust and criticism. Sometimes the
actions of Belgian officials were seen as a direct attack on Islam.
An example of this occurred in 1903 when the Customs administration in
Bushire impounded a large quantity of anti-Babi tracts which had been
. 143
published m  Bombay and which had been sent for distribution m  Persia.
The Belgian officials acted on this occasion in order to prevent
further violence against that sect.. But many members of the population
of Bushire saw the impounding of the books as an act of intolerable
interference on the part of the Belgians. Demonstrations resulted and
144
the books were released. In February 1905 there occurred the well-
publicised incident in which Naus appeared at a party dressed as a
- 145
mulla. This caused very great anger and resentment.
Evidence of anti-Belgian feelings comes, therefore, from many
quarters, but it was perhaps expressed most succinctly in an anonymous
and clandestine Persian broadsheet distributed in Tehran in late
February 1905o In translation it reads, "0 Moslems, Islam is dead and
infidelity is up. The Sovereign is Naus, the Vizir is Lavers and the
146Statesmen Christians. It is the end". At a time when such opposition
143. F.O. 248:788. Kemball to Hardinge, No.17, 17 August 1903.
144. F.O, 248:788. Kemball to Hardinge, Noo107_, 3 October^1903.
145. F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.40 Confidential,
28 February 1902o
146. FoOo 60:698. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.40 Confidential,
28 February 1902o Lavers was one of Naus’s chief assistants whose 
particular responsibility at^that time was for the postal service.
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had been generated, and when emotions were running so high, it is not 
difficult to see why the dismissal of Naus and his Belgian colleagues 




THE CHOLERA EPIDEMIC OF 1904
"Among so many premature deaths, a large number were due to the 
great epidemics which descended frequently upon a humanity ill- 
equipped to combat them; among the poor another cause was famine.
Added to the constant acts of violence these disasters gave life 
a quality of perpetual insecurity."
Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, 
translated by L.A. Manyon,
London 1961, p.73o
The pattern of diffusion and the effects of epidemics remain; one 
of the many neglected areas of Islamic social history. The affliction 
which probably had the greatest impact on the Middle East is plague and 
in the nineteenth century one of Nasir al-Din Shah’s chief physicians,
Dr. J.D. Tholozon, wrote a series of studies on that disease.* More 
recently MoWo Dols has produced an authoritative monograph on the 
epidemic of plague which devastated the Middle East in the fourteenth
2
century before advancing on Europe where it was known as the "Black Death". 
The very great impact of that pandemic, and the fact that the symptoms of
1. J.Do Tholozan:
Une Epidemie de Peste en Mesapotamie en 1867. Paris 1869:
Histoire de la peste bubonique en Perse ou determination de son 
origine, de sa marche, du cycle de ces apparitions et de la cause 
de son extinction snontan£e. Paris 1874:
Histoire de la peste bubonique en Mesapotamie ou determination de 
son origine, de sa marche, du cycle de ces apparitions et de la 
cause de son extinction spontanee. Paris 1874:
Histoire de la peste bubonique au Caucasef en Armenie et en Anatolie 
dans le premiere moitie du dix-neuvi&me siecle. Paris 1876:
La Peste en Turquie dans les temps modernes. Paris 1880*;
An interesting account of an epidemic in one town is provided by 
P. Russell: A Treatise on the Plague: Containing an historical 
journal and medical account of the Plague at Aleppo in the years 1760,
1761, 1762, London 17920 
20 MoW0 Dols, The Black Death in the Middle East, Princeton 1977.
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plague are distinctive, have given it a special place in medical history.
Other diseases have, however, been very serious in the effects, but the
lack of precise terminology often makes it difficult to decide which
3particular illness was afflicting the population. The specific vibrio
which is responsible for cholera was not isolated by R. Koch until 1883,
but even before that date the European powers had begun to recognize that
the Indian sub-continent was a major source of intestinal diseases, and
that the annual congregation of Muslim pilgrims in the Hijaz was a major
4
cause of their dissemination.
Serious outbreaks of the infection now recognized as cholera began 
in India in 1817 and in 1826. The latter wave of infection took six years 
to reach Scotland and the United States of America. Further outbreaks 
occurred in the sub-continent in 1840 and 1849, and in 1863/64 the disease 
was carried to the Hijaz by Indian pilgrims. There some 15,000 out of
90,000 pilgrims died, in Egypt the death toll rose to 60,000 while the 
disease later killed some 200,000 people in the major cities of Europe and 
in New York, Cholera reappeared in India on a major scale in 1879, 1891, 
and 1902. European fears of the disease, and greater knowledge of its 
etiology, had stimulated international discussions aimed at controlling 
its spread and in 1892 an International Sanitary Convention was signed in 
Venice. This agreement was concerned with shipping between Asia and Europe,
3. M.W. Dols, The Black Death in the Middle East, pp.35 and 316.
4. There are several works which discuss the role of the pi-lgrimage in 
the spread of diseases. One of the most useful is F. Duguet:




and in particular on the movement of Muslim pilgrims to and from the 
Hijaz. As a result of this increased international awareness there is 
an appreciable body of evidence available concerning the international 
diffusion of cholera in the second half of the nineteenth century. The 
work of R. Koch in Egypt, and later in India, led to effective counter­
measures being adopted in Europe, and the 1902 outbreak in India was the
5
last occasion on which the disease reached pandemic proportions.
The history of cholera within the Middle East is, however, a 
subject to which relatively little research has been devoted. The 
European sources tend to concentrate on the sea-borne transmission of 
the disease and on its diffusion during the pilgrimage season. The 
spread of cholera to Persia by the land route - by Indian pilgrims going 
to Mecca or by other pilgrims returning therefrom - is largely ignored, 
as is its transmission by vessels plying between the sub-continent and 
the ports of the Persian Gulf.
Although the outbreak of cholera in Persia may have been of little
interest to the European powers the result for the inhabitants of that
country were often serious. The 1817 Indian outbreak took four years to
reach Persia with Shiraz suffering the worst effects. In 1845 the
disease again entered Persia from India via Afghanistan, some 12,000 people
were reported to have died in Tehran but the infection did not spread
7
westward of Qazvin. The attack of 1851/53 seems to have come from the 
West - the immediate source of infection was Baghdad - and from the
5„ Background information drawn from "Cholera", Encyclopedia Britannica. 
Chicago 1970, Vol.5, pp.674-5.
6. A general discussion of outbreal.cs of cholera in Persia during the 
nineteenth century can be found in Dr. J.Go Baker, "Remarks on the 
Most Prevalent Diseases and the Climate of Northern Persia", in 
Accounts and Papers (1886), Volume LXVII, Appendix to Paper C.4781,
p.325o
7. C. Elgood, A Medical History of Persia, Cambridge 1951, pp.496-7.
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capital the disease spread as far as Kirman and Bushire. Ten years
later cholera reappeared in Tehran and in Mashhad - pilgrims were
9
reported to have spread it from the latter city. In 1869-70 it existed 
at Isfahan, and Shiraz where some 2,000 people are said to have died,1^ 
but the next major attack did not take place until 18920 It was this 
outbreak and its spread from Mashhad which Gertrude Bell described so 
graphically.11 Panic among the population led to flight from Tehran, 
the example being set by the Shah, and thus the disease was disseminated 
over a still wider area. As fear grew, so did religious fervour with some 
members of the religious classes explaining the visitation of the sickness 
as divine retribution for the presence of so many Europeans in Persia. 
These considerations, together with a neglect of simple rules of hygiene 
led Gertrude Bell to conclude that she was living "in a land where
12
Ignorance is for ever preparing a smooth highway for the feet of Death".
The outbreak of cholera which began in 1904 was therefore no novel 
experience for Persia or its people; but to study this epidemic in some 
detail is to gain an insight into the values and attitudes of contemporary 
Persian society.
The variety of the disease which affected Persia was "classical" 
cholera. It is an acute diarrhoeal disease of short duration, but 
untreated it is often fatal. The illness is exclusively one which attacks 
man, and the susceptibility of the individual depends upon complex
8, C D Elgood, op.cit., ppo506-7,
9* Ibid., p.515.
10. Ibid., pp.515-16.
11o G. Bell, Persian Pictures, London 1928, pp.59-68.
120 Ibid., p„68„ A
14&
circumstances concerned with levels of gastric acidity, but some 
people appear to have a natural resistance to the disease. The cholera 
vibrio is active in the small intestine and after an incubation period 
which can vary between a few hours and five days, the patient begins to 
experience severe diarrhoea and vomiting. The body becomes subject to 
dehydration and death may occur because of failure of the circulatory or 
renal systems.
The dissemination of the disease depends on a connection being made
between the faeces of an infected person and the mouth of the victim-to-
be. The vehicle is usually water, but it can also be via flies to raw
food such as fruit or leafy vegetablesc Because the mode of transmission
is often by the infection of a water supply system, and because the
incubation period is so short, the number of cases often rises very
quickly and the speed with which mortality occurs also gives the disease
a very dramatic impact. Fortunately, however, the infecting vibrio is
a relatively fragile organism; without moisture and an oxygen supply it
soon dies, but it can be spread by indirect contact via food, water and
flies. For classical cholera there is no true ’’carrier" status, but
because the attack can lack symptoms a person may unknowingly pass
infective vibrios to others for up to a week after his or her initial
infection. Defecation in fields near inhabited areas, or near water
supplies, and the use of fresh night soil on vegetable plots are well-
13known methods by whrch the vibrio is transmitted.
13. I would like to repeat my thanks to Dr. B 0 Anderson of the 
University of London Health Service, who worked in Calcutta 
during the 1971 cholera epidemic^, for her great assistance with 
the medical aspects of this chapter.
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The immediate source of the Persian epidemic of 1904 would appear
to have been the religious city of Karbala, where cholera was
14
reported m  December 1903. From there the infection reached Persia by
two routes - the first wave entered via Kirmanshah and proceeded via
Hamadan to Tehran, Mashhad and on to Central Asia. This route was also
responsible for the disease reaching Tabriz, and spreading via Qumm to
Isfahan. A second, later, path of infection from Karbala lay via Basra 
« •
to the ports of the Gulf and thence inland to Shiraz. The two infections
"met" at the village in Qumisheh, some 45 miles south of Isfahan in the
late autumn of 1904. For the northerly progress of the disease it is
possible to offer an explanation of how the infection was spread and this
too adds to the interest and value of the study.
Soon after the disease was reported in December 1903, the Persian
authorities began to impose quarantine restrictions on travellers entering
the country at Qasr-i .Shirin. The task of maintaining this single
quarantine post quickly passed to the Belgian officials who were already
15
m  charge of the collection of customs dues there. It is not clear
whether the Belgians sought to perform this task or whether it was given
to them because of pressure by European diplomats in Tehran who were
already apprehensive about the possible effects if the disease did enter
Persia. What quickly became obvious, however, was that the local population,
as well as those travellers whose movements were restricted, were very
16
resentful about this extension in the powers of European officials.
This was to become a common and important factor in the Persian 
population's attitude to the progress of the disease. The British Minister
14. H.L. Rabino Report on T^ade of Kermanshah 1903-1904, in 
Accounts and Papers (1904), Volume C, Paper Cd. 1766,-123




in Tehran, Sir Arthur Hardinge, returned to his post from Baghdad in 
January 1904 and reported that the employee of the Belgians who was in 
charge at Qasr-i Shlrln, Monsieur Cesari, was a "tough and very combative 
Corsican".
Indian Muslims returning from Najaf and Karbala^seem to have
accepted the restrictions imposed by the European authorities with
patience - possibly because they were more familiar with European control
in their homeland. Persian pilgrims, however, soon became resentful.
There were reports that some un-named religious authorities in Najaf had
said that to kill Cesari would be a meritorious deed as his actions were
IS
preventing Muslims from pursuing pious practices - i.e. pilgrimage. 9
Cesari received little assistance from the local Persian authorities, an
understandable reaction in view of the growing anger of the religious
classes against him, and in February he requested that 100 cavalry and
. 1 9300 infantry be sent from Tehran to assist in enforcing the quarantine.
No such help was forthcoming and at the end of February 1904 a group of
20pilgrims broke through the quarantine cordon and entered Persia. The
results were to be very serious for the country - but opportunely the
leader of the group of pilgrims involved was so eminent that his progress
was followed with much attention - and because of that it is now possible
to trace, at least partially, the way in which the disease was spread
across northern Persia.
The man in question was Aqa Hasan Mamaghanf, an importantcalim from
* >
Najaf, and he was on his way to Mashhad with, in HardingeTs words "hundreds
21




19. F.O. 60:681. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.42, 2 March 1904.
20. Ibid.
21. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne No,86, 19 May 1904. Mamaghani's 
group comprised some 800 people when he Entered Persia (F.O. 60:682. 
Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.119, 21 June 1904).
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importance was such that he had attracted a large group of followers, and 
even without the existence of cholera his movements would have been 
followed with much attention - the presence of cholera among them adds a 
doleful and macabre note to .their pilgrimage. That Mamaghani*s company 
were responsible for the entry and early spread of the disease was 
recognized at the time, Naus told Hardinge in July that he had proposed
offering Mamaghani a sum equivalent to £20,000 not to .enter Persia, but
c 22that Ayn al-Dawla had not acted on this suggestion.
It is necessary here to note the size of pilgrim traffic between 
Persia and the holy cities of Iraq. H.L. Rabino, who knew Persia well, and 
who had lived for three years in Kirmanshah - the town nearest to the major 
border post - believed that in 1902-3 some 25,000 people crossed into Iraq 
by mule, donkey or horse. Pilgrims who used such transport required pass­
ports so their number could be known with some accuracy, those who went on
foot did not require such documents and Rabino estimated their number at
23
some 75,000 per year. (A British report of 1875 quoted a similar total of 
24
100,000 pilgrims.) Rabino also noted that approximately 3,500 corpses per 
year entered Iraq via the Kirmanshah route. A tax was levied on each corpse
and because of evasion of that payment the figure quoted may not be entirely
- 25 accurate□
— — 26 
The first reports of cholera in Kirmanshah began in late March 1904,
and the disease was to persist in that town until July. In April Hardinge
sent Dr. H. Scott, one of the Legation physicians, to the area and on
*■
220 F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.126, 17 July 1904.
23. H.L. Rabino, Report of the Trade of Kermanshah 1902-3, in Accounts 
and Papers Cl903). Volume LXXVIII, Paper C d  J386-120, p.8.
24. F.O. 60:373. Thomson to Derby, 30 September 1875, cited in C. Issawi 
(editor) The Economic History of Iran 1800-1914, Chicago 1971, p.129.
25. H.L. Rabino, Report on the Trade of Kermanshah, op.cit.
26. F.O. 60:685. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Telegraphic Commercial No.2A,
6 April 1904.
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April 21st he reported that the Belgian authorities had been able to 
establish effective quarantine services at Blsittin; but that at Kangavar 
the situation was very bad, for cholera was known to exist there and that 
the best remedy was to isolate that place. At the same time all traffic
27 -  t
to and from Iraq should be forbidden, said Scott. Mamaghani, who was
still in the area, had been very vocal in his criticism of the impious
restrictions being imposed on pilgrims by the Europeans>and on April 25th,
he defied the orders of a Turkish doctor who was assisting with the
quarantine services, Dr. Vaume, and led his followers on a visit to
Kangavar to make sure that all restrictions on pilgrims there were lifted.
During that visit Dr. Vaume was attacked and groups of travellers who had
28
been detained at that spot were freed to continue their journeys. By
this time the daily death rate in Kirmanshah had risen to % Q  and riots
were followed by the exodus from the town of more than a third of the
population - some of whom took the disease with them to the surrounding
29
villages where they sought refuge. This frightened exodus from a centre 
of infection was to be a repeated phenomenon throughout the progress of 
the epidemico
The importance of water in the diffusion of cholera has already been
noted and in Kirmanshah conditions of hygiene were far from ideal. Even
before the disease arrived Rabino had commented upon the dangers inherent
in a situation where the spent water from one house constituted the water
30
supply of its neighbour at a lower altitude. (In the 1892 epidemic the
27. E.O. 60:682o Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.86, 19 May 1904.
2 8 .  I b i d o
2 9 .  I b i d o
30. F.O. 6Q.:<?81. Hardinge to^Lansdawne, No.17, Confidential,
27 January 1904.
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German Chargd d1Affaires in Tehran had described how in Qulhak water
which had been used for washing corpses became the drinking water
31
supply of people who lived lower down the hill; in Quram there was
. . . .  . 32
a similar situation during the 1904 epidemic. Rabino also commented
on the problem caused by the long delay in changing the water in the
rooms of some popular public bath houses. In some instances he said
33
this change took place only on an annual or bi-annual basis. Hardinge 
was to write at a later date that schemes for the European inspection 
of such bath houses would be deeply resented by Muslims, and that any 
plans for the regulation of thos.e establishments by non-Muslims would 
be regarded as a very serious interference with the practice of Islam, 
and the maintainance of proper standards of religiously-prescribed 
ablutions. ^
The Belgian customs officials in Kirmanshah joined forces with the
various European and European-trained doctors who had been sent to the
town by foreign legations, and by the central government, to try to
make the Governor, Farm&n Farnfii, introduce elementary hygiene precautions.
He refused, and according to Dr. Scott this was because he knew that
any expenditure involved would have to come from his own pocket and that
he could expect neither'financial aid nor support from Tehran. The
Governor was also aware of the influence and popularity of Mamaghani,
and did not wish to antagonize him and his band of followers by
35appearing to act as an agent of the Europeans. As the death rate
31. F 0 Rosen, Oriental Memories of a German Diplomatist, London, 1930, p. 171. 
See also G, Bell, op.cit., p.67.
32. F.O. 60:682. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.119, 21 June 1904.
33o F.O. 60:681. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.17, Confidential,
27 January 1904.
34. F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.7, 5 January 1905.
35. F.O. 60:682. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No,86, 19 May 1904.
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continued to grow rumours became wilder and they circulated more widely,
36
(a phenomenon on which Gertrude Bell had remarked in 1892). In
particular it was said that European medicines were made to kill Muslims 
37
not to cure them. Although the general reaction to the outbreak of 
cholera on the part of most Persians was a compound of fear and 
resignation, an important additional element was a sharpened sense 
of resentment against the presence of Europeans; particularly since 
the Europeans took steps which were designed to lessen the impact of 
the epidemico Actions which appeared to the Europeans as precautionary
and preventative could easily be described to, and viewed by, pious
Muslims as attempts at subverting and suppressing Islam; particularly 
when important members of the religious classes took a hostile attitude 
to those activitieso
Before describing the manner in which cholera spread across Persia
it is useful to look in some detail at the effects of the cholera on one
town. Kirmanshah was the first urban centre to be infected, and the 
exodus of population which resulted has already been noted. There were
i
probably some 40,000 to 50,000 people living in Kirmanshah before the 
38
disease struck, and RabinoTs estimate would mean that some 13,000 ^
17,000 people deserted their homes. The death rate in the middle of
May 1904 was over 20 per day, and on the worst day in the month some 
39
100 people died. These figures are provided by reliable observers 
such as Rabino and Scott, but they should probably be regarded as minima
36. G. Bell, opQcit., p.65.
37, P.O. 60:682. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.86, 19 May 1904.
38 „ See E. Lorini, La Persia Economica Contemporanea, Rome 1900, p.383.
39. P.O. 60:682o Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.119,
21 June 1904.
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for although these men had good knowledge of events within the town and
its immediate environs, they had little opportunity at the height of the
epidemic to visit the outlying villages to which many inhabitants of
Kirmanshah had fled. Unfortunately neither Rabino nor Scott seem to
have estimated the total number of deaths in the town, but the mortality
40
rate was still m  excess of 40 per week in July, and it is probable on
the basis of a maximum death rate of 110 per day, and a duration of the
disease of 8 to 10 weeks, that between 2,0Q0 and 3,000 people lost their
lives in the town as a result of the epidemic.
The economic effects of'the disease were considerable, and they were
compounded by famine in the region„ The imposition of quarantine
measures had an immediate impact on trade with Baghdad, but it should
be remembered that this trade route had been in decline before the
epidemic occurred. The reason for this was that the Turkish authorities
were at the time conducting military operations against rebellious tribes
under eAbd al-^.ziz in the vicinity of Anayza and Burayda, and for these
punitive operations they had commandeered large numbers o^ * camels through-
- 41
out the vilayet of Baghdad. Camels were used on the Baghdad’-Kirmanshah
route in the spring, summer and autumn (snow and the resultant mud made
42
their use impossible m  the winter) and mules in the winter,. The 
commandeering of camels in southern Iraq meant that there was a general ‘ 
shortage of pack animals throughout the region, and trade declined on 
almost all routes leading to and from Baghdad, as transport costs rose
4 0 .  F . O .  60:682o  Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.134,  20 July 1904.
4 1 .  F o0 .  6 0 : 6 8 2 0 Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.8 6 ,  19 May 1904.
42. See H oW 0 Maclean, Report on Conditions and Prospects for British
Trade in Persia, Accounts and Papers (1904), Volume XCV,
Paper Cd.2146, pD15.
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in response to this scarcity. (This situation prevailed until the end 
43
of 1905.) The full effects of the cholera did not become noticeable
until late March 1904, but even before that date the price of transport
between Kirmanshah and Baghdad had already begun to rise sharply. By
44
mid-April the epidemic had brought trade to a complete halt. Some
recovery did take place later but customs receipts for Kirmanshah declined
45
by some 10 per cent in the year 1904-5 compared with the previous year.
The situation was in fact worse than this single figure would indicate 
for the trend had been for customs dues to rise annually since the 
introduction of Belgian control in 1899-1900, and between 1902-3 and 1903-4 
the increase had been over 40 per cent. The decline in trade and in
46
customs revenue for 1904-5 was a source of considerable dismay for Naus 
and was regarded by the directors of the Imperial Bank as sufficiently 
serious to deserve a special mention in their annual report to share­
holders.^
43. Report on the Trade of Kermanshah 1905-6, Accounts and Papers (1906)
Volume CXXVII, Paper Cd.2682 “208, p.l.
44. F.O. 60;682. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.119, 21 June 1904.
45. KIRMANSHAH CUSTOMS RECEIPTS (QirSns)
1901-2 3,041,851
1902-3 3,265,366
1903-4 4,610,640 (estimated by Rabino on
, basis known volume
of imports and exports)
1904-5 4,210,640
Source: various Reports on Trade of Kermanshah in Accounts and Papers 
(1903) Volume LXXVIII Paper Cd. 1 3 8 6 - 1 2 0 ^ 0 5 )  Volume 
Paper C d  $ $ 3 6 ' *  1 6 ^  (1 906) Volume CXXVII, Paper. Cd^.2682—
460 F.O. 60:682, Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.126, 17 July 1904.
470 See statement by Sir L 0 Griffin (Chairman of the Imperial Bank of
Persia) in the Annual Report of the Imperial Bank of Persia for 
1904-5. (Copy to in F.O. 60:685).
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The decline in trade was not, however, the only hardship to
affect Kirm3nshah. As was true on earlier occasions “ in particular
48
in 1869-70 and in 1892 - cholera was accompanied by famine, thus
adding even further to the prevailing sense of insecurity. The cause
again pre-dated the epidemic, for a serious drought had begun in 1903.
That year's wheat crop was down by a quarter on that of 1902 as a result
of the drought, attack by locusts, and tribal unrest which had led to
the destruction of some crops. This shortage was soon reflected in
price. Newly^harvested wheat was sold for 10-12 qirSns per kharvar in 
49
1902: in 1903 the same type of wheat was first sold for 15 qirHns
50 . . .
per kharvar and that price soon doubled. Barley showed a similar rise
from 15 qirans per kharvar in 1902^1 to 38 qir'hns per kharvAr in the 
52 . . .
summer of 1903. This rise m  prices encouraged many merchants to take 
a quick profit and reserve stocks were put on the market so that stores 
were at a very low level when the 1904 crop was sown. That harvest was 
nothing short of disastrous, the drought continued and the harvesting force 
was reduced by the exodus of population aijLd by deaths resulting from 
cholera. Wheat harvested in the late summer of 1904 opened at 40 qirans 
per kharvar but the price rose by December to 100 qirans per kharvar.
These were urban prices„ In some of the outlying villages of the province 
wheat was bringing up to 250 qirans per kharvar. Barley prices moved in 
sympathy and that crop brought 96 qirans per kharvar in the town and up to
48. See C. Elgood, op0cit., pp.515-7.
49. H.L. Rabino, Report on the Trade of Kermanshah 1902-3, Accounts and 
Papers (1903), VolumeL^'^TII» Paper Cd. 1386-120, p.6.
50. H.L. Rabino, Report on the Trade of Kermanshah 1903-4, Accounts and 
Papers (1904), Volume C Paper Cd. 1766. - - \ % 3  p  3 %.
51. HoL. Rabino, Report on the Trade of Kermanshah 1902-3, op.cit., p.6.
52„ H.L. Rabino, Report on the Trade of Kermanshah 1903-4, op.cit., p.32.
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200 in the province. Such fluctuations in the price of basic food­
stuffs may not have been directly caused by the outbreak of cholera but 
they certainly did nothing to alleviate the hardships caused by the 
disease.
After cholera had passed Kirmanshah and Kangavar the authorities
tried to prevent its further spread by establishing inland quarantine
camps. According to the British Legation doctor, T. Odling, these
efforts were useless, for with so many tracks linking villages and
hamlets the quarantine barriers were easily evaded. Even worse was the
fact that the camps which were established were very poorly managed, with
travellers who arrived on different days being allowed to mix freely
and so transmit the disease among themselves. Water supplies to the
camps were often suspect and sometimes the camps were set up in the wake
of the disease rather than in advance of it, thereby gathering people.-
54
together xn an already infected area. Such were the criticisms of a 
European doctor; to the local merchants the measures were objectionable 
rather as a barrier to trade; while for the local population as a whole
they represented yet another item of government expenditure and therefore
. . 55
an additional tax burden.
Dr. Odling had had long experience of Persia. He had arrived in 
1872 as a physician to the Indo-European Telegraph Department and moved 
to serve in the Legation nineteen years later.. He had seen the epidemic 
of 1892 and was soon convinced that MamaghSni and .his group of ^followers - 
now swollen to some 800— 1,000 people - were the source of the spread of 
the disease . ^  From Kirmanshah the infection reached Malair and from
53. H.L. Rabino, Report on the Trade of Kermanshah 1904-5, Accounts and 
Papers (1905), Volume XCI, Paper Cd. 2236 -  *>.€.
54. F.O. 60:682o Hardinge to Lansdowne, No0119, 21 June 1904.
55. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.86, 19 May 1904.
56. F o0. 60:682. Enclosure in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No0119, 21 June 1904.
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r* - - 57
there it passed to Sultanabad by June 7th. A week later it was m
5 8
Qumm, where it persisted until August, and by the end of the third
59week m  June cases had been observed m  Tehran.
Mamaghani had arrived on the outskirts of the capital in mid-May 
and such was his importance that the Shah felt it advisable to meet him
. i £ rt
at the mosque of Shah Abd al-^zim on May 13th. The Shah did not meet
Mamaghani for political reasons, indeed the mujtahid made few comments
on such mattersc When. Aqa Najafi}the leading religious figure in
Isfahan appealed to Mamaghani for support in his disputes with the 
• )
Governor (Zill al-Sultan), Mamaghani told Najafi that if he sold all
o *
his property and gave the proceeds to the poor then he would have little
further trouble with the authorities.^ This attitude to personal
possessions, and the contempt in which he held earthly dignities were,
62
in Hardinge1 s view, the source of much of Mamaghani1 s prestige. That 
prestige was obviously considerable for when Muzaffar al-Din spoke to 
Mamaghani about his ill-health the mujtahid washed his hands and a
grateful Shah proceeded to drink the water.in which they had been
. . 63
washedo
From Tehran cholera spread to the Caspian coast via Qazvin, Lahljan 
and Smul,^ in this case Mamaghani and his followers cannot be blamed for 
they continued on their way to Mashhado The group, now numbering some
57. F.Oo 60:685o Hardinge to Lansdowne, Telegraphic No.65, 7 June 1904.
58. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 150,- 16 August 19-04•
59. FoO. 60:685. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Telegraphic No.72, 26 June 1904.




64. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.126, 17 July 1904.
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65
1,200 people, arrived at Sabzavar on June 10th, where the religious 
leader is reported to have instigated a riot against Armenian sellers
t 66
of wine and araq. Four days later the first members of the group
arrived on the outskirts of Mashhad and within three weeks cholera had
67
broken out in the city. The daily death rate reached a maximum of
68
some 300 to 400 by mid-August, and deaths were still occurring in mid- 
69September. A total of some 8,000 people were reported to have died in
70
Mashhad and its immediate environs. The usual pattern of a large exodus 
from the city repeated itself and the disease was thereby diffused on an 
even wider s c a l e . T h e  Russian government endeavoured to enforce strict
65. F.O. 60:688. Meshed Diary, 18 June 1904.
66. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.124, 4 July 1904.
67. F.O. 60:685. /VllNCHtN to Hardinge, No.81, 30 July 1904.
68. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.146, 15 August 1904.
69. F.O. 60:685. Meshed Diary, 24 September 1904.
70. Mortality figures are given in Report on Khurasan, 1904-5, Accounts 
and Papers (1906), Volume CXXVII Paper Cd.2682-249, p.6. The
' population of the city itself had been estimated in 1899 at 80^ 000 
(G. Lorini, op.cit., p.383) and at 70,000 in 1903 (War Office Report
W0.33 333), see also footnote 119 below).
71. F.O. 60:683. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.173, 11 September 1904. The
exodus of population did, however, bring a period of relative calm to 
a city which had previously been very turbulent. The causes of 
discontent were several. The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war had 
inflicted severe economic hardship on many Persian merchants, for trade 
with Russia had come to a virtual standstill even before the anti­
cholera quarantine had been imposed. The population was also 
affected because both paraffin and sugar - which had previously been 
imported from Russia - had become very scarce and expensive (F.O. 60:688 
Meshed Diary, 18 June 1904). Locusts had done much damage to the 
grain harvest and hail had ruined the fruit crop (F.O. 60:688 Meshed 
Diary, 14 May 1904). Within the city a series of rowdy and drunken 
parties at a newly-opened Russian club had caused great scandal and 
resentment. Notices protesting about these events had appeared in the 
shrine of the Imam Riza (F.O. 60:688, Meshed Diary, 11 June 1904).
The Russian Bank had recently opened an office in a building belonging 
to the shrine which had previously been used to house poor pilgrims, 
and this action was condemned by Mamaghani; so too was the establishment 
of a Russian cemetery on land adjacent to a Muslim one. (F.O. 60:688, 
Meshed Diary, 18 June 1904). Some of the religious leaders had also 
protested against the introduction of electric lighting at the shrine 
and this innovation had led to violence by groups of students.
(F.O. 60:688, Meshed Diary, 9 July.) There had also been a riot 
against the Jadids (Jewish converts to Islam) in early July.
(F.O. 60:688, Meshed Diary, 9 July 1904).
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quarantine on the Khurasan border, thereby causing further resentment
72
among the Persians. The attempt availed little and cholera reached
Merv and then spread to Tashkent and Samarqand during the late autumn
73
and winter of 1904.
During the summer the population of Kirman feared that the
infection would reach their city both from Kashan via Yazd, and from 
74Mashhad. It was m  fact a group of travellers from the latter city who
brought the disease into the province. This happened in mid-September
when cholera broke out at Ravar, some six stages north of Kirman among a
group of pilgrims returning from Khurasan. The bedding of one of the
deceased was washed in a water course from which drinking water was later
75
extracted and the infection spread rapidly. Pear of the epidemic had
caused the Governor of Kirman, Rukn al-Dawla, and most of his entourage
76
to flee to the village of Husaynabad in the south in August; but the
77 . .disease was not confirmed m  the city until late October, The British. 
Consul endeavoured to halt the sale of friiit and to get the streets 
cleaned, but as nearly all the officials had fled it was impossible to 
get any orders issued.^
The disease affected Kirman during Ramadan and the distribution of 
refreshments among those who attended the nightly rouzo. khwanTs aided the
72. P.O. 60:685. Meshed Diary, 20 August 1904.
73. P.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.7, 5 January 1905.
740 F.O. 248:82.0. Kerman Diary, 21 July 1904.
75. Ibid., 2 September 1904. +-
76, Ibid., 2 September 1904.
77o Ibid., 30 October 1904.
78. Ibid., 30 October and 1st November 1904.
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spread of infection. Sykes reported that cases of the disease were
still occurring in early December and he estimated the total death toll
80
for the city as being about 500. He believed that had it not been for
great efforts on the part of the staff of the Church Missionary Society
(who had begun their activities in Kirman three years previously) the
number would have been much higher. As in other provinces there is no
evidence which indicates the incidence of the disease or the level, of
mortality in the villages, but as in Kirmanshah and Bushire the epidemic
interrupted trade severely and there was little movement of goods in
either direction on the Kirman-Sirjan-Bandar *Abbas route from August
82
until mid-Decembero
Meanwhile, Mamaghani had completed his pilgrimage in Mashhad and
had begun to retrace his steps. The Shah did not meet him on his return
to the capital (for reasons which will be described below), but while
83
Mamaghani was in Tehran his wife died of cholera. By the time the group
reached Kirmanshah the earlier phase of the epidemic had passed and there
had been no deaths reported for at least six weeks. In the wake of
Mamaghani1s second passage, however, cholera returned to the city and
the period September 16-26 nearly 40 deaths were recorded, but this second
84
wave was much less virulent than had been the first.
Before turning to the effects of the epidemic, the description of
its diffusion can be completed. The last major northern city to be
affected was Tabriz. Deaths began there in late September and reached a
*■
79. Ibid., 4 November 1904.
80. Ibid., 15 December 1904.
81. Report on Kerman 1904-5 ,, Accounts., and Papers (1905), Volume XCI,
Paper Cd. 2-236 **.118 'p-Tv"
82. F o0. 248:842,P Persian Gulf Diary, 14 January 1905.
83. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.146, 15 August 1904.
84. F.O. 60:683o Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.189, 12 October 1904.
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85maximum of 300 per day by mid-October. Thereafter the disease seems to
have declined rapidly in intensity, but evidence from rural sources is
practically non-existent and it is therefore impossible to offer any
reliable guide to total mortality in Azarbayjan.
A similar judgment must be made about the effects of the epidemic in
the Isfahan region,, The disease entered that province from Qumm, via
86
Kashan, where it arrived during the third week in June. Deaths in 
Isfahan itself were few compared with other urban centres which had been
9
affectedo About 500 inhabitants of the city were believed to have died 
during the short outbreak (out of a total population estimated at 80,000 
to 100,000) and the British Consul believed that this relatively low 
level of mortality was because Isfahan drew the bulk of its drinking
o
87
water from wells rather than from streams and rivers. The efforts of
Church Missionary Society personnel, and the fact that the Armenian
community in Julfa paid great attention to keeping the streets there clean,
also helped to reduce the seriousness of the disease. It was Preece1s
view, however, that mortality in the surrounding area had been much
88
higher than in the city itself. Again there is little specific 
information about the villages, but Preece reported that cholera had
certainly caused deaths during August in the district of Burkhwar to the
_  89 . -  -
north and at Najafabad in the west0 The Bakhtiyari country was still
90
infected at the end of October, and cholera was causing deaths in
91villages along the Isfahan-Yazd road as late as November.
85. Ibido, No.201, 9 November 1904.
86. F.O. 248:820. Preece to Hardinge, No.30, 12 July 1904
87. Ibid., No.38, 24 August 1904 (population estimated based on E. £©rini, 
La Persia-. Economica Contemporanea, Rome 1900, p.383.
88„ Ibid., No.38, 24 August 1904„
89. Ibid., No.41, 7 September 1904.
90„ Ibid., Isfahan Diary, 2 November 1904.
91. Ibid0, Isfahan Diary, 3 December 1904.
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Isfahan and its environs were one of the last areas reached by
the wave of infection which entered Persia via Kirmanshah. For areas
to the south cholera came by a different route and this is less easy to
trace than the former0 The immediate source of the infection was the
same -' Karbala1 - and after the disease had moved to the'north-east in
December 1903 and January 1904 it began to travel south. After reaching 
92 ^ ___
the port of Basra (It ^as confirmed there in April) maritime trade quickly
disseminated cholera throughout the Persian Gulfc Bahrayn was affected
in early May and from there the disease spread among the pearling fleets.
By mid-June cases had occurred in Masqat and at other ports on thecUmani 
94coast.
95Cholera was confirmed at Bushire in late May and trade at that port
96
was greatly reduced for over five months. The disease spread north­
wards following the road to Shiraz. It reached Burazjan on June 8th
and it was reported in Dalaki on June 17th. In Kazirun it had caused
97
some 100 deaths by June 27th0 A quarantine post had been set up at
Tang-i Turkhan (some 20 miles to the north of Kazirun) on June 18th, but
if suffered from the defects of the camps which had been established
elsewhere. The basic problem was that the disease had already passed
through the area by the time the camp was in operation and it served
98
therefore as a reservoir of further infection.
In order to try to protect Shiraz a further quarantine post was set 
up on June 30th at Dasht-i Arjan, some 40 miles southwest of the city.
920 F.O. 248:818. Cox to Hardinge, No.73, 27 May 1904.
93. F.O. 60:682d Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.95, 25 May 1904.
94. F.O. 248:818, Persian Gulf Diary, 18 June,* 23:* June;and 27 July 1904.
95. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.95, 25 May 1904.
96. F.O. 248:819, Persian Gulf Diary, 24 September 1904.
97. F.O. 60:686. Grahame to Lansdowne, No.11, 19 July 1904.
98. Ibido
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This again failed to check the spread of the disease and on July 10th
, - 99
cases of cholera were reported on the outskirts of Shiraz. The 
beglarbegi of Fars, Salar al-Sultan, had tried to prevent people from 
washing themselves and their clothes in water courses to the south and 
west of the town, for much of that water later flowed into Shiraz and 
was there drunk by the inhabitants. He wished to confine all washing 
to the area northeast >of the city, for there the water flowed only on 
to fields and was not used for drinking. These attempts, and those
of the British Vice-Consul who urged that the city’s streets should be 
cleaned, failed; and on July 12th the presence of the disease in Shiraz 
was confirmed. The maximum daily death rate was in excess of 700.*^
As in other cases, the approach of the epidemic prompted an exodus 
by many of the inhabitants and this again helped to spread the disease 
to the surrounding villages. When some of those who had left Shiraz 
returned to the city in August they brought the infection back with them
and the.re was a smaller second outbreak of the disease during that
103 . . t -
month. The official figure for death m  Shiraz was 3,300, but the
British Consul, who got his information from the people responsible for
washing the corpses before burial, reckoned that the true number of
104
deaths exceeded 5,000. (The population of the city had been estimated
105
to be between 38,000 and 50,000 before the disease struck.) From
99. Ibid.
100. F.0o 248:818. Shiraz Diary, 29 June 1904.
101. F.O. 60:686o Grahame to Lansdowne, No.11, 19 July 1904.
102. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.146, 15 August 1904.
103. F.O, 248:818. Shiraz Diary, 31 August 1904.
104. Ibid. ' '
105. Ibid. Lower figure1 is from E..Lorini, ..op.cit., p.383, and refers 
to 1899, the higher one is Grahame’s estimate.
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Shiraz cholera spread northwards and it was around the village of
Qumisheh that the two waves of infection ’’met11 in October 1904, but
106
by then both had lost much of their former virulence.
The southwest of Persia was also badly affected but cholera was
- ~ . 107
not reported along the Karun river until late June. This is quite
a long time after Basra had been infected and it is difficult to say by
which route the disease, was spread to this area. Shaykh Kha^al had
issued orders during the early summer that no boats from Muhammaia were
to visit Basra, but by then cholera was known in many other ports and
108
there was no shortage of possible sources of infection. The first
109
fatal cases were reported at Muhammara on June 27th, the following
day there were deaths at Dizful,1*^ and on June 29th several inhabitants
of Shushtar succumbed to the disease.*^  Absence of troops and a
shortage of funds prevented the Governor of the latter town from
112
instituting any sort of quarantine measures. By early August cholera
- . 1 1 3
was causing deaths m  Ahvaz and from there it travelled along the 
Lynch-Bakhtiyarl road into the m o u n t a i n s M a l a m i r  was also affected*^
and deaths began to occur in Nasirx by August 1 4 t h . T h e r e  was a general
. . 119exodus from that town and all trading activity soon ceased.
106. F.O. 248:820. Preece to Hardinge, No.47, 5 October 1904.
107. F.O. 60:6850 Ahwaz Diary, 9 July 1904o
108. F.O. 248:818. Persian Gulf Diary, 17 June 1904.
109o F.Oo 248:818. Persian Gulf Diary, 27 June 1904.
110o F.O. 248:818. Persian Gulf Diary, 28 June 1904D
111. FoO. 248:818. Persian Gulf Diary, 29 June 1904.
112. F.O. 60:685. Ahwaz Diary, 9 July 1904.
1130 F.O. 60:685o Ahwaz Diary, 15 August 1904.
1140 "Xb i d . The"Xyn'ch-Bnkh tiy axl road, which was named after the British
company which constructed it and the tribal area through which it
passed, was opened for traffic in December 1899. It ran from Nasiri 
to Isfahan (see J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and 
Central Arabia. Calcutta 19/£T, II,-p. 142.
115. F.O. 60:685o Ahwaz Diaryj 15th August 1904.
116. F.Oo 60:688. Ahwaz Diary, 30th August 1904.
117. Ibid.
The death toll again varied greatly from town to town. In
118
Muhammara, it was put at 200 by July 22nd (out of an estimated
13 9
population of 4,500-6,000), The British Consul also reported that
the epidemic killed some 3,400 people In Dizful, but unlike his
» . . 1 2 0
colleague in Shiraz he does not say how these figures were derived.
The latter one seems quite high, but it is impossible to categorize
for estimates of the population of Dizful vary between 16,000 and 
121
28,000o In Shushtar there seem to have been relatively fewer
122
deaths, but the disease occurred during the summer and because of
the heat at that season many of the inhabitants would probably not have
been living in the towne As in almost all the other regions the Consul
reported that the death rate in the villages and' among the Bani Turuf
tribe was believed to be high, but again it is impossible to make any
123
estimate of total rural mortality. The disease ceased to effect the
1 2. A . j
population of Muhammara towards the end of July, but it returned
125 .
"briefly and less severely in early November.  Cases were still being
126
reported at Shushtar and Nasiri in mid-September.
118. F.O. 60:683. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.173, 11 September 1904.
119. Lower estimate is from E. Lorini, op0cit., p.383 and refers to 1899.
The higher figure is from a British War Office report, which was 
published in 1905, but which stated that the population figures are 
estimates made in 1903o See W.0.33. J333, Military Report on Persia 
compiled by the General Staff at the-War Office, 1905.
120. F.O. 248:818. Persian Gulf Diary, 30 July 1904.
121 o The low figure is on this occasion that from the War Office report
of 1905 (see Footnote No.119 above), the higher figure is from 
E. Lorini, op.cjto, p.383 and refers to an estimate made*in 1899.
122. F.O, 60:686. McDouall to Hardinge, No.6, Commercial, 4 August 1904.
1230 F.O. 248:818. Persian Gulf Diary, 30 July 1904o
124, F.Oc 248:818. Persian Gulf Diary, 6 August 1904.
125o F.O. 248:819. Persian Gulf Diary, 19 November 1904.
126. F.O. 248:819. ArabistanDiary, 22 November 1904.
It was in the capital itself that the effects of the epidemic
can be most clearly seen. Deaths began in late June and one of the
first people to suffer was Dr. Vaume the Turkish representative on
the Tehran Sanitary Council, who had earlier tried to halt the spread
127
of the disease at KangSvar0 The daily mortality rate quickly reached
128
200-300, and the American missionaries, who were in almost constant
contact with many of those afflicted by the disease, reckoned that some
12913.000 to 14,000 people died m  the city during the epidemic.
(^Contemporary estimates for the population of Tehran varied between
230.000 and 280,000.)130
What were the reactions of the Persians to this epidemic? No 
single answer can be given to this question but one common, indeed almost 
instinctive, reaction was that of fear. Panic and flight followed. In 
the absence of proved methods of prevention, or of recognized and effective 
means of limiting the spread of the disease, such responses are under- 
standable; but at the same time they show the degree to which self- 
interest rather than a sense of responsibility was the overriding concern 
of the governing classes. The example was set by the Shah himself. When 
cholera was first observed in Tehran Court officials endeavoured to keep 
the news from Muzaffar al-Din, but his medical attendants insisted that 
the ShahTs diet should be changed and royal suspicion was aroused by the 
fact that only bland foods were being served to him. He learned that the 
disease was present in the vicinity and insisted on leaving the Niarvaran 
Palace immediately. This decision placed his European doctors-in .a 
dilemma - to go to the mountains could be dangerous as the Shah had a
127. F.O. 60^6827. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.126, 17 July 1904.
1280 Ibid.
129. F o0. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 18, 31 January 1905.
130. ‘ The lower figure is from E. Lorini, op.cit. , p.383. The higher
figure is from the War Office Report in W.O. 33.3333(see Footnote 119 
above)0
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weak heart, but to go down to' the plains would mean going to the very 
area where cholera was rampantD The Qur^an was consulted and the decision 
was made to go to Taliqan in the mountains north of Tehran by way of 
Karajo131
The Shah set out accompanied by some 2,000 servants and retainers. 
The conditions in the first night’s camp were insanitary and the 
existence of cholera within the caravan of followers was confirmed by one 
of the royal physicians, Dr. Schneider, before dawn. Schneider consulted 
his colleague Dr. Lindley and they both told the Grand Vazlr that they 
could not accept responsibility for the Shah’s health unless he left the 
camp immediately. The Minister had little desire to alarm the Shah by 
telling him this news, but the unpleasant task never had to be performed 
as Muzaffar al-Dxn had learned of the disease from another but unknown 
source. His reaction was to panic. He sent for Schneider and Lindley 
and told them at a private audience tha-h he had decided to abandon the 
camp and that he wished his doctors to accompany him on a rapid journey 
by motor car to the port of Enzeli and from there to Europe. This lack 
of responsibility appalled the two doctors and they told the Shah that if 
he was to leave in such a sudden way then alarming rumours would quickly 
spread across the country and his return to Persia as ruler could not 
be guaranteed. After much argument the Shah was prevailed upon to
abandon this idea, and to return instead, with a much smaller following,
132 . . .
to the Niarvaran Palace„ There he remained in vxrtual seclusxon for
nearly two months - a situation w&ich resulted in almost all government
131. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.126, 17 July 1904.
NaSir al-Dxn Shah had likewise sought refuge in the hills during 
the 1892 epidemic, see G. Bell, op.cit., p.65.
132. F.O. 60:682o Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.126, 17 July 1904,
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business coming to a complete standstill. The enforced rest did, *■ 
however, help Muzaffar al-Din's general state of health to recover a 
little.134
Meanwhile, the flight of officials from Tehran had made the
implementation of effective preventative measures even more difficult.
Most of the European-trained Persian doctors joined the exodus from the city.
The one who did not was not to survive for very long as he mistook
135
carbolic acid for brandy, with fatal results. In the absence of
Persian doctors trained in western methods, the burden of health care 
fell upon the Europeans. They certainly acted with the best of 
intentions but their actions were to arouse much suspicion and resentment.
In particular Naus took powers over the supervision of burials and
the provision of water supplies, actions which caused considerable offence
136 ~ -
to pious Muslims. This was one of the most important results of the
epidemic — a heightened awareness among many Persians of the extent to
which the Christian Europeans had gained an unwelcome position of authority.
This effect was certainly not confined to Tehran, in the southern
ports too it was very noticeable. There measures to limit the effects of
. . .  137
cholera followed earlier actions designed to prevent the spread of plague.
133. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.150, 16 August 1904.
134. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.162, 1 October 1904.
135. F.O.-60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.126, 17 July 1904.
136. Ibid.
137 . On the question of plague prevention in the Persian Gulf and the 
4 political complications surrounding that issue, see C. Elgood, 
op.cit., Chapter XVIII, and J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the 
Persian Gulf, f0man and Central Arabia, . Calcutta 1915, I, 
Appendix M, Epidemics and Sanitary Organisation in the 
Persian Gulf Region.
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The latest epidemic of that disease had begun in the early summer of 
1899. The imposition of quarantine at Bushire was again the first, 
and most important, source of resentment. Blame was laid on those who 
were administering the restrictions - British officials. Complaints 
were many and they involved charges that Christian Europeans were not 
held in quarantine while pious Muslims were being prevented from making
pilgrimages. This was seen as an attempt by the Christians to suppress
138 . . . .
Islam. Similar emotions gave credulity to rumours which said that
a machine installed to disinfect the clothes and baggage of passengers
landing at Bushire had, as it real purpose, the boiling alive of Muslim 
139
children.
Against this background of fresh suspicion the activities of
British officials in trying to impose measures of hygiene in the spring
and summer of 1904, could not but re-awaken resentment. In other towns
too there is evidence that it was easy to lay the blame for the epidemic
at the door of the Europeans0 In Isfahan the influential^religious
leader, Aqa NajafI, said on several occasions that the cholera had come
as a punishment from God because some Muslims had sent their children to
. 1 4 0the schools run by Christian missionaries. In Mashhad it was said
138. F.O. 60:608. Dhrand to Salisbury, No„66, 23 June 1899. The 
fact that a British gunboat had arrived at Bushire to enforce 
the quarantine arrangements (F.O. 60:609, Durand to Salisbury,
No.87, 24 August 1899) and that three of the religious leaders who 
had led the agitation against the imposition of these regulations 
were later deported (F.0«.60:609 , Durand to Salisbury, No. 125,
20 December 1899) had greatly increased the intensity of anti- 
European feeling in Bushire in 1899 o
139. F o0. 60:609. Durand to Salisbury, No.91, 16 September 1899. On 
the prevalence of rumours and the strength of anti—European feeling 
during the 1892 epidemic, see G. Bell, op.cit., p.65.
140. F.O. 248:8200 Preece to Hardinge, No.41, 7 September 1904.
See Chapter VII of this thesis.
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that the outbreak of the disease was divine retribution on the
Muslims for allowing Europeans to take charge of the customs and 
141
postal systems. So although the 1904 epidemic may not have caused
anger against and discontent with the bureaucracy and the rule of the
Shah, it certainly sharpened the sense of resentment and suspicion
about the position occupied by Europeans in Persia.
The cholera epidemic, also had other important indirect effects, one
of the most noticeable being a further decline in internal security.
The exodus of officials — something which happened in almost every town -
included the military, and even in the formerly reliable Cossack Brigade
1/0
discipline began to fail and troops deserted. Robberies increased in
number, both within towns and along the roads. This in turn led to a
further reduction in trade and commerce; the result was a decline in
customs revenue. One incident occurred in Burazjan. Some men pretended
to have caught cholera and this caused a great flight of people from ’
their houses. Once the population had left^they proceeded to steal grain
from the stores - and grain was a very valuable commodity in that part
of southern Persia after a drought which had persisted for some three 
143
years. As well as leading to greater insecurity, the desertion of 
troops also meant that it was much more difficult to take effective action 
to impose measures which might have limited the spreading of the disease.
141. F„0. 60;682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.120, 22 June 1904,
In April 1904 members of the religious classes in Mashhad had 
said that a recent and very damaging hail storm was a sign of 
Divine anger at the presence of so many foreigners in the city.
(E.Oo 60:688. Meshed Diary, 21 April 1904.)
142. F.O. 60:682. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No,134, 20 July 1904.
1430 Fo0„ 60:683. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.173, 11 September 1904.
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Another source of resentment followed in the aftermath of the
epidemic. The large number of sudden deaths meant that there were many
instances in which property had to be divided and its ownership
transferred. This could only be done through the religious classes and
. . 144
Hardinge reported several complaints of extortion by those officials.
In this respect the cholera epidemic gave further grounds for complaint
against injustice.
In conclusion therefore, it can be seen that the epidemic of cholera
in Persia in 1904 had several important effects. Many of these were
indirect in that the disease was met with fear and resignation rather
than with anger and desperation. The epidemic did not cause people to
blame the Shah nor to seek his overthrow, but it did halt trade, reduce
customs revenue, and lead to greater insecurity in both towns and along
trading routes. The economic effects of the epidemic often exacerbated
an already bad situation - drought had already produced famine —
conditions in the west and in parts of southern Persia; the cholera
made things worse.
In the north the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war had already begun
to reduce trade between Persia and her northern neighbour. The
imposition of quarantine restrictions by the St. Petersburg government
served to hasten this decline. Adverse weather conditions added to the
sequence of causes by ruining the silk and rice crops in the Caspian
145provinces during the same year. In these respects, therefore, dholera
had a cumulative and supplementary effect on the economic1 hardships already 
being suffered in many parts of Persia.
144. F.O., 60:682.- Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 150, 16 August 1904.
145. Ibid.
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In political terms too the effects were indirect but nevertheless 
important, for in endeavouring to combat the disease the Europeans took 
actions which called attention to their growing predominance. Though 
they acted with the best of intentions, and doubtless reduced the 
mortality of the disease, they endeavoured to introduce restrictions 
over the free movement of Muslims which were seen by the pious as an 
attempt to suppress Islam. Similarly efforts to supervise water supplies 
and to change the place and manner in which corpses were washed and 
buried, aroused deep suspicion among the devout about the motives of 
those seeking to impose such measures0 There was little understanding 
of what the Belgians in Tehran and KirmSnshah, the British in the south, 
and the Russians in the north were trying to achieve. In such conditions 
of ignorance seemingly grotesque rumours could circulate and the 
assumption was quickly - and easily - made that the motives of the 
Europeans centred upon the destruction of Islam.
The cholera epidemic caused the Europeans to take a more active 
role in Persia - and to do so in areas of human activity which were very 
sensitive - because of this the outbreak of disease did affect the 
attitude of some of the population to the government,, For if Europeans 
could achieve such positions, and could endeavour to alter usages which 
the pious believed to b.e important in the practice of fight religion, 
then the rulers were failing in their essential task of protecting 
Islam and its adherents. It was Hardinge's opinion, expressed in the 
aftermath of the epidemic, that cholera had been the only factor which
169
had prevented the outbreak of active unrest in Persia in 1904.
While agreeing with this view, it is necessary to add that when the 
unrest did occur the epidemic had contributed, albeit indirectly, to 
the causes of resentment and disquiet.
146. F.O. 60:683. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 173, 11 September 19.04, 
The British Consul in Isfahan also indicated that the cholera 
1 ’ epidemic had restricted the activities of various small groups 
which had -been formed -’-'-to -educate people” „in Isfahan,..Tehran, . 
Shiraz and Yazd; but he thought that these committees would 
become active again if the disease did not return to Persia in 





"The miseries which the inhabitants of Sheeraz have individually 
suffered, render them callous to the afflictions of their 
neighbours. The only principle of their life is to avoid giving 
offence,and to afford even a handle for persecution."
E. Scott Waring, A Tour to Sheeraz 
by the Route of Kazroon and Feerozabad, 
London 1807, p.35.
One of the most striking features in the history of the province of
Fars during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din is the lack of continuity in
its government; between 1896 and the end of 1906 there were no less
than ten changes in the post of Governor-General }  The previous
twenty year period (from August 1876) had seen only five transfers of
2
office and one of those had been for less than twelve months. During
those two decades the province had been ruled for nearly five years by
Mu^tamid al-Dawla (from the autumn of 1876 to the spring of 1881), and
for. the following six years it was under the control of Zill al-Sultan.
At that time Zill al-Sultan held sway over much of southern Persia,
* •
exercising authority from .Isfahan, When he gained control of Fars he 
appointed one of his sons, Jalal al-Dawla, as his representative in 
Shiraz; but as he was a minor, effective power was in the hands of the
1. This was far from setting a record even for Muzaffar al-Din*s reign. 
The post of Governor of the Gulf Ports was helS by nine different 
men between March 1897 and September 1898. See J.G. Lorimer, 
Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf,*0man and Central Arabia, Calcutta 
1915, I Part 2, p o2130.
2. J.G. Lorimer, op.cit., I Part 2, pp.2055-57.
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experienced official Eath All Khan (also known as Sahib Divan), who
* k *
f* m
was sent to accompany the young boy. During the tenure of both Mu ternd
al-Dawla and Zill al-Sultan the province was firmly controlled and 
• •
4
security was good. This continued to be the case under the governor-
3. Any study of affairs in Fars during the Qajar period must pay 
close attention to the members of the wealthy and very influential 
Hashimiyya family of which Fath All Khan was a member. The 
immediate origins of the family's influence stemmed from the fact 
that one of the members was Haj jT Ibrahim Khan, the Kalantar of 
Shiraz appointed by Lutf cAli Khan Zand who changed sides and who 
handed the city over to Aqa Muhammad Khan Qajar. (See History of 
Persia under Qajar Rule: translated from the Persian of Hasan-e 
FasaH/s FarsnSma-ye Naseri by H. Busse, New York 1972, pp.40-42.)
Haj jT Ibrahim later became beglarbegi of Fars and finally chief 
minister to Aqa Muhammad Khan Qajar. He also held this post under 
the second Qajar ruler Fath cAli Shah. Hajji Ibrahim's rapid rise 
to power and his nepotism aroused much jealousy and royal 
suspicions of him resulted in his blinding and death in 1801.
Many of his relatives were seized at the same time, and few 
escaped imprisonment, mutilation or death. One who did survive 
was Haj ji Ibrahim's fourth son, Haj jiMfrza CAli Akbar Khan, who was 
born in 1789. The family's fortunes gradually revived and Hajji 
Mirza'All Akbar Khan became Kalantar of Shiran in 1811. In 1829 he
received the title of Qavam al-Mulk, He had several sons, one of
whom was FathCA1T Khan, the official who accompanied Jalal al- ___
Dawla to Fars in 1881. One of Haj jT MirzacAli Akbar Khan's other
C  f*« * « VP
sons, All Muhammad Khan, received the title Qavgm al-Mulk on 
his father's death in 1865. In turn his only son, Muhammad Riza 
Khan received the title in 1885. He is the Qavam al-Mulk .who 
will be referred to in the rest of this chapter. There was 
considerable rivalry between Fath CA1I Khan and his brother All 
Muhammad Khan. (For further genealogical details see Biographical 
Notices of Persian Statesmen and Notables, August 1905, by
G.P. Churchill, Calcutta.1906; entry number 113 Hashimia family 
of Shiraz, pp.22-24. Some of the information on which Churchill 
based this compilation is to be found in F.O. 60:595.)
4. For contrasting accounts of the popularity of-Mu^amid al-Dawla's 
period as Governor, see H. Busse, op.cit., pp.386-415, and
E.G. Browne, A Year Amongst the Persians, London 1959, pp.117.18.
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ship of Ihtisham al-Dawla, the son of Mi&amid al-Dawla, who was in
5
office from 1887 to 1892. Some decline then seems to have occurred 
for Rukn al-Dawla, who was appointed Governor-General in February 1892, 
came into dispute with Qavam al-Mulk; and after a few months had to
g
retire from the city. The next Governor, Nizam al-Saltana held office
until 1894; when Rukn al-Dawla was re-appointed to the post. He was
confirmed in office again .in March 1896.^
When Muzaffar al-Din came to the throne in May 1896 many posts 
♦
changed hands and the Govemor-Generalship of Fars passed to Nazim al-
Dawla who arrived in Shiraz in October 1896. Rukn al-Dawla had left
his post in July and during the summer there was no Governor in
residence. Nazim al-Dawla was unable to maintain security and within
8
six months there was great disorder throughout the province.
In the first months of his reign Muzaffar al-Din had stopped the
practice of selling offices, but by early 1897 his need of money was
9
such that the custom was revived. The change which took place m  the 
Governor-Generalship of Fars, however, was due to intrigues at the 
Court rather than to the payment of money. The new Governor-General 
was Farman Farma, who had played a leading part in the intrigues which 
had .lain behind the 'overthrow of Amin al-Sultan in November 1896.^  
Farman Farma had subsequently gained the post which he coveted, that of 
Minister of War.^ It was not long, however, before he had antagonised
5. J.G. Lorimer, op.cit., I part 2, p.2057.
6. J.G. Lorimer, op.cit., I part 2, p.2057.
7. J.G. Lorimer, op.cit., I part 2, p.2128.
8. F.O. 60:601. Hardinge to Salisbury, No.141, 24 October 1897.
9. F.O. 60:601. Hardinge to Salisbury, No.141, 24 October 1897.
10. ;G.P. Churchill,^op.cit., pp.19-20. - -
11. F.O. 60:593. Durand to Salisbury, No.81, 25 November 1896.
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the Russian government by reducing the effective strength of the
12
Cossack Brigade m  Tehran. After further intrigues and reports of
massive bribery and a failure to pay the army, Farman. Farma was forced
13
to resign m  September 1897. He was offered the Governorship of 
MSzandarSn, but because he wished to remain near the Shah he refused
this post. In October, however, for reasons which are not clear, he
- 14 .accepted the Governor—Geperalship of Fars. By this time Nazim al-
Dawla had been recalled and had already left ShTrSz. The province was
once more without a Governor and the result was an increase in lawlessness
and insecurity on the roads.^
Farman Farma remained in office for some fifteen months. According
to Durand his rule was firm and resolute and the province was relatively
quiet. One of the reasons for this was that he established good relations
with Qavam al-Mulk and the latter used his great local influence to
16
support the Governor-General. As will be seen later, the nature of 
relations between this influential local magnate and the Governor-General 
was to be a factor of considerable importance in the politics of the 
province0 Durand also noted that both Nazim al-Dawla and Farman Farma —  
in common with the Governors of Azarbayjan, Khurasan, Kirman and cArabistan — 
had failed to send much revenue to the capital; though taxes were still 
being levied in those provinces.^
12. For Russian evidence of this see F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain 
in Persia, 1864-1914: a Study in Imperialism, New Haven 1968, p.304.
13. F.O. 60:601. rfardinge to Salisbury, No.121, 12 September 1897.
14. F.Oo 60:601. Hardinge to Salisbury, No.141, 24 October 1897.
15. F.O. 60:601, Hardinge to Salisbury, No.141, 24 October 1897.
16. F.O. 60:608. Durand to Salisbury, No.17, 16 February 1899.
17. F.O. 60:608o Durand to Salisbury, No.31, 9 March 1899. This 
failure to remit revenues was a very serious matter for these 
provinces were among the most important in Persia. In 1891 they 
had had the following rank on the list of revenue payments from all 
provinces: Azarbayjan 1st, Fars 2nd, Khurasan 3rd, Kirman 7th and
cArabistan 9th. See G.N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, 
London 1892, II, p.480.
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Farman Farma fell from office in February 1899 and he was ordered
to go abroad. His replacement was Nizam al-Mulk who had previously been
1 8
Governor of Tehran. He was somewhat apprehensive about accepting this
new posting and he took with him a personal escort of men from the 
19
Cossack Brigade. His term of office lasted approximately twelve months 
and security in the province and in Shiraz seems to have been quite 
good. The only major disturbance occurred in the late autumn of 1899
when Christian missionaries in Shiraz aroused considerable resentment
. . 20 
by distributing religious tracts.
The next Governor, Mulyyid al-Dawla was appointed in March 1900.^^
He soon had to face opposition by local merchants to the introduction
of new customs regulations which called for the imposition of a uniform
five per cent tariff on imports; and which were due to come into effect
in July. The opposition was not merely because the new dues were higher
than the previous one’s paid by Persian merchants; but also because'
they were to be collected by foreign officials: for control of the
Customs administration at Bushire had been handed to Belgian agents in 
22
March. The first Director-General of Customs for the Gulf Ports was
H. Simais, and he quickly aroused resentment by refusing to give to
Persian merchants more favourable treatment than that which he gave 
23____________
to foreign ones. The Shiraz merchants gained some support from the 
religious classes in - the city?who sent telegrams to their colleagues 
in Isfahan asking for assistance in the struggle against the new
* v
18. F.O. 60:608. Durand to Salisbury, No.17, 16 February 1899.
19. F.O. 60:610. Durand to Salisbury, Telegraphic No.50,-7 August 1899.
20o F.O. 60:617. Durand to Salisbury, No.4, 1 8 ’January 1900. -
21. F.O. 60:617. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.21, 4 April 1900.
22. See A. Destree, Les Fonctionnaires Beiges au Service, dei la Perse,
1898-1915, Tehran-Li^ge 1976, p.57. ~
23. F.O. 60:617. Spring Pice to Salisbury, No.16, 27 March 1900.
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regulations. Qavam al-Mulk took the opportunity to support the
protest in the hope that he would thereby secure the recall of the
. 25Governor-General, with whom his relations were very poor.,
At this time, however, not all groups in Shiraz were inclined to
give their support to any movement which had the backing of Qayam al-
Mulk; for one of his relatives had apparently been responsible for
instigating the murder of a sayyid during Muharram (May 1900). A group
of twenty-eight sayyids had so little confidence in the Governor-General
that they sent a personal message to Queen Victoria in July, asking her
to bring their complaints to the notice of Muzaffar al-Din so that
. ^  ^ J 26 
justice might be done.
The first protest against the new customs regulations was not as
widespread as Durand had at first feared, and the reason given for
this was that the population was relatively content; for harvests had
27
been good and bread was cheap and plentiful. The merchants, however, 
continued their agitation and trade between Bushire and Shiraz was 
brought to a virtual halt for most of July and August. Simais Visited 
Shiraz during August 1900 and was able to make a temporary arrangement 
whereby the rate of duty would be reduced, and the level of rahdarl
28
(road tax) was fixed at a lower level than had previously been levied.
Although the religious classes in Shiraz had played relatively 
little part in the protests against the new customs regulations, they 
were active in two other agitations which disturbed the city in the
24. F.O. 60:618. Spring--Rice to Salisbury, No.83, 26 July 1900. The 
culama?in Isfahan in turn sent telegrams to their colleagues in Mashhad.
25. F,0. 60:618. Spring- Rice to Salisbury, No.87, 23 August 1900.
26. The original petition together with other documents concerning this 
case can be found in F.O. 60:623. The petitioners appear to have 
believed that the Shah’s tour to Europe would include a visit to London.
27. F.O. 60:618. Spring- Rice to Salisbury, No,87, 23 August 1900.
28. F.O. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.112, 18 October 1900.
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latter half of 1900. These were protests against M n  al-Sultan for
signing the loan agreement with Russia and the wastage of its
29 . . . .
proceeds; and a more general objection to growing Russian influence
30 . . . »
m  Persia. It was reported that the religious classes m  Isfahan and
Shiraz had agreed that they would support a public subscription to pay
off the Russian loan; but that they would do so only if Amin al-Sultan
31
was dismissed from office. Sykes, who was making a tour through Pars
at this time, noted that many Persians believed that it was Russia x^ ho
had really been put in control of the Customs, and that the Belgians
acted only as their agents. He also observed that many people sax-7 the
appointment of more Russian consular officials as a further sign of
32
Persia's subservience to her northern neighbour.
By the end of the year the difficulties facing the Governor-General
Xtfere increasing; for as \7ell as having to deal xtfith the protests;
mentioned above there X7as another local, but troublesome, issue an
acute shortage of small copper coinage. This was causing considerable
33
hardship to the poorer classes. Disturbances and robberies were 
growing in number, but good harvests helped to keep the price of bread 
low.34
29. F.O. 60:168, Spring Rice to Salisbury, Wo.102, 28 September 1900.
30. F.O. 60:618. Spring-;Rice to Salisbury, Wo.107, 17 October 1900.
31. F.O. 60:618. Spring*Rice to Salisbury, Wo.102, 28 September 1900.
32r. F.O. 60:641. Sykes to Lansdoxrae., no number, 12 January 1901.
A Russian Consulate-General had been established at Isfahan in 
1897 and in February 1900 a Vice-Consulate was opened in Sistan. 
There were discussions during 1900 for the opening of other Russian 
Consulates in the south of Persia. A Consulate-General X7as 
established in Bushire in 1901 and Consular Agencies were opened at 
Ahvaz in December 1902 and BandarcAbbas in January 1904. See 
J.G. Lorimer, op . ci t. , pp.2121-2, 2.124, and 2690-2.
33. F.O. 60:618. Spring Rice to Lansdoxme, Wo,131, 13 December 1900,
34. F.0t 60:618„ Spring-Rice to Lansdowne, Wo,131, 13 December 1900.
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During the early months of 1901 there was continued insecurity
. . . .  35
along the roads and the Baharlu tribe was raiding its neighbours.
In January there was a serious incident on the Bushire-ShtrSz road, near
DeLlakt, in which several people were killed. This interrupted trade for 
36
some time* The collection of rahdari" was proving unpopular, for
apparently amounts in excess of those agreed in the summer of 1900
were being collected. The Governor-General blamed Qavam al-Mulk for
this on the grounds that the tax was being collected outside the city
. 37
and the men who were levying it were under Qayam al-Mulk* s influence.
In March 19C1 a law was introduced which abolished several internal
taxes on trade, the level of revenue, however, was to be maintained by
imposing the full five per cent import duty which was supposed to have
38
come Into operation in July 1900. (The efficacy of this new law and 
of other later changes will be discussed at another point in this 
chapter.)
A new Governor-General, Shu a'al-Saltana the Shah*s second son, was
t
39appointed in March 1901. He was a great favourite of his father and
this fact was to have serious repercussions later. He had acted as
. 4 0
regent while Muzaffar al-Din was in Europe in 1900; but Hardinge 
thought that his poor state of health and his youth (he was then 20 years
old), would mean that he was unlikely to be an effective governor of
, . . , . 4 1
this important southern province.
35. E.O. 60:636. Spring-:.Rice to Lansdowne, N o . 1 1 , 9 January 1901.
36. F.O. 60:636. Spring'Rice to Lansdowne, No.23, 7 February 1901.
37. F.O, 60:636. Spring’Rice to Lansdowne, No.ll, 9 January 1901.
38. There is a copy of the law in F.O. 60:641.
39. F.O. 60:636. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.31 Confidential,
27 February 1901.
40. F.O. 60:618. Spring-Rice to Salisbury, No.79 Secret, 25 July 1900.
41. F.O, 60:636. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.31 Confidential,
27 February 1901.
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When Shu1 aeal-Saltana passed through Isfahan en route to his new
appointment he was reported to have been accompanied by an entourage
42
of some 6,000 people. On his arrival in Fars the new Governor-General 
rapidly came into conflict with Qavam al-Mulk. Details are provided
in a memorandum of complaint sent later to Amin al-Sultan from some of
T „ 43
the inhabitants of Shiraz who supported Qavam al-Mulk. According to
that report one of Qavam al-Mulk*s sons, Intizam al- M m m i K q Et the new
Governor-General some six stages north of Shiraz and there offered him
presents of cash, horses, and other goods to the value of over thirteen
thousand tumans. Shu a'al-Saltana was apparently most displeased with
this, and according to the memorandum he said, "This is not a present
worthy of me. I have written the Kawam*s name in my book for a hundred
thousand tumans. Go back and prepare this sum for the day of my arrival
at Shiraz". The new Governor-General also demanded that Qawam al-Mulk
should take the responsibility of expelling some of the leading
religious figures from Shiraz before he arrived, and that other presents
of silver maces should also be prepared. The report goes on to say that
when the nobles, notables and members of the Culama* of Shiraz heard this
news they swore an oath on the Qui? an to support Qavam al-Mulk and to
place themselves under British protection if Shu aCal~Saltana proved to
be oppressive.
When the new Governor-General arrived in Shiraz Qavam al-Mulk sent 
different presents to him, but these too were not regarded as sufficient. 
At the first audience between the two men Shu acal-Saltana threatened to 
have Qavam al-Mulk seized and imprisoned. The latter, however, had
42. F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, ho number, 30 March 1901.
43. F.O. 60:636. Enclosure No.1 in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.78 
Confidential, 20 May 1901.
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taken the precaution of bringing some fifteen hundred of his armed
followers into the city; and they caused a great commotion outside
the Governor*s house. During this uproar Qavam al-Mulk was able to
make his escape and seek refuge in the Shah Chiragh Mosque. The town
was soon in chaos and the bazaars were quickly closed. Some of Shu a*
al-Saltana’s men were beaten and abused by the population and the
tumult lasted for several days. Shiraz became peaceful again only
when Qavam al-Mulk obeyed a summons from the Shah to proceed to Tehran -
44
but he was careful to take a large armed escort with him
Hardinge viewed the above report with some caution, us it came
from supporters of Qavam al-Mulk; but he acknowledged that there had
been very serious unrest in Shiraz. The situation was also exacerbated
by the belief that was being attached to widespread rumours that the
British government would demand the recall of Shu acal-Saltana; and would
support Qavam al-Mulk, by sending a naval force to Bushire if necessary.
Hardinge tried to counter the effects of these rumours by asking the
British Political Resident in Bushire, who was about to go to Shiraz for
the summer, to take particular pains to establish good relations with
the new Governor-General; and to assure him that Britain regarded him
45
as the legitimate representative of the Shah’s authority m  Fars.
Hardinge believed that Oavam al-Mulk would get little support from his
former ally, Amin al-Sultan, in Tehran even though the latter knew that
c~ c  . 46 . • • .
Shu aal-Saltana was both rapacious and reckless. The British Minister 
♦
also reported that the new Governor-General was being very hard on the 
merchants and on the wealthy; for he, like other officials in the
44. F.O. 60:636. Enclosure No.1 in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No,78
Confidential, 20 May 1901.
45. F.O. 60:636, Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.78 Confidential, 20 May 1901.
46. F.O. 60:636, Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.78 Confidential, 20 May 1901.
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provinces, was aware that Muzaffar al-DinTs health was precarious,
47
and that appointments were therefore even less secure than usual.
Hardinge*s earlier fears that Shu acal-Sal tana* s somewhat delicate
health might inhibit vigorous action were proved to be false. The
new Governor-General soon set about collecting taxes, sometimes at
twice the levels which had previously been imposed, and he sent armed
48
men to recover arrears of taxation from Dashistan. In May 1901 he
took firm measures against three religious leaders who were advocating
49the non-payment of taxes. Followers of Qavam al-Mulk were made to
pay heavy f i n e s , a n d  so too were other wealthy individuals."** During
the summer the deaths occurred of two important religious figures in
c t 52
Shiraz, and this temporarily weakened the opposition to Shu aal-Saltana. 
Some reforms were introduced concerning the cleaning and lighting of the
streets; but the Governor-Generalrs violent and impulsive style of
. . .  53
administration was widely resented. Storms in August and September
did much damage to local crops, and prices of grain and bread began to 
54rise. By late October there was much agitation because of the
shortage of grain, and the Governor-General began to force those who
55
held stocks to sell them to him so that he could corner the market.
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twenty thousand kharvars of grain at seven tumans each; later he sold
~ ~ 56them at fourteen tumans per kharvar. In the late autumn and during
the winter, clandestine notices began to appear condemning the
c < 5"
administration of Shu a'al-Saltana and threatening a general uprising.
Telegrams of complaint were sent from religious leaders in Shiraz to
the Shah and to the British Legation in Tehran in December 1901.
Meanwhile in Tehran Qavam al-Mulk had been offered, and had
refused, the lucrative but distant post of Mutavalli of the Shrine at
Mashhad. He engaged in intrigues with Amin al-Sultan and Sipahsalar
59
to try to get Stnia'al-Saltana recalled. Qavam al-Mulk told Hardinge 
that he was most distrustful of the Shah’s son, and that he would be 
reluctant to return to Fars while he remained in office. It was Qavam 
al-Mulk’s hope that Shu^al-Saltana would be transferred to another 
appointment, and the way would then be free for him to return to 
Shiraz
In January 1902 there were rumours that Shu acal-Saltana would be 
called to Tehran again to act as regent during the Shah’s proposed
European tour, and although no such decision was made Qavam al-Mulk
 ^ 5 1
decided to return to Shiraz in February. Shortly after his return,
Qavam al-Mulk was able to rally his followers against the Governor-
General, and support was also received from the merchants and from
some members of the religious classes. Shu acal-Saltana in turn
endeavoured to win support in Shiraz by releasing some of the flour
6 2
which he had been hoarding.
56. F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.5, 8 January 1902,
57. F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.21, 5 February 1902.
58. F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.21, 5 February 1902.
59. F.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.105 Confidential, 4 July 1901.
60. F.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.105 .Confidential, 4 July 1901 .
61. F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.40, 4 March 1902.
62. F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lans downe, No.58, 2 April 1902.
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It would be wrong, however, to regard events in Fars as the 
only source of discontent. Members of the religious classes certainly 
paid attention to wider events, and in particular to the negotiations 
which were taking place in Tehran in the early months of 1902 for a 
new loan from Russia. The idea of an internal loan was again revived, 
and it received much support from the religious classes provided that 
they would be permitted to exercise control over the way in which the 
money was s p e n t S o m e  of the ulama^in Shiraz were in contact with 
their colleagues in Isfahan and in Tehran about this matter. The 
aspect of the loan which caused greatest concern in the south was the belief, 
that the customs revenue of the Gulf ports might be used as security 
for the loan.^
The rivalry between Shu acal~Saltana and Qavam al-Mulk led to 
demonstrations in early March; for nearly a week Shiraz was in 
turmoil as rival mobs terrorised the city, Shu acal-Saltana remained 
within his palace while Qavam al~Mulk and his chief supporters directed 
their followers from the safety of various mosques. The Governor- 
General’ s mob was apparently the stronger of the two and it wrecked 
the Persian government’s telegraph office. The Indo-European telegraph 
office was also threatened and the Manager of that establishment urged 
Hardinge to seek support in Tehran for Shu a^l-Saltana. The British 
Minister agreed that this was the best policy; for he feared that if 
the Governor-General was driven out then other men would be reluctant 
to accept the post, and the chances of establishing firm government and 
good order in Ears would become even more remote. Shu a'al-Saltana tried
63. F.O. 60:650. Enclosure No.l in Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.23 Secret,
14 February 1902.
64. F.O. 60:637. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.105 Confidential, 4 July 1901.
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to restore law and order by using troops to patrol the streets; but
the city became quiet only when both he and Qavam al-Mulk obeyed the
65
Shah’s urgent summons to go to Tehran.
When news of the riots reached the capital there were rumours
that Farman Farma would be pardoned by the Shah and allowed to return
. . 6 6
to Persia, so that he could resume office m  Fars. Some of the
reported intrigues at this time were indeed complex. After his exile
* 4
m  the spring of 1899 Farman Farma had visited Karbala and he had then
gone to Egypt. His sister, who was a wife of the Shah, had tried to
get him pardoned; but it was not until 1903 that she succeeded in 
67
this. In the spring of 1902, however, it was widely believed that 
Amin al-Sultan also was favoui-ing a pardon because he feared that 
Farman Farma would otherwise return to Karbala* and there incite even 
more opposition to the loans from Russia. At the same time it was 
believed by some Persians that Amin al-Sultan had plotted with Qavam 
al-Mulk to have riots break out in Shiraz, and that he provided money 
for this purpose. His aim was supposed to be that of getting the Shah 
to recall Shucaval-Saltana so that CAyn al-Dawla, a great rival of Amin 
al-Sultan, would be appointed to that distant and troublesome post. 
Support was also given to this interpretation by those who agreed that 
cAyn al-Dawla feared being sent to Shiraz, and therefore he too had 
supported the Shah’s wife in her pleas for her brother to be allowed to 
return to Persia; for then he,CAyn al-Dawla, would have an alternative
65. F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.45, 19 March 1902,
66. F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.49, 28 March 1902.
67. F.O. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 13, 22* January 1903.
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candidate to suggest to the Shah for the post in Fars. Such webs
of rumour were by no means uncommon in Tehran; and even though they
may not all have been true,they certainly indicate how deep were the
suspicions between officials, and how much time they felt they had to
devote to the preservation of their personal interests^and to the
prevention of their being sent to remote and turbulent areas.
The new Governor-General of Fars, however, was neither Farman
Farma, noreAyn al-Dawla, but Ssaf al-Dawla, who, according to Hardinge,
«
. . 69
was a very rapacious official0 The British Minister was m  Isfahan
when Asaf al-Dawla passed through that city en route to Shiraz in late
April 1903. While the new Governor-General was in Isfahan he was
«
approached by Qayam al-Mulk (who was still proceeding to Tehran under 
the orders of the Shah). A large bribe was offered to Asaf al-Dawla 
by Qavam al-Mulk for the new Governor-General to take him back to 
Shiraz. Asaf al-Dawla said he would be willing to meet Qavam al-Mulk1s 
wishes as long as he had first received permission to do so from Amin 
al-Sultan. When a request for such permission was made it was refused, 
and Qavam al-Mulk was told that he was likely to be ordered to go to 
Karbala7. Hardinge met Qavam al-Mulk while he was in Isfahan, and told 
him that the British government had supported the decision to call him 
to Tehran in the interests of establishing peace and order in Fars. 
Qavam al-Mulk expressed the view that the cause of the riots in Shiraz 
had been misgovernment by Shu^al-Saltana and he begged the British 
Minister to intercede for him in Tehran, so that he might be allowed to 
return to the south where he would again give proof of his friendly
68, F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.49, 28 March 1902.
69. F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.62, 9 April 1902.
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intentions towards Britain. Hardinge, however, knew that Qavam al-
Mulk had also been seeking similar assurances from the Russian Consul-
General during his stay in Isfahan.^
«
Asaf al-Dawla entered Shiraz on May 23rd 1902, without notice, in 
the hope of preventing disturbances. He soon found that lawlessness 
had again become rife during the period when there was no Governor in 
the province. Tribal groups migrating to their summer quarters had 
attacked villages and destroyed crops in the areas of Fasa and Darab.
There was much unrest in Shiraz itself; robberies were frequent and
71 .
shops had been plundered. The poor were suffering considerable
hardship because the price of bread was high, and in early May a baker
72
had been killed during a not. A group of fifty people had come
into Shiraz from Ardakan, some fifty miles to the northwest, to protest
against the injustice of their local governor, Nasir al-Dawla, a son
*
of Qavam al-Mulk. This group remained in bast (sanctuary) in the
73
Persian government telegraph office for over a month.
The new Governor-General made a quite good initial impression.
He returned land to Qavam al-Mulk!s sons which had been seized by
t c . 7 4Shu a a'l-Saltana; but for this he was later criticised by the Shah.
The prospect of good crops helped the price of wheat, barley and bread
75
to fall considerably. Asaf al-DawlaTs popularity began to decline,
*
however, as he appointed his sons to important posts. When bread 
prices started to increase Asaf al-Dawla took harsh measures against 
the bakers, and some of them sought sanctuary in the mosques. During
70. F.O, 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.78, 6 May 1902, and 
Enclosure No.l with that same document.
71. F.O. 60;650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.73, 29 April 1902.
72. F„0. 60:650. Des Graz to Lansdowne, No.46, 27 May 1902.
73. F.O. 60:651. Des Graz to Lansdowne, No.81, 24 June 1902.
74. F.O. 60:651 „ Des Graz to Lansdowne, No,110 Confidential, 22 July 1902.
75. F.O,. 60:651. Des Graz to Lansdowne, No.110 Confidential, 22 July 1902.
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the summer there was a serious outbreak of smallpox in the city,
but a report of four thousand deaths would seem to be somewhat 
76
exaggerated. Agitation arose over an incident in which a Christian
missionary was accused of having tried to give lessons to Muslim
77 .children. Outside the city there was considerable tribal turmoil
throughout the summer and autumn of 1902, particularly among the
> 78
Qashqa i, and the Rost to Bushire was robbed on several occasions.
During August Qavam al-Mulk was allowed to return to Shiraz, because
his wife had died, and he remained in the city until mid-September when
->79
he left for Bushire; taking the corpse with him for burial m  Karbala.
Xt would appear that Qavam al-Mulk used the opportunity to strengthen
his relations with Asaf al-Dawla; for Qavam al-Mulk1s sons sent a
telegram to the Shah immediately on his return to Persia in early
October from his visit to Europe^informing him that all had been quiet
in Pars during his absence, and that no one had any complaints against
SO
the government of Asaf al-Dawla. Hardinge held a different view, and 
he wrote in December 1902 that, "Asaph al Dawla has neither the
81
character nor the means to repress the growing lax^lessness and disorder".
The extent of the Governor-General’s failure to preserve security was
shown by the fact that in January 1903, his own house was burgled and
82
valuable carpets were stolen.
76. F..0. 60; 6 5 U
77. F.,0o 60; 651.
78. F.,0. 60; 651 .
F,,0. 60: 651.
79. F..0. 60; 651.
80. F,.0. 60: 651.
81 . F,.0. 60: 65 K
82. F,.0. 60: 665.
Des Graz to Lansdowne, No.110 Confidential, 22 July 1902.
Des Graz to Lansdowne, No.123, 19 August 1902,
Des Graz to Lansdowne, No. 134, 16 September 1902., and
Hardinge to Lansdowne, No,170, 7 December 1902.
Ersklne to Lansdowne, No. 147, 14' October 1902’.
Erskina to Lansdownes.No.!57, 11 November 1902.
Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.170, 7 December 1902.
Hai'dinge to Lansdowne, No. 20, 3 February 1903.
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During 1903 further steps were taken in the reform of the Customs 
administration, and these had important repercussions in Fars, In 
October 1901 the Russian and Persian governments had signed a Declaration 
concerning their future trade. Under this the previous ad valorem 
duties, most of which had been levied at the maximum permitted rate of 
five per cent since the first reform of 1900, were to be replaced in 1903 by 
fixed duties. These new duties varied according to the type of goods 
imported into Persia from Russia. Exports from Persia were mostly free 
of duty; the exceptions consisting chiefly of certain foodstuffs, live 
animals, opium, tobacco, raw silk, and precious stones. This Russo- 
Persian Declaration had relatively little effect in the south for there 
was almost no trade with Russia from the Gulf ports.
The negotiations between Persia and Russia had been conducted in
secrecy, and the signature of the Declaration caused considerable
consternation to the British government. The progress and complexity
of the negotiations which then took place between Britain and Persia
for a similar Declaration to govern Anglo-Persian trade are of little
relevance to this particular study. The result of those negotiations
was a Declaration, similar to that of October 1901, which was signed
and which came into effect in February 1903. This Declaration too
replaced the previous ad valorem dues with specific imposts. The
Declaration also stated that import duties would be paid at the port
83
of entry and that no further dues would then be levied inland.
(As will be seen, this provision was not always carried out.)
83. An accurate summary of the negotiations and details of the 
agreement can be found in J.G. Lorimer, op.cit., I part 2, 
pp.2597-2602.
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The new regulations caused an agitation in the south of the
country, and the grounds for this were twofold. On the one hand the
new dues raised the price of certain popular commodities very sharply -
84
the outstanding example being that of tea. The second objection
arose from the fact that the new dues had been introduced at the behest
85
of Britain, and were being enforced by Belgian officials. To many
Persians this was further evidence that their country was being handed
over to foreign powers„ There was another important local source of
grievance. In late February 1903 an agent of the Customs administration
had had a merchant who had taken bast in a mosque at Bushire removed
by forceo (The merchant had imported aniline dyes which were then
forbidden in Persia.) The man responsible for the removal of 'the
merchant from the sanctuary was a Persian; but that did not prevent the
Belgians from being blamed for this serious violation of a respected 
86Persian custom. There was much agitation in Shiraz about this whole
87
matter, but no violence occurred.
In early March 1903 there were reports that Shi/a^al-Saltana was 
seeking to return as Governor-General of Fars, but the appointment went 
t o iAla>al-Dawla. He had had experience of turbulent events before when 
he was Governor of ^ rabistan in 1896-7, and he had then gained a
88 v ~
reputation for firm government. He arrived in Shiraz in early April 
1903. By May there was already a distinct improvement in the security 
of the province; stolen goods were being recovered and the roads were
84. See Chapter iy The Reform of the Customs Administration.
85. F.Oc 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.28, 3 March 1903.
86. F.O. 248:817. Kemball to Hardinge, No.41, 22 March 1903.
87. F.O, 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.26, 3 March 1903.
88. F.O. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.26, 3 March 1903. See also
G.P. Churchill, op.cit., p.3.
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becoming much safer. When there was a temporary reduction in the
level of dues imposed on tea the agitation against the new tariff
system subsided somewhat, and trade between Bushire and Shiraz began
to revive. The Governor of Kazirun was bastinadoed for failing to
prevent robberies; and in Shiraz a notorious criminal was blown
from a gun. The new Governor-General took pains to see personally
90
those people who had grievances and this was greatly appreciated.
The pay of the road guards was increased and distributed regularly;
but they were then held responsible for any robberies on the section
91 c , . .
under their control. Ala al-Dawla established good relations with
Qavam al-Mulk (who had returned to Tehran from Karbala in January 1903,
and had then been permitted to go back to F a r s a n d  with his sons. In
return Qavam al-Mulk used his considerable authority to secure less
unruly behaviour by some of the tribes. In Shiraz the barracks were
repaired and the soldiers appear to have received regular pay. Salar
al-Sultan, Qavam al-Mulkfs second son, was placed in charge of the troops,
c _ *>
and he was apparently respected by them. Ala al-Dawla banned the playing
of music at prayer times in the city and this was welcomed by the 
92
religious classes, Good order prevailed throughout most of the province, 
and the Governor-General1s firmness won much approval.
The Governorship of^Ala*al-Dawla forms an interesting and 
illuminating episode in the history of Fars under Muzaffar al-Din, for 
it indicates that in one province at least, traditional government, if
89. F.O. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.78 Confidential, 26 May 1903.
90. F.O. 248:800. Shiraz Agent to Kemball. No number. Shiraz Diary,
22 April 1903.
91. F.O. 2.48:800. Shiraz Agent to Kemball, No number. Shiraz Diary,
12 May 1903.
92. F.O. 248:800. Shiraz Agent to Kemball. No number. Shiraz Diary,
28 September 1903.
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effective, could go a long way towards meeting the needs of the people.
This is not to say that all agitation died out and that every road
throughout the province was always secure. There were still disturbances
around Fasa and Jahrum during the summer, and trade in this area was at
a standstill for a few weeks, but compared with other provinces Fars
93
at this time was a model of good government.
One of the dangers in concentrating on one province is that one
tends to lose sight of events elsewhere in Persia. During 1903 there
were many centres of agitation in the country. Riots occurred in
Mashhad in April, chiefly because of misgovernment; and there were
violent agitations in Tabriz during Dutieagainst the tariff reforms.
Nearer to Shiraz the Babis of Isfahan suffered violent attacks during
94
May, and these persecutions spread to Yazd m  June. Members of the
Isfahanculama? tried to incite similar agitations In Shiraz, but the
95
town remained peaceful throughout the summer of 1903. Even the news
of the fall of Amin al-Sultan in mid-September caused less of a stir
in Fars than it did in other provinces.^
During the winter months there were more robberies on the roads
and the British Residency courier was attacked near Kazirun in 
97December. The Governor-General earned high praise, however, from the
Director of the Indo-European Telegraph Company as being the only
provincial Governor in Persia who, in his experience, investigated
98
commercial claims quickly and settled them honestly. In January 1904
93. F.O. 248:800. Shiraz Agent to Kemball. No number. Shiraz Diary,
27 July 1903.
94. F.O. 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.102 Confidential, 9 July 1903.
95. F.O. 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.102 Confidential, 9 July 1903.
96. F.O. 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.3 (Persian Gulf) Confidential,
21 November 1903.
97. F.O. 60:681. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.6, 6 January 1904.
98. F.O. 248:803. Director of the Persian Section of the Indo-European 
Telegraph Company (Tehran) to Grant Duff, 23 November 1903.
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the British Consul m  Shiraz also said that Ala al-Dawla was a good
Governor and that he was eminently preferable to either of his
predecessors. He described Shu aCal-Saltana as "a self-willed Prince"
*
with "a rapacious following", while Asaf al-Dawla had been "notoriously 
incapable".^
c
In January 1904 Ala al-Dawla gave further proof of his concern 
for those under his administration when he took action to prevent a 
bank in Shiraz from imposing a twelve-and—a—half per cent discount on 
copper coins because they were cracked and c h i p p e d . ( T h e r e  had been 
much discontent in Bushire earlier in the month when a bank there had .
said that it would accept such coins only after discounting their value
by ten per cent.)^^ The Governor-General also showed considerable 
courage during the same month when he welcomed a member of the Alliance 
Israelite Umverselle who came to Shiraz as a teacher for the Jewish 
community there. Ala al-Dawla told the British Consul that there was
a great need for such a man as the Jewish community of some 6,000 people
was poor and depressed. Grahame noted that among other occupations the 
Jews had previously made wine and distilled spirits, but that they had 
been forbidden to do so since Ala al-Dawla had been Governor. Grahame 
also noted in that same despatch that the Jewish quarter of Shiraz was 
very overcrowded but that members of the community were obviously 
reluctant to move elsewhere because they feared they would not be as 
well-protected if they did so. The British Consul made an unwitting, 
but grim, prophecy when he noted that such overcrowding could be very
99. F.O. 248;817. Grahame to Hardinge, No.4, 11 January 1904.
100. F.O. 248:817. • Grahame Monthly Summary No.l, 25 January 1904.
1010 F.O. 248:817. Kemball to Hardinge, No.6, 12 January 1904.
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harmful if an epidemic were to occur in Shiraz (see Chapter V, The
102
Cholera Epidemic of 1904).
In February 1904tAla?al-Dawla was called to Tehran for a meeting
of provincial governors which was to discuss proposals for reform of
the tax system. Before he left Shiraz he swore an oath before the Imam
Jumcathat he would not accept any measures which would weigh heavily on
c —
the people. There was, however, much doubt about whether or not Ala
al-Dawla would return to Fars, and Grahame said it was just possible
that the Governor-General might go as far as to instigate a local
disturbance so as to prevent, or at least to postpone, his journey.
103
But this did not happen. Qavam al-Mulk was now apprehensive lest
Shu aCal-Saltana should be reappointed to his former office; and although 
Qavam al-Mulk had nominally been reconciled with the Shah’s son there 
was still much trepidation among Qavam al-MulkTs followers about his 
possible return as Governor-General. This feeling prompted Qavain al-Mulk 
to ask the British Consul for a promise of protection if Shu a^al-Saltana 
should return, but Grahame gave no such commitment. In the British 
Consul’s view what Qavam al-Mulk and his followers most desired was 
a weak Governor-General like Asaf al-Dawla,
During February 1904 there was considerable rejoicing in Shiraz 
about the naval defeat which the Japanese had recently Inflicted on
102. F.O. 248:817. Grahame to Hardinge, No.7, 21 January 1904. Further 
details of the Jewish community in Shiraz can be found in D. Loeb,
Outcaste: Jewish Life in Southern Iran, New York 1977. That author,
using Alliance-Israelite UniverselYe""archives,states that the Jewish 
population of the city in 1903 was approximately 5,000 (op.cit.,
p.300). The same book has details of the occupations followed by 
Jews in 1903 (op.cit., p.82).
103. F.O. 248:817. Grahame, Shiraz News, 10 February 1904.
104. F.O. 248:817. Grahame to Hardinge, No.ll, 19 February 1904.
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105 . . . .
the Russian fleet. This is an interesting indication of how
knowledge of outside events contributed to strengthening the desire 
of the many sections of the population that the Persian government
should also assert itself against Russia.
— — . c
Security m  Shiraz remained good during the early weeks of Ala
al-DawlaTs absence and the regular night patrols of soldiers were 
106
continued. On March 25th 1904, rumours circulated that the Shah had
died; there was much panic buying of food and the price of bread rose
sharply from thirteen shahis per maim to one qiran. The acting
Governor-General^Sahara al-Dawla^denied the rumours and punished some o f
the bakers. By the following day the city was quiet again and prices
107
returned to their former levels. Trade on the road to Bushire was
108
interrupted while the rumours continued to circulate.
’['/hen the news was announced in mid-April that Shu a al- Sal tana was
indeed to return as Governor-General there was much consternation in
Shiraz, particularly among the followers of Qavam al-Mulk. Two of the
latter1s sons sent an immediate present to the new Governor-General in 
109Tehran. The fact that Amin al-Sultan no longer held the office of
.Scwdt't$C3iam deepened the degree of disquiet, for it was known that Shu a& 
al-Saltana had feared him. According to one of Qavam al-Mulk1s sons 
the only people that the new Governor-General now feared were his half- 
brother, the Vali-ahd and his mother; for his father, the Shah, Shu a 







817. Grahame to Hardinge, No.11, 19 February 1904, 
817. Grahame, Shiraz News, 7 March 1904.
817. Grahame, Shiraz News, 28 March 1904.
817. Grahame, Shiraz News, 13 April 1904.
817. Grahame to Hardinge, No.20, 21 April 1904.
817. Grahame to Hardinge, No.21, 25 April 1904.
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considerable anxiety among many sections of the population in Shiraz, 
including the religious classes, about the exactions which the new 
Governor-General and his entourage might impose on their arrival.
In late April and early May 1904 grain and bread prices rose,
C —c
partly as a result of hoarding prior to the arrival of Shu aal-Saltana,
and partly because of a failure in the crop after attack by pests. The
acting Governor-General again punished some of those responsible and
112
prices were soon back to normal levels. There were very heavy r a m s
on May 9th-llth, and these did much damage to the opium crop in the
southern parts of the province where the incisions had already been
made in the poppy heads. This damage was to cause hardship in those
areas later in the year. Around Shiraz the opening of the poppy heads
1 1 3
had not been done and there the crop was saved. In May and late June
there was growing apprehension about the approach of cholera, and trade
1 14
began to decline sharply on the road to Bushire. Grahame noted that
if the disease were to reach the city its effects would be serious
115
because of the insanitary condition of many of the streets. In June
there was an outbreak of measles and diphtheria, and over twenty deaths
116
per day were occuring by the middle of the month.
The greatest cause of apprehension in Shiraz, however, was the 
gradual approach of the nex? Governor-General. Grahame had told Qavam 
al-MulkTs sons that Shu a al-Saltana had promised the British Minister 
in Tehran that xibat had happened in the past x^ould be forgotten, but
111. F.O. 248:817. Grahame, Shiraz Nex^s, 27 April 1904.
112. F.O. 248:817. Grahame, Shiraz Nex^ s , 12 May 1904.
113. F.O. 248:817 . Grahame, Shiraz Nex^s, 12 May 1904.
114. F.O. 248:818. Grahame to Hardinge, No.29, 25 June 1904.
115. F.O. 248:818. Grahame, Shiraz News, 8 June 1904.
116. F.O. 248:818. Grahame, Shiraz Nex^s, 29 June 1904.
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117this did little to calm their fears. When Grahame met the new
e-_c
Governor-General outside the city on June 28th, Shu aal-Saltana
immediately asked about the approach of cholera, and he was told that
it had reached Kazirun on June 26th. Grahame recommended that the
streets of Shiraz should be cleaned and that rubbish should be
incinerated. According to the British Consul's report the new Governor-
General replied that hhat needed to be burnt were " fles turbans du 
118clerge'". Such statements did not bode well for future tranquility
in Fars.
As the cholera got nearer to Shiraz more and more people left 
for the villages. Shu aal-Saltana remained m  the city long enough to 
distribute posts among his followers, and to reach an accommodation with
Qavam al-Mullc, before he too left. Qavam al-Mulk and his sons had been
right to be apprehensive about Shu aal-Saltana1s return to Fars for, 
according to Grahame, the presents which they had to offer the new
Governor-General to achieve a reconciliation cost some thirty thousand
- - . . . 1 1 9
tumans more than those which had proved acceptable m  April 1901. By
mid-July there were few officials left in Shiraz; law and order
. - 120
declined and the price of bread rose to over one qiran per mann. It
was not until the very end of August that the Governor-General and his
 ^ _ 121 . . .
suite returned to Shiraz. When they did so intrigues soon began and
Qavam al-Mulk was 'angered when one of his former supporters,/Vh/tamid al-
Dawla, went over to Shu aal-Saltana's party and was rewarded with the
122
post of Vazir-i Daftar.
117. F.O. 248:818. Grahame to Hardinge, No.28, 8 June 1904.
118. F.O. 248:818. Grahame to Hardinge, No.30, 29 June 1904.
119. F.O. 248:818. Grahame, Shiraz News, 31 July 1904.
120. F.O. 248:818. Grahame, Shiraz News, 31 July 1904.
121. F.O, 248:818. Grahame, Shiraz News, 31 August 1904.
122. F.O. 248:818. Grahame to Hardinge, No.38, 7 September 1904.
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During the autumn there were many reports of the new Governor-
General' s rudeness and impulsive behaviour. In September a criminal was
found guilty for a second time of theft and, as he had already had the
fingers of his right hand cut off during Shu a.cal-Sal tana's first period
♦
as Governor-General, he was sentenced to have one of his feet amputated.
When the sentence was announced to the criminal in the presence of
Shu aVL-Saltana he made a remark which was regarded as offensive by the
Governor-General; the latter immediately flew into a rage and ordered
123
that the unfortunate man should forthwith be blown from a gun.
During the winter of 1904-5, as trade began to revive following 
the end of the cholera epidemic, there were many complaints that rahdari
was still being levied despite its nominal abolition in 1903. Most of
- . 124
the complaints about this concerned the Shiraz to Bushire road. In
January 1905 the rates which were teing levied, in each direction, were
one qiran ten shahis per camel or mule load, and one qiran per donkey 
125
load. These dues were sometimes levied repeatedly at several stages
along the road, and on occasion they were collected at the very outskirts
of Shiraz. When Shu aal-Saltana was questioned about these taxes near
Shiraz he denied that they were rahdari, and insisted that they were
instead a form of poll tax on the animals in the caravan. According to
Grahame, however, no local muleteers could remember ever before having
127
had to pay such a poll tax. Additional dues were also apparently
levied on caravans which brought charcoal into Shiraz, and these dues
*r 1 28
were imposed by agents of Sardar-i Akram, the Va£ir of Fars.
123. F.O. 60:683. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.189, 12 October 1904.
124. F.O. 248:842. Cox to Hardinge, No013, 12 February 1905.
125. F.O. 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 2 January 1905.
126. F.O. 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 2 January 1905,
127. F.O. 248:849. Grahame to Hardinge, No.12, 8 February 1905.
128. F.O. 248:849, Grahame, Shiraz News, 13 September 1905.
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Among other illegal taxes which were being collected was one
called bar which was being imposed on trade from Bushire passing through 
- - 129
Shiraz. Fees were also being levied in January 1905 by the road
guards at Shif, and at Khushab, Dalaki, Kunar Takhti, Kumarij and at 
- . - 130
Kazirun. These fees were nominally levied for the protection of the
131
caravans, but robberies were still frequent. The average rate in
January was five qirans per twenty mules at each stage, but this rate
. . 132
varied from place to place, and it increased later m  the year. Many
C c
of these dues were being imposed directly by Shu a al-Saltana’s men, and
the amount of money which the Governor-General was collecting was
133
believed to be considerable.
A further complaint concerning the road from Shiraz to Bushire was
that local villagers had been forbidden to sell their produce and that
merchants and other travellers now had to buy grain and other commodities
from the official corn chandlers (allafdan) , and ttugse officials were
charging extortionate prices. For example, the allafdan were charging
one qiran ten shahis per mann for barley when the normal market price was
only five shahis pei* mann, and they charged eight shahis per mann for
straw when it could be bought for half a shahi per mann locally. Some
of the muleteers told Grahame in October 1905 that if road guard fees
and the compulsory purchase produce from the Callafdan were ended then
_ , 134
transport charges on the Bushire-Shiraz road would fall by fifty per cent.
Merchants who sent goods to Bandar CAbbas also had to pay illegal 
dues. A brokerage tax (dallall) was being levied on consignments which
129. F.O. 248:849. Grahame to Hardinge, No.12, 8 February 1905.
130e F.O. 248:842. Trevor (acting for Cox) to Hardinge, No,20, 3 March 1905.
131. F.O. 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 2 January 1905.
132. F.O. 248:842. Trevor (acting for Cox) to Hardinge, No.20, 3 March 1905.
133. F.O. 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 9 July 1905.
134. F.O. 248:850. Grahame to Grant Duff, No.98, 7 October 1905.
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were sent to that port by inland merchants when the goods were handed 
over to the exporting merchants, the rate varying between two-and-a- 
half and ten per cent ad valorem. Some goods which were traded 
through Bandar CAbbas also had to pay a weighing tax (qappandari).
• c — r*
Imports which left Bandar Abbas for the north had to pay exit fees 
(maydani) . * Shu aal-Saltana was not responsible for those levies,
but he did nothing to provide redress for the merchants whose trade 
was being damaged by their imposition. (The levying of such dues at 
Bandar Abbas appears to have diverted much trade to Minab during the 
spring and summer of 1905,, for only the authorized dues were collected 
there.;
c c
In May Shu aal-Saltana had some road guards arrested for extortion;
but it was believed that their real crime had been that of not handing
over a sufficient proportion of what they had collected to the agent
137of the Governor-General. In September the Governor-General proposed
to increase security along the roads by reducing the number of road
138
guards, but enhancing the pay of those who remained on duty. This
seems to have been an ineffective promise; for robberies continued
during October and nine payments to road guards were being exacted from
caravans travelling between ShTf and Dalaki, and eleven more payments
1 3 9
were demanded between Dalaki and Shiraz. In November some of the
140
road guards complained that they had received no pay since March,
and those between Kazirun and Burazjan were exacting heavier and heavier
141
payments from caravans. Road guards at other places were seizing
135. F .0. 248:: 842.
136. F .0. 248:: 842.
137. F .0. 248;; 843.
138. F .0. 248:: 850.
139. F .0. 248: 850.
140. F .0. 248:: 850.
141 . F .0. 248:: 850.
Trevor (acting for Cox) to Hardinge, No.20, 3 March 1905. 
Cox to Hardinge, No.68, 13 June 1905.
Persian Gulf Diary, 25 June 1905.
Grahame, Shiraz News, 29 September 1905.
Grahame to Grant Duff, No.98, 7 October 1905,
Grahame, Shiraz News, 18 October 1905.
Grahame to Grant Duff, No.108, 28 October 1905,
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sheep from caravans which passed during November and they were
142
demanding a ransom for the return of the animals.
Within Shiraz itself there was much misgovemment. A  serious
. c — c # t
complaint was that Shu a al“Saltana was again purchasing and hoarding
143
g r a m  and forage so as to charge more for it later. Taxes were
144
being levied for street cleaning, but that task was never performed.
Shopkeepers ,in Shiraz’s most important bazaar - the Vakil bazaar -
145 . . .
had their rents arbitrarily raised during the autumn. The discipline
and morale of the soldiers in the city declined for many of them
received little or no pay during 1905. In September over 150 of them
146
took sanctuary at the Russian Consulate to protest about -this. The
temper of the inhabitants of Shiraz was not improved when they saw, in
July, much of the money that had been extorted from them being spent on
t t 1 4
lavish celebrations for Shu IT a 1*-Sal tanaT s marriage. During these
celebrations the price of bread rose sharply and this too caused discontent,
In January there had been some protests about the activities of 
148Christian missionaries, but these were not as great as the 
disturbances against the Jews during the summer, autumn and early winter. 
The Jewish distillers and makers of wine were subject to great 
oppression; for while^Ala*al-Dawla had forbidden them to practice those 
occupations he had also abolished the licence fee for that profession
142. F.O. 248:844. Cox, Persian Gulf Diary, 5 November 1905. Much of 
the information about conditions prevailing along the Bushire- 
Shiraz road was obtained from the clerks in the Indo-European 
Telegraph Company’s stations along the road. See P.O.248:850, 
Grahame to Grant Duff, No.133, 26 December 1905.
143. F.O. 2.48:849, Grahame, Shiraz News, 2 January 1905.
144. F.O. 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 2 January 1905.
145. F.O. 248:844. Persian Gulf Diary, 15 October 1905.
146. F.O. 248:850. Grahame, Shiraz News, 29 September 1905.
147. F.O. 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 9 July 1905.
148. F.O. 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 21 January 1905.
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which they had formerly paid. Shu aal-Saltana continued to ban such
activities, but at the same time he insisted on collecting the licence
_ „ 149
fee of some 4,000 tumans. On June 2nd 1905 there was a riot against
the Jews because they were allegedly not wearing the tall hats which had
150been decreed for them m  the past. More violence followed and on
June 22nd a Jew was k i l l e d . I n t e r m i t t e n t  demonstrations continued
during the summer and autumn and these culminated in serious disturbances
in December (see below).
Two things appear to have prevented more serious demonstrations
from occurring in Shiraz during the summer of 1905. One was that the
152
harvest was quite good and bread prices began to fall; and as Grahame
noted, some of the peasantry had remembered the shortage and dearness of<
bread during the latter part of 1904 and they had sown crops of millet
153
and maize for their own use. Also in late July an important religious
figure, Hajji Shaykh Aqa died. He had been the successor designate of
c .the Imam Jtimevand his demise temporarily weakened the opposition to the
rule of Shu a ^ l - S a l t a n a . T h e  religious classes did, however, express 
growing concern about the misgovernment of the province. They were in 
regular contact by telegraph with their colleagues in Isfahan and Tehran 
throughout most of the year,^^ and in November and December when protests 
were at their highest they were also in touch with their colleagues in 
Karbala*
149. P.O. 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 18 February 1905.
150. F.O. 248:843. Persian Gulf Diary, 25 June 1905.
151 . F.O. 248:843. Persian Gulf Diary, 16 July 1905,
152. F.O. 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 6 August 1905.
153. F.O. 248:843. Persian Gulf Diary, 20 August 1905.
154. F.O. 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 19 August 1905.
155. F.O. 248:850. Grahame to Grant Duff, No.97, 1 October 1905,
156. F.O. 248:850. Grahame to Grant Duff, No.126 Secret, 6 December 1905
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It was not only Shu aal-Saltana who was practising extortion, nor
was it just the inhabitants of Shiraz who were suffering. In August
Grahame noted that the Governor-General and his entourage were
endeavouring everywhere to make money as quickly as possible and there
157is ample evidence to support this view. In January some 500 of the
inhabitants of Fasa had come to Shiraz and there they took refuge in
the Shah Chiragh Mosque to protest about the high level of taxes being
sought from them by their local governor - l^am al-Mulk. They alleged
that he was demanding 30,000 tumans more than they had previously paid,
and they threatened to abandon the town entirely unless this was
reduced. Another report supports the view that taxes in Fasa had
certainly been increased greatly, but by somewhat less than the 30,000
tumans alleged. According to that report, which Grahame said was from
a trustworthy source, taxes from Fasa had amounted to some 20,000 tumans
in 1900. During his first administration Shu aCal-Saltana had raised them
to 32,000 tumans, while in 1905 he was demanding about 45,000 tumans from
159
the unfortunate inhabitants.
In Jahrum too the oppression was so great that many of the people
were leaving their houses and moving to Bandar Abbas to escape from the
160
clutches of their local governor Mudabbir al-Saltana. During August
1905 some 3,000 people in Abadeh took refuge in the telegraph office
there to protest against the extortion practised by their local
161governor Muntasir al-Dawla. All three of these officials were members
157. F.O. 248:849. Grahame to Hardinge, No.69, 15 August 1905.
158. F.O. 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 21 January 1905, and 
Shiraz News, 18 February 1905.
159. F.O. 248:850. Grahame to Hardinge, No.135, 29 December 1905.
160. F.O. 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 18 February 1905.
161. F.O. 248:849. Grahame to Hardinge, No.69, 15 August 1905.
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of Shu aal-SaltanaTs entourage when he arrived in Fars in July 1904.*^
In the late autumn there were many complaints from Kazirun that much
163
higher taxes than usual were being imposed on the opium crop.
Although much more money was being collected in Fars very little of it
was being remitted to Tehran.
* c _
The rivalry between Shu aal-Saltana and Qavam al-Mulk had become
even more intense during 1905. Several of Qavam al-MulkTs followers
were imprisoned by the Governor-General and they gained their release
only after paying considerable sums of money. One of Qavam al-MulkTs
agentsj who was in charge of an appeal to Tehran about the usurpation
of some of Qavam al-Mulk s lands, was seized by some of Shu aal-Saltana s
*
men in early September; and a ransom of twenty-five thousand qirans
166
was demanded for his release. On another occasion some of Qavam al-
Mulk1 s followers came to Shiraz to protest about a raid on their village
in which four peasants had been killed and most of the crops destroyed.
The head of the deputation was beaten on the orders of the Governor-
General, and the other petitioners suffered the insult of having their
167
beards cut off before they were sent back without redress.
At the end of September Shu aal-Saltana left to visit Europe for
medical reasons, but there was little improvement in the government of 
168
the province. He left his Vazir, Sardar-i Akram in charge and there
were soon many complaints about his administration. In early October 
1905 Grahame sent to the Vazir some muleteers who had been in charge of
162. F.O. 248:818. Grahame, Shiraz News, 31 July 1904.
163. F.O. 248:850. Grahame to Grant Duff, No.219 Secret, 23 December 1905
164. F.O. 248:844. Persian Gulf Diary, 29 October 1905.
165. F.O. 248:844. Persian Gulf Diary, 17 September 1905.
166. F.O, 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 6 September 1905.
167. F.O, 248:849. Grahame, Shiraz News, 6 September 1905.
1680 F.O. 248:844, Persian Gulf Diary, 15 October 1905.
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a caravan which had been carrying goods belonging to an Indian
merchant which had later been stolen. Sardar-i Akram refused to pursue
169
the robbers and had the muleteers beaten for troubling him. Later
the same month some goods belonging to the British company Zeiglers
were stolen on the Bushire-Shiraz road. The Vazir had the muleteers
from the caravan seized and imprisoned until they paid the cash value
of the stolen goods. Again no attempt was made to pursue the robbers
or to improve security along the road.*^
In a lengthy and uncharacteristically bitter- despatch in November
1905, the British Charge d fAffairs in Tehran, Grant Duff, described
both the Governor-General and his Minister. "The Shoa es Sultaneh has
all the failings of the Kajar family, being vicious, cruel, tyrannical,
and incompetent. He affects to be very European and enlightened but
except for an outside varnish acquired in the music-halls of Paris and
Berlin His Imperial Highness is merely a savage and the fact that he
suffers both from epilepsy, syphilis, maniacal pride and a variety of
other ailments, renders him not only undesirable but even dangerous as a
ruler." Grant Duff’s description of Sardar-i Akram was briefer, "He is
171corrupt, incompetent and insolent". Grant Duff was already pressing
c _c
the Persian authorities in October 1905 to have Shu aal-Saltana and his
entourage removed from Fars; but he admitted that this would be no easy
task to accomplish for Shu a'al-Saltana was Muzaffar al-Din’s favourite
« *
son and the Monarch believed him to be perfect. The Shah also regarded
. . 172
Sardar-i Akram as a valuable servant and a competent official.
169. F.O. 248:850. Grahame to^Grant Duff, No.101, 7 October 1905.
170P F.O, 248:850. Grahame to Grant Duff, No.106, 25 October 1905.
171. F.O. 60:700. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.237, 1 November 1905.
172. F.O, 60:700. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No.254, 3 December 1905.
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When in December 1905 the Persian government announced that it 
was sending a special minister (Va£ir-i Makhsus) to investigate
conditions in Pars, there was considerable intrigue over the appointment.
c __c . . .
Shu a al-Saltana was m  P a n s  at the time and from there he offered five
thousand tumans to the Sadr-i A^am to choose someone who was not
173 - -
hostile to his interests. Grahame reported from Shiraz that few
people there believed that any official would have the courage to give
a truly independent report on the conduct of government by the Shah’s 
174favourite son..
What had finally prompted action by the central government was the 
outbreak of serious anti-Jewish rioting which began on November 15th 
1905 (this was during Ramadan). The immediate cause of violence was the 
building of a house by a Jew, The house had been designed to be of such 
a size that it kept within the restriction of being no larger than those 
in its neighbourhood; but while it was being constructed the building 
operations had caused the partial obstruction of a thoroughfare. As 
soon as the house was completed various members of the religious classes 
began an agitation about it. A certain Sayyid Muhammad first of all 
commanded the owner to demolish the house, and when this was not done 
he ordered some of his followers to pull it down. The Jewish owners 
appealed to the Vazir who promptly and publicly abused Sayyid Muhammad. 
Sardar-i Akram, however, had little desire to face a riot because he had
4 * M  C  *
few troops at his disposal, and he asked the Imam JVimctto intervene and
173, F.O. 248:850. Grahame to Grant Duff, No.129 Secret,
23 December 1905. (Grahame had apparently been able to make 
arrangements to be shown telegrams which were sent from Shu aal- 
Saltana via the Indo-European Telegraph Company to Shiraz.
See F.0.248:850, Grahame to Grant Duff, No,121 Secret,
1 December 1905.)
174. F.O. 248:850. Grahame, Shiraz News, 14 December 1905.
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to help calm the situation. That religious leader said he was 
willing to assist, but he feared that the discontent in the city was 
so deep that it would be impossible for him to prevent a tumult.
This proved to be an accurate assessment and there seems to be little 
doubt that although the riots were sparked off during a period of 
religious fervour by this anti-Jewish emotion, the movement was really
, . C„ c
an expression of bitter resentment against the misgovemment of Shu a
al-Saltana and his Vazir.
On November 14th the Imam Junra left Shiraz. Within two days the
agitation had grown considerably and the bazaars were closed. According
to Grahame large crowds gathered at the houses of the rAuj tahids and
demanded redress for injustices. A similar crowd gathered outside
the British Consulate and called for the removal from office of Sardar-i
Akram. Members of that crowd told Grahame that they would no longer
accept any promises from the Vazir unless they were given through the
British Consul.*^  There was considerable looting of the Jewish quarter
and some violence. By November 18th three people had been killed and
178
more than 10 had been injured. The agitations gradually subsided
after the end of Ramadan but there were sporadic outbursts of firing
until early December, and some of those who had taken refuge in the
. ~ . . 179
Shah Chiragh Mosque were still m  bast m  mid-December.
175. F.O. 248:850. Grahame, Shiraz News, 18 November 1905.
Sayyid Muhammad was the son of the late Sayyid All Akbar who had 
fomented the discontent against the Tobacco Regie in May 1891. 
See A.K.S. Lambton, The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to Revolution (1) 
Studia Islamica, Vol.22, 1965, pp.127-8,
176. F.O. 248:850. Grahame, Shiraz News, 18 November 1905.
177. F.O. 248:850. Grahame, Shiraz News, 18 November 1905.
178. F.O. 248:850. Grahame,‘Shiraz News, 18 November 1905.
179. F ’.O. 248:850, Grahame to Grant Duff, No. 129 Secret,
23 December 1905,
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While all this public agitation was occurring many of the
religious leaders had sent telegrams to their colleauges in Isfahan,
Tehran and Karbala* Others were addressed to the Sadr-i P^ zam, to
•  •
180
the Shah, and to the British Legation in Tehran. In early December
Grahame was asked for his assistance in trying to ensure that
telegrams of complaint would reach Muzaffar al-Din, for there was wide-
- c_c
spread belief in Shiraz that Shu aal-SaltanaTs friends at Court would
181
try to suppress them. Later that same month a member of the
religious classes enquired from the British Consul how a telegram'
could be sent to the English King, for the enquirer said that there
182
was little hope of receiving any satisfaction from Tehran.
Some of the merchants too were sending telegrams. A number of
these were concerned only with business affairs, such as those
despatched to colleagues in Isfahan advising against the forwarding of
183
goods to Shiraz while the agitation continued. Other telegrams sent
by the merchants, however, reflect the deep sense of injustice which
many of the inhabitants of Fars were experiencing. The most detailed
telegram of this nature preserved in the sources used for this study
was sent to the Sadr-iACzam on December 1st 1905, and it is over 1,200
words in length. There were five major sources of complaint listed in 
] 84
that document. The first concerned the increase m  taxes.
One example was mentioned in which the amount previously levied had
been three thousand tumans, now the sum of twenty thousand tumans was
185 . .
being demanded. It was also said that idiereas previously taxes m
kind had been taken in mann-i Tabriz, now a heavier mann was being used,
180. F.O. 248:850. Grahame to Grant Duff, No.126 Secret, 6 December 1905,
181. F.O. 248:850. Grahame to Grant Duff, No.126 Secret, 6 December. 1905.
182. F.O. 248:850. Grahame to Grant Duff, No.129 Secret, 23 December 1905
183. F.O. 248:845. Aganoor to^Grant Duff, No.77, 30 December 1905.
184. F.O. 248:850. Enclosure in Grahame to Grant Duff, No.122, Secret,
2 December 1905.
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but the same number of mann of produce were collected. It was
also reported that when, in a certain area, it had proved impossible
to provide the necessary amount of produce being demanded, the people
187
had been allowed to make a cash payment instead. Where injustice
had occurred was that the produce was entered on the official accounts 
at a value of ten tumans per kharvir when in fact the population had 
had to commute the tax at the rate of twenty tumans per kharvar. Other 
grievances under this heading concerned the fact that certain taxes 
previously been payable in some cases in seven instalments, now they 
were being demanded all at once and in advance. Another complaint was 
that a tax which had previously been collected at the rate of two shahis 
per tuman was now being collected at the rate of five shahis per tuman.^ 
It was also alleged that certain officials had had their salaries and
pensions increased from a total of 4,000 tumans to 12,000 tumans under
c _t t
the orders of Shu aal-Saltana. A second major area of complaint was
about the greediness and the size of the entourage of the current 
Governor-General compared with his predecessors. It was also alleged 
that many of his followers received no salary but that they lived off 
the province by extorting money.
A third complaint was that in outlying areas - particularly in Fasa 
and Istahbanat, extra-ordinary taxes were being levied. A fourth
185. Neither the name of the specific tax, nor place where it was 
collected are given in the telegram.
186. In the translation of the telegram the mann is called mann-i 
galbawi, but I have been unable to find any reference to this 
which would show how much heavier it was than the mann-i Tabriz
187. The name of the place in question is not given in the telegram, 
such commutation of taxes was not unusual.
188. The tax in question was not named.
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grievance was that orders from Tehran were not obeyed by officials 
in Fars, and that therefore it was impossible to gain any redress 
from the authorities in the capital. The continuation of rahdari and 
the imposition of the extra-ordinary taxes at Fasa were cited as 
specific examples of this inability to obtain justice. A final point 
covered the illegal sequestration of property by the Governor-General 
and members of his entourage. Shops had been seized in Shiraz and land 
had been taken from its rightful owners at Fasa in 1904, and at Abadeh 
and Bihbahan in 1905. The telegram ended with a general protest at the 
injustices which were being perpetrated and the fact that complaints 
were no longer investigated. In brief no man’s life, property or honour 
could be regarded as safe.
That paraphrased final sentence of the telegram could stand as 
a fitting summary of this description of affairs in Fars, and the last 
year of Muzaffar al-Dln1s reign can be treated quite briefly. During
r . . C C ,
that year the situation was certainly calmer for Shu aal-Saltana did
%
not return to the province; and Salar-iAs^ad, who arrived in Shiraz
l ’
on January 26t’n 1906, became the virtual Governor-General for most of
that year. He was both energetic and popular; under him the province
became less turbulent and security along the Shiraz-Bushire road
appears to have shown considerable improvement. When he was removed
in November some 2,000 inhabitants of Shiraz took bast in the telegraph
189
offices m  protest. The final transfer of appointment under
Muzaffar al-Din occurred in that month when Nizam al-Saltana became*
Governor-General. That appointment again came about as a result of 
court intrigues and it reflected the great desire of officials in
189. F.O. 371:114. Spring Rice to Grey, Telegraphic, Document 
Number 38224, 13 November 1906.
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Tehran to gain lucrative posts before the Shah died* for by then
Muzaffar al-Drn’s health was even weaker than it had been previously.
The change which is most noticeable during 1906 is that the
grievances of the population of Fars became less local in their nature
and there seems to have been a greater awareness of the fact that
Persia was facing a crisis at a national level. In part this was due
c _ c
to the removal of the immediate cause of discontent - rule by Shu a
al-Saltana - and to the improvement in local security. But there were 
♦
other factors also at work. One was the greater knowledge of events
elsewhere. News of the serious disturbances in Russia which followed
that country’s war with Japan, and of the subsequent ill-treatment of
Persian and other Muslims in southern Russia, turned the attention of
the people of Shiraz away from their local grievances and gave them
191
the opportunity, m  late January 1906, for a more general protest.
Many inhabitants of Fars also began to realise that the burden of 
misgovernment and oppression was shared by people in many other parts 
of the country; and that it was in Tehran that solutions were being 
sought. The important political events of 1906 took place in and 
around the capital: the repeated basts during the first nine months
of the year at various mosques and at the British Legation, and the 
great exodus in late June of members of the religious classes and of 
merchants, tradesmen and artisans to Qumm. It was these events which
190. F.O. 371:114. Spring Rice to Grey. Telegraphic, Document 
Number 39273, 22 November 1906.
191. F.O. 248:866. Grant Duff to Grey, No.80, 1 February 1906. News 
of the plight of the Muslims in southern Russia and the Caucasus 
started to emerge in the late autumn of 1905. By early January 
1906 many refugees fleeing from the persecution had crossed the 
border into Az_arbayjan where they added to the general turbulence 
of that province. Their presence was particularly important at 
Tabriz. (See F.O. 248:866. Grant Duff to Grey, Telegraphic 
Number 58, 30 January 1906.)
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led to the Shah’s promise in January of an Adalat-Khana (House of 
Justice), to his pledge in August to create an Assembly, to the 
publication of the Electoral Law in September, and finally to the 
promulgation, on the last day of the year, of the Qanun-i Asasi 
(the Fundamental Law). Eight days later Muzaffar al-Din Shah was 
dead.
The people of Fars - like those in other provinces of Persia -
192
followed the events m  Tehran with great interest. Indeed it would
be true to say that they saw them as the culminating expression of 
their own grievances. It had, after all, been a poet from Shiraz 
who had most elegantly defined the duties of kings some six-and-a-half 
centuries earlier, and it was essentially because Muzaffar al-Din did 
not live up to those ideals, that better government was so vociferously 
demanded,
"Kings are but guardians>who the poor should keep^
Though this world’s goods wait on their diadem.
Not for the shepherd’s welfare are the sheep;
The shepherd rather is for pasturing them.”
Sa€di. The Gullstan, 
translated by E.B. Eastwick,
Hertford, (0$^ > p.85".




AFFAIRS IN THE PROVINCE OF ISFAHAN
"Isfahan is a paradise 
Tbere ought (however)
full of luxuries; 
to be no Isfahanls in it." 
Translation of an anonymous Persian 
poem by E.G. Browne in 
A Year Amongst the Persians 
Cambridge 1950 (3rd Edition), p.214.
The previous chapter showed how frequent changes of rule could
have serious and harmful consequences for the administration of a
province. To look at events in Isfahan provides the greatest possible
♦
contrast; for while its southern neighbour was experiencing ten changes
of governorship Isfahan remained in the continuous charge of the man
whose period of office, had begun in the middle of the nineteenth century,
and whose fall from power did not occur until after the death of
Muzaffar al-Din in 1907. The person in question, Zill al-Sultan, was a
remarkable individual. He was the eldest surviving son of Nasir a1-Din
*
Shah, but he did not inherit the throne because his mother,CIffat al- 
Saltana, was not a Qajar, but a member.of the Afshar tribe.^ The 
governorship of Isfahan was given to him in his early childhood, but
1. It was not an invariable rule that the Valiahd had to have a 
royal mother. Nasir al-DinTs eldest son, Mucin. al-Din (who was 
born in 1849 and died in 1856) had a Qajar mother and was the 
first Valiahd of that Shah. On the death of the boy Nasir al- 
Dtn’s second son, Muhammad Q&sim Khan, who had been born of a 
non-royal mother, was declared Valiahd. When he died in 1858 
Nasir al-Din reverted to the usual practice and passed over Zill 
al-Sultan in favour of his fourth son, Muzaffar al-Din. (See 
G.N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, I, op.cit., 
pp.390 and 412-3, and A.K.S. Lambton, Kadjar in Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, leiden (in progress),IV, p.392.
he did not wield power personally until he was over twenty years of 
age. Other provinces were added to his charge and by 1886, at the
age of thirty-six, he controlled over one third of Persia and possessed
2 . .
a force of some 21,000 men under arms. Such power bred suspieion at
court, and in February 1888 he was stripped of all his governorships
except that of Isfahan, and his army was disbanded.
Many reports speak of Zill al-Sultan’s severity asta governor,
but there is little doubt that he had been an effective one. ,C.J. Wilson,
who worked in Isfahan as the doctor to the Indo-European Telegraph
Department from 1871-1881, knew him well and hoped he would become the
Shah, for he was "clever, tolerant and a good governor".^ According
to C.E. Stewart, an Indian Army officer who travelled through Persia
in 1880, Zill al-Sultan "had put down thieving and highway robbery^in
5
a wonderful way in his dominions, and the roads were safe". That 
same writer added that "on the whole his government was that of an 
enlightened ruler", and he drew particular attention to the fact that 
he would not tolerate persecution of the Jewish or Christian communities
2. At the height of his powers the following provinces and districts 
were in his charge: Gulpayagan and Khunsar, Jushaqan, Iraq,
Isfahan, Fars, Yazd,cArabistan, Luristan, Kurdistan, Kangavar, 
Nihavand, Kamareh, Burujird, Kirmanshah, Asadabad and Kazzaz 
(G.N. Curzon, op0citt, I, p.416 footnote).
3. E.G. Browne was in Persia at the time and he records some of
the reactions to the relegation of Zill a-Sultan In A Year Amongst 
the Persians, Londonl95Q (third edition) particularly pp.1 14-5 and 21 9-20. 
4 U C.J. Wills, In"the Land of the Lion and Sun, London 1891, 
p .3660
5D C.E, Stewart, Through Persia in Disguise, London 1911, p.258.
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in Isfahan. Curzon, who met the Prince after his relegation, wrote
that "The Zil-es Sultan was undoubtedly a ruler of vigour and determination.
He held the reins in his own hand and with a tight grip. Hating and
7
despising the Mussulman clergy, he treated them with refreshing contempt".
(As will be seen, Zill al-Sultan was to retain those views, but he became 
• *
less able to take action based upon them.)
A further feature mentioned by Curzon is Zill al-Sultan’s lively 
and informed interest in European political affairs. The Prince told 
his visitor that he employed a translator to prepare summaries for him
g
of the British, French, German and Russian newspapers. W. Sparroy, who 
was tutor to Zill al-Sultan’s sons in Isfahan in 1897 and 1898, also reports 
that his employer paid close attention to the European press; and that
he sometimes asked his sons to prepare translations into Persian for him
9 - .
of items of interest. Zill al-Sultan’s attitude to the religious classes,
and his interest in European affairs, were together demonstrated in 1905 
when he met a group of French travellers and told them that "we need 
a Monsieur Combes here to bring our mullahs to reason".^
Much of the above evidence indicates that Zill al-Sultan had a 
very different character than his half-brother Muzaffar al-Din, and that 
the former’s personality was better suited to the tasks of government.
6. Ibid.
7. G.N. Curzon, op.cit., I, p.417.
8. G.N. Curzon, op.cit., I, p.419. Zill al-Sultan knew French and.
used that language for his private letters to Hardinge which 
will be cited later in this chapter.
9. W. Sparroy, Persian Children of the Royal Family, London 1902, 
pp.151-2.
10. C. Anet, Through Persia in a Motor Car, London 1907, p.197. 
(Combes was the Prime Minister of France from 1902-5, and leader 
of the Delegation des Gauches. The changes in the law of
associations which he introduced were designed to restrict the
activities of Roman Catholic religious orders in France.)
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The contrast between the two men was noted by several visitors to
Persia,, Dr. Wills drew a very unfavourable portrait of the Vala/ahd
compared with Zill al-Sultan.11 G. Jequier, a French archaeologist
who worked in Persia for a number of years, noted after a meeting with
Zill al-Sultan, that the Prince was "le seul etre intelligent, parait-
il, de la famille royale, et en tous cas un homme a poigne".1^
It is worth pausing to note that Zill al-Sultan had little regard
» *
for the abilities of his half-brother. At a meeting with Aganoor in 
January 1898 he complained of the weakness of Muzaffar al-Din, and 
said* "My father was undoubtedly more fond of money and much more stingy 
than the present Shah. But he was admittedly also more able and better
informed as to the state of the country, having been reigning for so
13 -
many years". When Zill al-Sultan met Durand in October of the same
year he expressed the viexvr that one of the reasons why Persia was facing
- 14
so many problems was that the Shah was "a nobody". He expressed
* rsimilar views to'Preece in April 1901, adding that the Valiahd
“ 15
Muhammad Ali was equally unfitted to rule Persia,
Sparroy had also pointed to the contrast between Zill al—Sultan 
and his half-brother. The same author went on to express the view" that
the former’s character bore a close resemblance to that of his father;
. . .  , , 16
for both were men of action, and were shrewd, inquisitive and brusque.
11. C.J. Wills, op.cit., pp. 119 and 366.
12. G. Jequier, En Perse 1897-1902 (edited by M. Jequier), Neuchatel 
1968, p.98. The diary entry is dated 21.8,98,
13. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.4, 5 January 1898.
14. F.O* 60:617. Durand to Salisbury, No.5, 18 January 1900.
15. F.O. 248:242. Preece to Hardinge, No.13, 20 April 1901.
16. W. Sparroy, op. cit:. , p. 313.
21 £>
When Durand visited Isfahan in the autumn of 1898 he too was struck
by the great similarity between the character of Zill al-Sultan and
17that of his father.
The events of 1888 had certainly reduced the power of Zill al- 
Sultan, and some sources suggest that his character too was weakened 
by them. Sparroy links the two circumstances in a very direct way.
"The breaking up of his troops, all things considered, 
was a blunder it would be impossible to exaggerate.
It broke the back of the Zill's sturdy patriotism and 
tore the heart out of the Persian army. The Zill, 
from being the most generous and public-spirited 
Prince in Persia, lives nowadays with no more inspiriting 
an ambition than to amass money; and the army, free from 
his guiding hand, has sunk to the condition of a rabble 
of spiritless ragamuffins, sans head, sans hearts, sans 
arms, sans discipline - the finest material in the world 
running to rust from the want of a directing mind and a 
liberal-fisted p a t r o n " .
G. Crawshay Williams, an officer from the Indian Army, visited Persia 
in 1903 and observed that:
"His army [the Zill al-Sultan's] was deprived of regiment 
after regiment, until all but a mere fraction of its 
former glory had gone. His power was fettered, his 
strength crippled, and he was left a harmless ruler 
instead of a mighty potentate".
The same writer adds that:
"I do not think any human spectacle during my travels 
impressed me more than the sad sight of this strong, 
able man, with so great a past and so great a 
potentiality, sitting there, fretting and brooding 
as he must, over the things that had been and the 
things that could never be".^
There are two aspects of this matter and they are worth separate 
consideration,, On the one hand there is little evidence that Zill al- 
Sultan regarded himself as being broken in spirit as a result of his
17. F.O. 60:617. Durand to Salisbury, No.5, 18 January 1900.
18. W. Sparroy, op.cit. , p.305.
19. E. Crawshay Williams, Across Persia, London 1907, pp.283-4.
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relegation; but on the other hand, he admitted, and regretted, that
he had lost much of his power. It would seem that his wish to act
firmly and decisively was little diminished by his relegation. But
he recognized that he was no longer able to take effective and
determined action. In many of his conversations with British officials
he deplored the loss of his army and his current shortage of troops.
In early January 1898 Zill al-Sultan told Aganoor that he no
longer had enough men to maintain law and order, and that the current
Sadr-i Aczam Amin al-Dawla, unlike his predecessor, Amin al-Sultan, did
~  20
not recognize hox<r fanatical and turbulent was the town of Isfahan.
There was obviously some truth in this view, for there were several
serious disorders in the city that year. One of the most violent
occurred in late March, outside the British consulate, and the cause
was a rumour that Russian forces had occupied Mashhad and that Britain
had seized the port of Bushire in retaliation. Sarim al-Dawla, who
commanded the troops in Isfahan, was able, but only with great difficulty,
21
to arrest the two sayyids who had led the riots. They were later
22
expelled from the city.
At this time the nominal strength of the army in Isfahan was two
*
battalions of infantry (each with 1,000 men), a regiment of cavalry
20. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.4, 5 January 1898.
21. F.Oo 248:676„ Aganoor to Durand, No.6, 2 April 1898. By this
date there was no Russian Consulate in Isfahan. One was being
built, and its construction had given rise to protests.
(F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.2, 1 January 1898.)
22. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.7, 4 April 1898.
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(about 1,000 men), and a battalion of artillery (approximately 500 :
23 .
men). In fact all the regiments were, like the rest of the Persian
array, woefully under strength and Zill al-Sultan told Aganoor that he
• •
24
could call upon only about 300 men to deal with any disturbances.
The British Vice-Consul agreed with the Governor’s estimate that 2,000
infantry and 500 cavalry were needed to be sure of maintaining law and
. . .  . 2 5
order m  Isfahan and its immediate environs.
In the absence of that number of troops, reported Aganoor, the
Governor had to rely on clever management; and to hope that no
26
demonstration would attract great support. The latter was a somewhat
vain hope, for in Isfahan there were several influential religious
leaders who were far from friendly towards Zill al-Sultan; and one of
them in particular, Aqa Najafi, was to raise several large demonstrations
in the city during the course of the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah.
Najafi was a wealthy man whose family owned much land around
Isfahan, and his influence was of long-standing. He had taken a leading
f  27
part In the protests against the Tobacco Regie in 1891-2, and he had
also shared in the responsibility for the riots which had led to the 
— — 28
death of several Babis in 1889. It will be seen that persecution 
of the latter group was to be a recurrent feature in the history of 
Isfahan during this period.
23. F.O. 60:629. Enclosure in Durand to Salisbury, No.1, 18 January 1900.
240 F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.8, 9 April 1898.
25. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.8, 9 April 1898.
26. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, Noe8, 9 April 1898.
27o A.KoSc Lambton, The Tobacco Regie: 'Prelude to Revolution I, Studia
• Islamica-22 (1965), pp.141 and 144.
28. G.P. Churchill, Biographical Notices of Persian Statesmen and 
Notables, August 1905, Calcutta 1906, pp.52-3.
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It was, however, the Jewish community which was the target of 
the first disturbances led by Najafi during the reign of Muzaffar al- 
Din; and this happened in the early months of 1898. Najafi issued 
a fatwa which forbade Muslims to purchase goods from Jewish traders 
and shopkeepers. It banned Jews from entering the bazaarjin Isfahan, 
and it also prohibited Muslims from selling food to Jews. At this
time there were about 1,000 Jewish shopkeepers and itinerant pedlars
. . . .  . . .  . 29
living in the city and their livelihood was seriously threatened.
The Governor was alarmed by the extent of the demonstrations against 
the Jews and by the accusations that were made at this time that
3
members of that community were also guilty of witchcraft and immorality 
Zill al-Sultan told Aganoor that the only effective solution was for the 
government in Tehran to ensure the removal of Najafi and his two
C T  — C •
brothers, Shaykh Muhammad All and Shaykh Nur Allah from the city. They
should be sent, said the Governor, either to Mashhad, or preferably out 
31 -
of the country. Zill al-Sultan regretted that he no longer had the
• •
power to carry out such an expulsion from Isfahan himself; and Aganoor
confirmed that the religious leaders would not have dared to act as they
32
were doing when the Governor had been at the height of his powers.
Zill al-Sultan appealed to the Sadr-i Aczam for additional troops 
. . * *
to be sent from Tehran, but none were forthcoming. The Governor knew 
that he had insufficient men at his disposal to take decisive action, 
so he endeavoured instead to cause a division within the ranks of the 
religious classes by trying to increase the influence of the Imam Jumca
29. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.3, 31 January 1898.
30. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.3, 31 January 1898.
310 F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.4, 5 February 1898.
32. F.O. 248:676c Aganoor to Durand, No.4, 5 February 1898.
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at the expense of Najafi and his brothers. In May the Imam Jumca was
to attempt to lift the restrictions on Jewish traders; but Najafi’s
followers continued to act in conformity with the original fatwa.
In April Zill al-Sultan went to Tehran and there sought the help
o *
c 35 .of the Sadr-i Azam. By nox? another cause of discontent had arisen;
•
namely that control of the customs posts at Kirraanshah and Bushire had
3 6
passed to agents of the Imperial Bank. The Sadr-i Afzam sent a 
telegram to the religious leaders in Isfahan telling them that they 
should not concern themselves with matters relating to the Customs
administration; but nothing was said about the discrimination against
37 . . . -
the Jews. That activity continued m  Isfahan, and it also spread to
Tehran where a fatwa was issued forbidding Muslims to allow Jewish
38
pedlars to enter their homes. Durand said that a general recession
in internal Persian commercial activity was the reason why these
39
restrictions were being imposed on Jewish traders at that time.
In June 1898 Amin al-Dawla fell from office and this event caused
jubilation among many of the religious leaders and students in the
- - 40 . - .
madrasas of Isfahan. When Zill al-Sultan returned from the capital m  
* • •
July he told Aganoor that he had been greatly dismayed by the weakness 
of the government in Tehran; and that he now knew that it was unlikely
33, F*Oc_248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.10, 26 April 1898. Zill al- 
Sultan’ s particular aim was to try to increase the influence of the 
Imam Jum€a over the students in the madrasas for that group took a 
very active part in almost all the demonstrations which involved 
the religious classes.
34, FoO. 248:676, Aganoor to Durand, No.16, 26 May 1898.
35. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.13, 30 April 1898.
36, See Chapter IV of this thesis.
37, F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.17, 26 May 1898.
38. F.O. 60:609, Durand to Salisbury, No,74, 26 July 1899.
39. FoO. 60:609. Durand to Salisbury, No.79, 27 July 1899.
40. F.O. 248:678. Aganoor to Durand, No.19, 11 June 1898.
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that he would receive any support, or any soldiers, from there. By 
early September the situation in Isfahan had become somewhat calmer, 
for the agents of the Imperial Bank were no longer in charge of customs 
collection at Bushire and Kirmanshah. The active persecution of the Jews 
too had begun to decline, but those Muslims who were beginning to trade 
with Jewish shopkeepers and pedlars were doing so secretly for fear of
—  42
the wrath of Najafi.
The ban on Jewish traders was not the only example of ill-treatment
of that community during 1898. A second case involved the Jews who
collected Isfahan*s night soil and made it into manure by mixing it with
earth. On the land which was hired for this purpose a tax had been
levied; but this was paid in kind by means of 4,000 donkey-loads of
manure. That manure was sent to the village of Sin, which was nominally
khalisa (crown land), but which appears to have been owned by one of
Zill al-Sultan*s wives. The price of manure had apparently risen sharply 
* •
from five shahis per load to about 30 shahis per jload,, since the tax had
first been imposed. The bailiff of the village, however, was still
insisting on receiving the full amount of manure though this was now
worth more than six times the original cash value of the tax. The Jews
appealed to the Shah who ordered Zill al-Sultan to carry out an
investigation. When this had been completed it was discovered that
orders had been given at an earlier date for the tax to be abolished,
and that its continued collection was in fact illegal. Zill al-Sultan
• *
ordered that the tax should be reinstated, but that payment should in
4 3
future be made by the annual delivery of 1,000 loads of manure.
41. P.O. 248:678, Aganoor to Durand, No.26, 4 July 1898.
42. F.O. 248:678. Aganoor to Durand, No.41, 3 September 1898.
43. F.0„ 248:678. Aganoor to Durand, No.41, 3 September 1898.
(The importance of agriculture in the province of Isfahan and some 
of the difficulties which beset that activity will be considered later 
in this chapter.)
The third incident in 1898 involving the Jewish community occurred 
during September, and it serves as a reminder of the truth of Zill al- 
Sultan* s view that there were fanatical groups among the population of 
Isfahan. The immediate cause of the disturbance was the discovery that 
a tract, justifying the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity, was
circulating in the Jewish quarter. The tract was printed in the Persian
44 . . .
language, but m  Hebrew characters. On September 6th the building
belonging to the Society for the Promotion of Christianity among the
45 46 . . .
Jews was set on fire, and Durand reported that the responsibility
for this lay with a Muslim mob.
Five months later there was further unrest following an incident
in which an English missionary, J.R. Garland, who taught at a school
for Jewish boys, struck a young Muslim who had insulted him. Garland
was quickly seized by an irate mob of Muslims who took him before
Shaykh Muhammad CAli„ The latter fined the missionary for hitting the
boy. Zill al-Sultan was not in Isfahan at this time and the acting
Governor, Rukn al-Mulk, was not a very firm official. There were
further outbreaks of unrest, an.d on hearing of them the British Consul
sent a telegram to Durand in Tehran asking that the Shah should be
requested to order Zill al—Sultan to return immediately to the city.
t
This was done, and after the Governor’s return the disturbances subsided.
44c F.O. 248:678,, Aganoor to Durand, No.43, 28 September 1898.
45. F.O. 248:678. Aganoor to Durand, No.43, 28 September 1898.
46. F.O. 60:617. Durand to Salisbury, No04, 18 January 1900,
47. F.O. 248:699. Preece to Durand, No,7, 25 February 1899.
48. F.O. 248:699.' .Preece to Durand, No.8, 26 February 1899. There is a
report of this incident in W. Sparroy, op. cit. , pp. 337-8, but the author 
gives the date of the incident as February 1 898, when the affair in fact 
occurred in February 1899.
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Shortly after the Garland incident Zill al-Sultan again expressed
regret about the lack of troops at his disposal. He said that the
situation was now worse than it had been the previous year; for he had
been forced to use some of the men who were previously stationed in
Isfahan as road-guards in the province. As a result he now had only 200
men with which to maintain the security of the city and its immediate
neighbourhood. The Governor stated that the mullas for their part
49
could quickly turn out a crowd of some 20,000 of their followers. At
another meeting with Preece a short time later, when preaching against
Europeans was still taking place, Zill al-Sultan used one of the
strongest terms of abuse available in Persian against Aqa Najafi and
Shaykh Muhammad CAli. He said that they should both be sent to Karbala":
50
"For if you have a toothache you get the tooth taken out".
The most sustained campaign of persecution in Isfahan during the 
reign of Muzaffar al-Din, however, was directed not against the jews or 
the Christians, but against the Babis. As has been noted, Najafi had 
played a leading part in the persecution of that group in 1889-1890, and 
his name was to figure prominently in many of the later incidents. During 
1898 there was no violence against the Babis, but there was much preaching 
against them, particularly by Shaykh Murtada Riza, whom Aganoor described 
as the "mouthpiece of Najafi".~**
49. F.O. 248:699. Preece to Durand, No.9, 26 February 1899.
50. F.O. 248:699. Preece to Durand, No.13, 9 March 1899. According
to Preece, the Governor called the two religious leaders 
"pedarsukhtes", which implies that their father was such an evil 
man that he had gone to Hell after his death.
51. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.5, 1 March 1898.
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In April 1899 anti-Babi riots broke out at several places in
the province, and many members of the Babi community in Najafabad
came into Isfahan and sent telegrams to Muzaffar al-Din requesting 
• •
52 - tprotection. In June there was further violence against the Babis
- . 5 3
and Zill al-Sultan imprisoned one of the leaders of that disburbance.
After this the city and its environs became quieter.
In the early months of 1900 the religious leaders in Isfahan paid
less attention to the Babis for they were involved in protests against'
two other events which were causing discontent across the entire country.
The first of these was the signature of the loan agreement with Russia
in January. From this grew the feeling that was expressed in many
54
mosques that the whole of Persia was being sold to Russia. When a
party of Pvussians passed through Isfahan during the summer, many of the
population believed that their task was to inspect the property which
55
the Tsar was rumoured to have purchased. It is interesting to note, 
however, that some of Isfahan’s merchants expressed a different view. 
While they regretted the "sale" of Persia to Russia, they believed that 
the Russians would be s t e m  masters, indeed they would be preferable 
to the existing Persian government; for the Russians would be able to 
maintain law, order and security, and trade could then revive and 
flourish.
It was not long, however, before the merchants and the religious 
classes were united in protest. This time the source of the discontent 
was the introduction of new customs regulations and the wider employment
52. F.O. 248:699. Aganoor to Durand, No.24, 18 April 1898.
53. F.O. 248:699, Aganoor to Durand, No.32, 21 June 1898.
54. F.O. 248:723. Aganoor to Durand, No.2, 31 March 1900.
55c F.O. 248:723. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No.9, 18 June 1900.
56. F.O. 248:723. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No.9, 18 June 1900,
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of Belgian officials in that branch of the bureaucracy. Leaders of
both groups in Isfahan sent telegrams of protest to Tehran, and there
57 t
was much agitation about this matter. In July one of Najafi’s
brothers approached the British Vice-Consul and asked him, in great
secrecy, if the population of a whole town or province could become
British subjects: for, said the questioner, many of the religious
leaders in Isfahan knew that Islam was respected in India under the
British, while in the Caucasus the Russian government sought to oppress
58
that religion and its adherents.
Such expressions of pro-British sentiment were very short-lived,
and in August Aqa Najafi returned to a. general condemnation of Europeans 
59and their ways. During the same month he referred, m  a sermon, to
recent events in China - the Boxer rebellion - in which Europeans had
been killed, and he indicated that it might be necessary for Persia to
follow such an example.^ The arrival of a group of Persian Cossacks in
Isfahan in early October caused considerable discussion* The men had 
%
been sent to act as bodyguards for Zill al-Sultan, but many rumours soon
surrounded their arrival.^ Some members of the religious classes said
that the troops were only the advance guard of a full Russian occupation 
6 2
forceo Other rumours which gained credence at this time were that the 
Cossacks had arrived to arrest Zill al-Sultan and to take him to Tehran.
A variation on this theme said that it was Aqa Najafi and his brothers who
57o P.O. 248:723. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No.10, 18 July 1900.
58c F.O. 248:723. Aganoor to SpringJRice, No.11 Confidential,
, . 23 July 1900, The name of Najafi*s brother is not given.
59. P.O. 248:723. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No„12, 25 July 1900.
60. F.O. 60:618. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.87, 23 August 1900.
61. F.Oc 248:723. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No.15, 3 November 1900.
62. F.O. 248:723. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No.15, 3 November 1900.
225
were to be arrested and expelled. A third rumour said that the troops
had come to Isfahan to establish royal control over khalisa land which
had been sold during the latter years of the reign of Nasir al-Din Shah.*
The Babis did not escape attention in 1900, however, for when news
of bread riots in Tehran during June and July reached Isfahan, Aqa
Najafi said that the Bahis were responsible for them and that their
purpose was to foment unrest in Persia while Muzaffar al-Din was out of
64
the country on his European visit. In late November Shaykh Muhammad
C 7 , ,
All died as a result of an accidental poisoning. Two European doctors,
including Aganoor, were called to treat him, but he was unconscious when
they arrived and nothing could be done for him. Shaykh MuhammadCAli1s
death occurred while the two European doctors were still with him, and
rumours immediately circulated that it was they who had been responsible
for his dying. The resulting tumult, however, was very brief and the
period of mourning, together with the approach of Ramadan, brought a
65 - c
temporary calm to the city. Shaykh Nur Allah did, however, approach
Aganoor in December to ask if the rumours were true that Muzaffar al-Din
♦
Shah (who had recently returned from his visit to Europe) was about
to introduce in Persia forms of government which he had observed during
. . , — e
that journey. If this was so, said Shaykh Nur Allah, violent protests
would certainly result unless the religious classes were first consulted 
and approved of the proposed changes.^
63. P.O. 248:723. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No.15, 3 November 1900.
64. P.O. 248:723. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No.12, 25 July 1900.
65. P.O. 248:723. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No.16, 5 December 1900. The
incident is also reported by the wife of the other doctor present,
M.E. Hume-Griffith, Behind the Veil in Persia and Turkish Arabia, 
London 1909, pp.147-8. The poisoning had resulted from the accidental 
substitution of oil of bitter almonds for oil of sweet almonds. The 
latter was harmless, the former was fatal.
66 o F.O. 248:723. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No.17, 6 December 1900.
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Apart from the incidents mentioned above law and order in the 
city seem to have been quite good during 1899 and 1900, and security 
along the roads was not a major source of complaint. The only
occasion on which robberies were reported in Isfahan was during October
"" 67
1900 when Zill al-Sultan was out of the city on a shooting expedition.
The year 1901 began quietly largely because of the continued period
of mourning for Shaykh Muhammad ^ li. In the early months of the year
several other leading members of the religious classes also died, and
68
this too contributed to keeping the situation calm. When news was
received that the Russian government was to open a consulate in Bushire
this was seen as further confirmation that Persia had indeed been sold 
69
to the Tsar.
In late March 1901, Zill al-Sultan wrote one of a series of personal 
letters in French to Hardinge, and in it indicated that he was aware that 
the power of the religious classes was very strong, and that he was 
still determined to prevent unfortunate events: f,L Tinfluence clericale 
ici est fort redoutable cependant votre Excellence peut s'assurer que 
je ferais tous les efforts possibles pour eviter des complications 
malencontreuses 7^ In early April Shu aCal-Saltana passed through Isfahan 
on the way to take up his post as Governor of Ears. The approach of his 
entourage of some 6,000 people quickly drove up the price of foodstuffs;
67. F.O. 248:723. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No.15, 3 November 1900.
Aganoor had noted in 1898 that the absence of Zill al-Sultan from the 
city usually resulted in a general reduction in the efficiency and 
vigour of local administration (F.O. 248:678, Aganoor to Durand, No.21, 
25 June 1898).
68. F.O. 248:742. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No.l, 5 January 1901.
69. F.O. 248:742. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No.l, 5 January 1901.
70. F.O. 248:742. Enclosure in Preece to Hardinge, No.7, 28 March 1901.
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71
but they declined again after that group had departed for the feouth.
(The matter of fluctuations in food prices will be considered later in 
this chapter.)
During 1901 there were several complaints from the merchants.
Most of these arose from the fact that despite the introduction of the
new customs administration under Belgian officials, the previous
internal customs dues (which were supposed to have been abolished) were
still being levied on trade in opium, tobacco, fruit, charcoal and 
72
sheep. The roads remained relatively secure throughout the year,
but when the first caravan of the year used the Bakhtiyari road after
73 . -
the snows melted, it was robbed. Zill al-Sultan's troops were,
however, able to recover' most of the goods and all of the money which 
74
had been stolen. In Isfahan itself, the Governor could not always
enforce his will. On 8th July there was a disturbance in the main
square when Zill al-Sultan sent a group of his servants to collect a
a debt owed by a sayyid. The students of Aqa Najafi came out of the
nearby Masjid-i Shah (Royal Mosque) where that mujtahid prayed and
taught, and proceeded to defend the debtor. Zill al-Sultanfs men had
• *
to withdraw without collecting the money, and Preece saw this as an ill
75
omen for the future maintenance of law and order m  the city.
During the summer there was a recrudescence of anti-Babi activity,
76
and in May 1901, two members of that sect were killed at Abarquh. In
71. F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No number, 30 March 1901, and 
No.16, 25 April 1901.
72. F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge0 No number, 30 March 1901, and 
No.16, 25 April 1901.
73. F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.21, 21 May 1901.
74. F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.24, 16 June 1901.
75. F.O. 248:742, Preece to Hardinge, No.26, 16 July 1901.
76. F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.21, 21 May 1901.
June a Babi was put to death in Najafabad and other members of the 
sect from that village sent a telegram to the British Minister in Tehran 
asking him to inform Muzaffar al-Din of their plight; for they thought
that Hardinge was one of the few men who could make sure that their
- 77 .
plea would actually reach the Shah. By the end of the year security
7 8along the roads had begun to decline markedly. (Crop failures and 
other agricultural matters were a major source of discontent in 1901 
and 1902, and these will be treated later in this chapter.) At the end 
of the year Preece said that Zill al-Sultan was expressing much gloom 
about the prospects for Persia, and that he was urging the British Consul 
to recommend to Hardinge that the British government should take action 
to help save the country from collapse and dismemberment. Speaking of 
his own position with regard to the British authorities, Zill al-Sultan
said, nI have often been smothered in their smoke but never warmed by
79 . . .  -
their fire". When Hardinge visited Isfahan in April 1901, Zill al-
Sultan took the opportunity to tell the British Minister personally of
his considerable doubts about both the future of Persia and his own
continuation in office. Hardinge endeavoured to reassure him on the
second matter, and he expressed the view that Zill al-Sultan was highly
regarded by the Persian government for his great efforts in maintaining
law and order in Isfahan, and for his firm handling of the religious
classes there, Zill al-Sultan replied that it was precisely because he 
• •
was a capable governor that he would be dismissed; adding that his
, . 80
local popularity and his wealth xrould also count against him.
77. P.O. 248:742. Hardinge to Preece, No.10, 7 August 1901.
78. P.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.50, 3 December 1901.
79. P.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.57 Confidential, 31 December 1901 .
80. F.O. 60:650. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Confidential, No.74,
30 April 1901.
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As well as having to cope with opposition by some of the most
influential religious leaders in Isfahan, Zill al-Sultan was also
» • •
faced, from 1902, with serious disputes within his own family. The 
intrigues which resulted involved the Russian Consul too, and they show 
how the internal problems of Persia became entangled with Anglo-Russian 
rivalry.
The most serious disputes were between Zill al-Sultan on the one
• 9
hand, and his sister Banu-yi Uzma and her sons on the other. One of
those sons, BadiCal~Mulk, held various posts in Zill al-Sultan’s
administration, and in the summer of 1902 he was involved in an obscure
but rancorous dispute concerned with the sale of some grain. At an
v c
early stage of the affair one of Badi al-Mulk's servants was injured in 
-c
a fight. Badi al-Mulk then sent a group of his men to seize those 
responsible for that attack. In a fracas those responsible for the 
initial incident were worsted, and they fled and took refuge in the
_ _ _ _ o
Masjid-i Shah, thereby involving Aqa Najafi in the matter. Badi al- 
Mulk’ s mother then sent some of her retainers to seize the grain which 
was the cause of the dispute, and which was stored in a village on the 
outskirts of Isfahan. The men sent to seize the grain were driven off 
by the villagers, who then appealed to prominent members of the religious 
classes in Isfahan for their support. There was a considerable ferment in 
the city and the bazaars were closed for several days on the orders of 
the religious leaders. Zill al-Sultan had no wish to increase the 
existing hostility of many members of the religious classes towards him, 
or to widen the extent of that antipathy, so he told his sister not to 
involve herself any further in the matter. He also gave orders that
230
no further attempts were to be made to recover the grain. Zill al-
Sultan had also refused earlier in the year to involve himself when 
*
Banu-yi Uzma was in dispute with some sayyids over the ownership of a 
_ — « M 32
village called Salarabad. These events caused much ill-feeling among
Zill al-Sultan’s family, and the consequences became quite serious during 
* •
the two following years.
In the early months of 1903, Zill al-Sultan was not distracted by 
this matter for Badi al-Mulk and his mother were absent from Isfahan 
making a pilgrimage to Karbala. 'When they returned m  late March they 
discovered that Zill al-Sultan had, during their absence, dismissed
c.
Badi al-Mulk from all the posts which he held. This caused great anger
- — . — 83 — -rC
to Banu-yi Uzma, and when Sarim al-Dawla, Badi al-Mulk’s elder brother,
was dismissed from command of one of the infantry regiments in Isfahan
84 - - .
m  June, the dispute became even more bitter. As a result, Banu-yi
Uzma began to enter into intrigues with the Russian Consul in the latter
months of 1903 in order to try to get her brother dismissed from his
governorship. When Zill al-Sultan was called to Tehran in January 1904,
for a meeting of provincial governors to discuss plans for tax reform,
Banu-yi Uzma and the Russian Consul took the opportunity to spread rumours
that the province would soon have a new Governor, and that Zill al-Sultan
85
would not be permitted to return from the capital. In March BadX al- 
Mulk left for Tehran in a carriage provided by the Russian Consul, and 
it was widely believed that he was going to the capital to try to
81. F.O. 248:763. Preece to Hardinge, No.31, 16 July 1902.
82. F.O. 248:763. Preece to Hardinge, No.31, 16 July 1902.
83. F.O. 248:788. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.7, 25 March 1903.
84. F.O. 248:788. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.24, 13 June 1903.
85. F.O. 248:820. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.8, 25 February 1904.
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• ^  gg
secure Zill al-SultanTs removal from office. According to Aganoor 
» *
both, the Russian Consul and Sarim al~Dawla tried to encourage people
to make complaints to the Shah against the administration of Zill al-
*
Sultan; but the population of Isfahan was apparently reluctant to take
87
any action until it was certain that a new Governor would be appointed.
The intrigues did not end with the return of Zill al-Sultan to 
Isfahan. In the autumn of 1904 he wrote to Hardinge telling the British
o
Minister that his sister was continuing to keep in close touch with the 
88 “
Russian Consul. Zill al-Sultan made various attempts at reconciliation
89
with her during the latter months of 1904, but these were fruitless.
In January of the following year Banu-yi Uzma announced that she would
move to Tehran with her family. This caused personal distress to Zill
al-Sultan for three of his daughters were married to three of his sister’s
90
sons, and he very much regretted their departure for the capital.
Zill al-Sultan was also alarmed by the likelihood of Banu-yi Uzma
continuing her intrigues against him at the court of Muzaffar al-Din,
and he told Preece that he was sure that renewed machinations there would
91
lead to his loss of office. The widespread belief that the Russians
were involved in those intrigues was strengthened when it became known
that Banu-yi Uzma left her property in the charge of the Russian bank in
92
Isfahan before she and her family departed for Tehran m  February 1905.
It would appear that this family dispute, and the intrigues which flowed
86, F.Oc 248:820. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.14, 21 March 1904.
87, F.O. 248:820. Aganoor to Hardinge, No,17, 18 April 1904,
88, Fc0o 248:787. Enclosure in Aganoor to Hardinge, No.54,
10 September 1904.
890 F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.8, 28 January 1905.
90. F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.8, 28 January 1905.
91. F.O. 248:845 F Preece to Hardinge, No,8, 28 January 1905.
92. F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.8, 28 January 1905.
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from it, did cause affliction to^and in some ways weaken the resolution
of,Zill al-Sultan. It is at this time that he began to tell Preece of ' , »
his wish to leave Isfahan and to visit Europe, and of a decline in his 
93health.
These intrigues against Zill al-Sultan also involved the Babis, for
the Russian Consul in Isfahan had sought complaints from them during 1904
94about the administration of the Governor, Members of that sect had
begun to suffer renewed persecution in 1903. Serious unrest began on 23rd
May that year when students of Aqa Najafi seized a man who x^ as alleged to
be a Babi, and who was also accused of drunkenness. While the students
were taking him to Aqa Najafi he escaped and made his way to the Russian 
95
Consulate. (It was alleged at the time that the Russian Consul had
- t . 96
been encouraging Babis to take refuge in that building.) News of the
incident spread rapidly, and 200 other Babis quickly made their way to 
the Russian Consulate; in which building they were soon beseiged by an 
angry crowd of Najafi’s followers. The Russian Consul, who had been out 
on a visit, was unable to enter the building on his return, and he went to 
complain to Zill al-Sultan. The Governor sent for Najafi and told him to 
disperse the crowds. This was done; but not before a Babi had been killed 
and several others badly injured.^ On 3rd June two wealthy merchants 
were seized and brought before another religious leader, Abu 1 Qasim 
ZanjariT, where they were accused of being Babis. The pair were handed 
over to the mob and dragged through the streets before being brutally 
killed. Aganoor reported that the fact that the religious leader in .
93. F.O. 248:845. Enclosure in Aganoor to Hardinge, No.12, 22 Febi'uary 1905.
94. F.O. 248:820. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.21, 20 May 1904.
95. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.20, 6 June 1903.
96. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.20, 6 June 1903.
97. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.20, 6 June 1903.
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question owed the two merchants some 1,300 tumans was believed to have
98
been the real reason for their seizure.
It was Aganoor’s view that the fact that some of the Babis had 
identified themselves so openly with the Russian Consul had made the 
situation much worse for that sect, because the anti-Babi movement could
now draw on the strong anti-Russian sentiment which was prevalent in
- 9 9  .
Isfahan. Some of the religious leaders were reported to believe that
because of the greater strength of the anti-Babi movement, Zill al-Sultan
would now be very reluctant to take effective measures to prevent further
disturbances.**^ The Governor admitted to the British Vice-Consul that the
only way to establish order would be to expel some of the most prominent
leaders of the agitation, including Najafi and ZanjahT, but such a move
would require strong support from Tehran, and Zill al-Sultan thought it
* *
unlikely that this would be forthcoming.**'**
- v . - 102
By mid-July, active persecution of Babis had ceased m  Isfahan,
but disturbances of a similar nature soon began in Yazd where Jalal al-
Dawla, the eldest son of Zill al-Sultan, was the Governor. Najafi welcomed
• *
news of the disturbances in Yazd, and said that they were the result of
98, F.O. 248:787.*- Aganoor to Hardinge, No.20, 6 June 1903.
99, F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.26, 13 June 1903. Anti-Russian
100, feeling in the city had increased considerably as a result of the 
second loan agreement with Russia in 1902, F.O. 248,_ Preece to 
Hardinge, No.14, 26 March 1902. There had also been rumours circulating 
in Isfahan in January 1903 that the- Persian government had leased 
Astarabad to Russia for a period of one hundred years, and these had 
caused much disquiet, F.O. 248:788, Aganoor to Hardinge, No.6,
2? January 1903.
100. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.26, 13 June 1903.
101. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.26, 13 June 19030
102. FoO. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.30, 10 July 1903.
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- . . . 103the people of Isfahan giving an effective lead. The disturbances m
Yazd and the surrounding district were more serious than those in
Isfahan. It was believed that some 40 Babis were killed in the city. A
similar number were also reported to have been murdered in the surrounding
104
villages, with particularly serious outrages occurring at Taft.
Zill al-Sultan was able to raise a temporary force of infantry in Isfahan, 
and he sent it to Y a z d . J a l a l  al-Dawla soon showed that he shared his
father*s ability to act firmly. At the end of July the Governor ordered
-  .
the Imam Jumfa of Yazd to make a pilgrimage to Karbala for his part in
the disturbances. In August Jalal al-Dawla used some of the troops sent
from Isfahan and led a military expedition against a number of the villages
where Babis had been killed. One of the leaders of the movement in Taft
was executed, and the houses of other participants in the violence there
were razed to the ground. In other villages heavy fines were imposed on
the inhabitants,*^
The severity of these outbreaks of violence had caused considerable
alarm in Tehran, and several of the heads of foreign missions.there,
including Hardinge, had made strong representations to the Persian
government about the outrages.*^ It was announced that a force of some
five to ten thousand armed men, under the command of Nasr al-Saltana,
103. According to Hardinge, Najafi had also sent emissaries in unsuccessful 
attempts to initiate anti-Babi disturbances in Sultanabad, Qazvln, 
Shiraz and Tehran. (F.O, 60:666, Hardinge to Lansclowne, No.102, 
Confidential, 9 July 1903.)
104. F.O. 248:802. Eldred (Yazd) to Hardinge. No number, 3 July 1903.
105. Zill al-Sultan had to borrow money from merchants in Isfahan to pay
the men who*joined this temporary force, (F.O. 60:666, Hardinge to 
Lansdowne, No.101, Secret and Confidential, 6 July 1903.)
106. F.O, 248:802. Eldred (Yazd) to Hardinge. No number, 29 August 1903.
107. F.O. 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne. Confidential No.102, 9 July 1903.
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would be formed at a camp near Tehran, and that some of the men would
then be sent to Isfahan and Yazd to maintain order
108
This announcement -
caused much consternation to Najafi and his supporters;
109 showing perhaps
that had Zill al-Sultan had a sufficient number of reliable troops at his 
disposal many of the disturbances in Isfahan might have been prevented. 
Aganoor reported that Najafi and his followers were making urgent enquiries
a forceful Governor of Gilan was not well received. The Russian Consul in 
Isfahan again sought to undermine Zill al-Sultan's authority by stating 
that the purpose of the new force was to depose and arrest the Governor.** 
Other rumours, however, said that it was Najafi who was to be expelled 
from Isfahan. Aganoor wrote that the latter action would be welcomed by 
many members of the population; for Najafi and his family were k n o w  to
have seized much land illegally and by force. It was the Vice-Consul's
r  . 1 1 2
view that Najafi was feared rather than respected by many Muslims.
On August 13th 1903, Amin al-Sultan told Hardinge that the plan to 
send a force of men to Isfahan and Yazd had been abandoned; but he also 
said that the threat of sending troops had been sufficient to prompt
Najafi to promise to come to Tehran to explain personally why the violence
113 - . r -
had occurred. Najafi had earlier told Amin al-Sultan that to send
108. F.O. 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Confidential No.102, 9 July 1903. 
The force was to be formed to help restore law and order in two areas: 
in Isfahan and Yazd following the anti-Babi riots, and in Azarbayjan 
after there had been violent demonstrations against the Belgian 
officials who were in charge of the Customs administration there.
(For details of the situation in Azarbayjan see F.O, 60:666, Stevens 
(Tabriz) to Hardinge, No.7 Secret and Confidential, 25 June 1903.)
109. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.35 Confidential, 26 July 1903.
110. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.42, Confidential, 10 August 1903.
111. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.38, Confidential, 7 August 1903.
112. F.O,, 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.35, Condifential, 26 July 1903.
113. F.O. 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.126 Confidential, 17 August 1903.
as to what kind of man was Nasr al-Sultana,
110
The news that he had been
236
troops to Isfahan on the scale that was being envisaged would greatly 
«
increase the price of foodstuffs' in the province; and that that would
114
promote even greater discontent. In Isfahan, however, news of the
cancellation of the despatch of the army had apparently not yet been
115 T
received; but it was known that Najafi had agreed to go to the capital.
He and his followers said that this promise had been made so that the
mujtahid would be able personally to urge the authorities in the capital
to take action against the Babis and against the growth of European
116influence in Persiac It is interesting to note that when news did
reach Isfahan that the soldiers would not be coming to the city, Najafi
117
immediately abandoned his plans to go to Tehran.
At the end of August, Zill al-Sultan wrote privately to Hardinge asking 
him to approach Amin al-Sultan as a matter of urgency, and to recommend 
that Najafi should be called to Tehran, and then sent on to either Mashhad
y  1 J 8  —
or Karbala. When it became known that Najafi had withdrawn his offer
of going to Tehran, Aganoor reported that there was widespread
disappointment, and some trepidation about the likely course of events in
Isfahan. Aganoor too expressed the view that Hardinge should see Amin
al-Sultan; for the British Vice-Consul believed that Najafi did fear the
central government, but that Amin al-Sultan probably did not realise that
this was so. In Aganoor’s view, it was necessary to act while Najafi
119
still held the government in some awe. In September, Zill al-Sultan
114. F.O. 60:666. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.126 Confidential, 17 August 1903,
115. At this time the Shah was away from the capital on a hunting 
expedition at Fashand, north of Tehran, and Hardinge had heard the 
news of the cancellation of the plan when he had visited the camp.
116. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.44 Confidential, 14 August 1903.
117. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No. 47, 2.7 August 1903.
118. F.O, 248:787. Enclosure in Aganoor to Hardihgg, No. 49, _30 August 1903.',
119. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.53, 9 September 1903.
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wrote to Hardinge again recommending that Najafi should be called to
120
Tehran as quickly as possible. Aganoor pointed out at the end of the
year that recent deaths among the religious classes, particularly that
of the Imam Jumla of Isfahan meant that the influence of Najafi and his
121
brothers was now even greater than it had previously been.
As has been seen above, the issue of Najafi1s removal from Isfahan 
involved the great powers. These wider aspects of the matter were known
to the population of Isfahan, for the Russian Consul was spreading
*
rumours that Zill al-Sultan would be removed as Governor, and that Britain
122 . . . .
would not be able to protect him,, In Tehran too, the wider implications
of the issue were also obvious. It was rumoured in the capital that Zill 
al-Sultan had been responsible for instigating the unrest in July in 
order both to embarrass Muzaffar al-Din Shah, and to provide-an excuse for
Britain to land troops in southern Persia, and to send them north to
- 123 
Isfahan.
After orders had been sent from the government in Tehran, Najafi
finally left for the capital on 12 October, but rumours soon began to
124 -
circulate that his absence would be brief. Zill al-Sultan had earlier
• •
expressed the fear that if he was not sent on from Tehran to a suitable
125
holy city, then his prestige would be increased. Aganoor reported
that the rumours of Najafi1s speedy return had been put about by his 
relatives; for as soon as it was known that he really had departed for
120. F.O. 248:787. Enclosure in Aganoor to Hardinge, No.54,
10 September 1903.
121. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.77, 29 December 1903.
122. F o0. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.38 Confidential, 7 August 1903.
123. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.42 Confidential, 10 August 1903.
124. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.74, 3 December 1903.
125. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.49, 30 August 1903.
338
Tehran, many villagers had set about trying to reclaim the land which
126had been taken from them. Other rumours circulated to the effect
that Najafi would soon return because he would cause great trouble in 
Tehran; and that the central government would then want to get him out 
of the capital as quickly as possible, the easiest course of action would 
be to let him return to Isfahan.
In January 1904, both Zill al-Sultan and Jalal al-Dawla were called 
to Tehran, along with all other provincial governors, to take part in 
discussions on plans to reform the taxation system. When that news was 
known in Isfahan rumours immediately began to circulate that the two men
would be going to the capital in disgrace, and that they would not return
128 — — 
to their posts. When Najafi did not return to Isfahan in the early
months of the year there were renewed rumours that he was indeed to be
sent to Mashhad, and Aganoor reported that they were widely welcomed by
12
many members of the religious classes who did not belong to his family.
At this time the Church Missionary Society's hospital was under
construction, and in March one of Najafirs sons, Aqa Kamal, spoke out
130
against it and against schools run by Europeans. The latter was to
be a recurrent theme in the agitations of 1904. When Zill al-Sultan
• *
heard in Tehran of the activities of Aqa Kamal, he sent strongly worded 
telegrams to him ordering him to desist from such activities, and some
of Zill al-Sultan’s troops expelled from the city a sayyid who had been
—  13] • .
praising Najafi. In early May, the news circulated that Najafi would
126. F.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No,78, 29 December 1903.
127. F.O. 248:787„ Aganoor to Hardinge, No.78, 29 December 1903.
128. F.O. 248:820, Aganoor to Hardinge, No.8, 25 February 1904.
129. F.O, 248:820. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.9, 26 February 1904.
130. F.O. 248:820. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.14, 21 March 1904.
131. F.O. 248:820. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.17, 18 April 1904.
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certainly be returning to the city, and Aganoor reported that his
relatives and followers thereafter became much bolder in condemning
. . . . . 132
the activities of Europeans in Persia. Later that month it became
known that Zill al-Sultan would be returning as Governor, and that the
• e
intrigues of the Russian Consul and Banu-yi Uzma, mentioned above, had
failed. When this news was known, Aqa Kamal said that the Governor1s
return was due to his father's intervening on behalf of Zill al-Sultan
• *
133 “ —
with the Sadr-i Aczam. Najafi returned to Isfahan on May 30th, and 
*
134
Zill al-Sultan arrived three days later.
« o
The next few months were relatively quiet, and this was largely due
to the approach of cholera; initially from the north, and later from the
135 . . t
south. When the disease broke out m  the city, Najafi said that it was
a divine punishment inflicted because some Muslims had been sending their
136
children to Christian schools. He returned to this theme in February
1905, when he said that cholera would return to the province if those
schools were a?JLowed._to remain open, and that— the first victims of the
disease would then be the parents who had permitted their children to
137attend those schools.
Missionary schools were far from being the only object of criticism
138
by Najafi in 1904 and 1905, In those years he and several other
members of the religious classes in Isfahan, returned to the issue of 
growing Belgian involvement in the government of Persia. As has already
132. F.O. 248:820. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.20, 18 May 1904.
133„ FoOo 248:820. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.20, 18 May 1904.
134o F o0. 248:820. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.23, 13 June 1904.
135. See Chapter V of this thesis.
136. F.Ot 248:820. Preece to Hardinge, No.41, 7 September 1904.
137. F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.13, 25 February 1904.
138. The agitation against missionary schools-was not confined to Isfahan. 
There were serious protests against the CMS school in Yazd in December 
1905. (See, F.O, 248:845, Baggaley (Yazd) to Preece, No.16,
12 December 1905.)
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been noted many merchants had raised objections in 1901 to the continued
imposition of internal taxes on trade after these were supposed to have 
139been abolished. There were renewed protests about the existence of
140
such imposts in the province in 1905. In 1903 there had been vociferous
opposition in Isfahan, as in many other Persian towns and cities, to the
suggestions that the land-tax should be re-assessed; and that its
141
collection should thereafter be placed m  Belgian hands. In January
1905, Najafi claimed that it was his opposition which had prevented the
implementation of a proposal by Naus that stamp duty should be paid to
142
the government when certain types of document were signed.
It was, however, over an aspect of the Belgian presence in Persia
that Zill al-Sultan and Najafi found themselves, for once, in agreement.
The issue concerned the attitude and behaviour of the Belgian who was in
143
charge of the postal service in Isfahan, L. Lavachery. The reasons
for the opposition to that man were different in each case. Najafi and 
certain other members of the religious classes objected to European
control of the postal service as such, and they went on to accuse Lavachery
- - 144 . .
of employing Babis. As opposition to him grew, Lavachery had notices
139. P.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.16, 25 April 1901.
140. P.O. 248:845. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.32, 15 July 1905, and 
P.O. 248:845. Aganoor to Grant Duff, Noc56, 21 October 1905.
141. P.O. 248:787. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.5, 24 February 1903, and
see also F.O. 60:665, Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.41, Very Confidential, 
30 March 1903. Aganoor explained that one of the reasons why 
many members of the religious classes objected to the proposal was 
that they owned much land and did not want to have to pay higher 
taxes c
1420 FcOo 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.7, 26 January 1901.
143. The postal service had been given into the charge of Naus in 1903 
(see A. Destree, Les Fonctionnaires Beiges au Service de la Perse 
1898-1915 , Tehran1 Liege' ‘1976, p .79.
144. F.O, 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.11, 15 January 1905,
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posted around the city warning its inhabitants not to interfere with
the postal service, or with its employees. The Belgian official had
not consulted Zill al-Sultan before those notices appeared, and the 
• *
Governor objected most strongly to xxhat had been done, and to the way
145 _
in which his position had been ignored. Zill al-Sultan had earlier
• *
aroused LavacheryTs resentment when he had imprisoned a Persian who
U
worked for the Post after that man had been found guilty of being drunk.
Preece believed that Lavachery’s behaviour was, at the very least,
insensitive; but he did not accept the view, which was apparently
widely held in Isfahan, that the man was mentally unhinged. In March
the British Consul reminded Hardinge that anti-European feeling in
Isfahan was already very high, and he feared that a tactless act by
147
Lavachery would have serious consequences. This was an accurate
prediction; for in May, when men employed by Lavachery raided some shops
and seized and destroyed aniline dyes which were on sale, there was a
148 . ~
considerable commotion. The religious classes, under Najafi’s
leadership, sent telegrams to their colleagues in Tehran and Shiraz 
asking for support in the protest about Lavachery’s action. Many of the 
merchants asked their agents in Bushire and Shiraz not to forward goods 
to Isfahan while he remained in the city. Zill al-Sultan sent frequent, 
and increasingly urgent, messages to Tehran asking the authorities there
145. P.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.ll, 15 February 1905.
146. F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.ll, 15 February 1905.
147. F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge', No. 14," 5 March 1905.
148. The importation of aniline dyes was prohibited at this time, 
and Lavachery, as well as being in charge of postal services, 
also acted as an agent of the customs administration in 
Isfahan. See J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf/Oman 
add Central Arabia, Calcutta 1915, I, p.2603.
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149 . . 150to recall the Belgian official» This was finally done m  June,
but the agitation had by then become much wider in its scope, and one
or two of the more fanatical religious leaders had begun to call for
violent protests against all Europeans who were living in Persia.*"**
The recall of Lavachery brought a temporary period of relative
calm; but fears of violence against Europeans persisted throughout
most of I905„ One of the major reasons for this was the news of the
massacres of Muslims which were taking place in southern Russia. Isfahan
was a particularly sensitive city in this respect because it had a large
Armenian population; and Armenians were believed to have been responsible
152
for many of the attacks on Muslims in the Caucasus. The Shah and his
ministers were very alarmed about the possibility of violent protests in
Persia; and both Muzaffar al-Din and Mushir al-Dawla (the Persian Foreign
Minister) wrote personally to Zill al-Sultan telling him of the need to
• •
153
take special precautions to maintain order m  the city.
This was no easy task, for Zill al-Sultan continued to lack troops,
• •
and two of the most turbulent leaders of the anti-Babi riots of 1902 and
1903 returned from exile to Isfahan in November 1904, and January 1905
154 . . . - .
respectively. On neither occasion was Zill al-Sultan informed of their
.149, F.O. 2,48:845. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.26, 20 May 1905.
150. F.O. 248:845. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.36, 17 July 1905.
151. F.O. 248:845. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.26, 20 May 1905.
152. F.O. 248:845. Aganoor to Hardinge,( No.35, 16 July 1905.
153. F.O. 248:845'. Aganoor to .Hardinge, Confidential, No. 4:1 , 10 August 1905 .
154. F.O. 248:820. Aganoor to Hardinge-;.No.53, _ 2 December 1904, and
F.O. 248:845. Preece^to Hardinge, No.ll, 15. February . 1905. The
second man to return was Abu’1 Qasim ZanjanT. The first man's name 
is illegible in the despatch. When he returned to Isfahan some 
friends are reported to have told him that he looked older, and that 
his beard was greyer, than when he had been made to leave Isfahan in 
1903. He replied that he hoped it would not be long before his beard 
was dyed with the blood of Babis (F.O. 248:820. Aganoor to Hardinge, 
No.53, 2 December 1904.)
impending return and he told Preece that had he had sufficient troops
155
at his disposal he would have expelled both men from the city.
Violence against the Babis began again in late March 1905, when a member
of that sect was shot and killed in Najafabad. The first group of
troops sent there by Zill al-Sultan was unable to carry out its task of
* •
arresting the man responsible, and it was only when members of the 
Cossack Brigade were sent to Najafabad that that object was achieved.
The arrest of the alleged culprit caused an agitation in Isfahan and 
Najafi said he should be released because it was no crime to kill a
if tv 157 Babi.
Preece reported at this time that Najafi and his followers now felt
free to act almost without restraint, for nearly all the other leading
members of the religious classes in Isfahan had died, and he had become
158
without any doubt the most influential figure. A further factor which
apparently increased his sense of freedom of action was that he was no
longer afraid of being summoned to the capital. It was widely believe,
reported Preece, that Najafi had paid a large bribe to ^Ayn al-Dawla while
he had been in Tehran in the early months of 1904; and that by this
means he had secured a promise ofimmunity from further action by the
159
central governmentc
155. F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.ll, 15 February 1905.
156. F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.19, 2 April 1905. The members
of the Cossack Brigade used on this occasion were those who 
usually formed the Governor's personal bodyguard.
157. F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.19, 2 April 1905.
158. F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.21, 20 April 1905.
159. F.O. 248 845. Preece to Hardinge, No.7, 26 January 1905.
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The British ConsulTs and Vice-Consul’s reports during 1905,
however, provide evidence of some opposition within Isfahan to Najafi
and his activities. Preece noted a growing number of complaints against
the manner by which he and some members of his family were continuing 
160to acquire land. Opposition by some of the religious classes was
also to be seen in January 1905 when the muj tahid sent some of his
students to take possession of a mosque which had previously been
regarded as in the charge of the Imam JumCa.*^ This incident caused
considerable unrest during which NajafT endeavoured to have the bazaars
closed. Preece repoi~ted that the heads of various guilds refused to
co-operate with him over this and that trade was conducted normally and
162
without interruption. Meanwhile, Zill al-Sultan continued to urge
t o
16 ^
that NajafT and his brothers should be sent to some distant holy city.
While Najafi’s power and influence appeared to grow, that of
Zill al-Sultan seems to have declined. He did not receive any additional
troops, and the roads throughout the province were not as safe in 1904
164
and 1905, as they had been earlier. Zill al-Sultan's fears that his sister 
Banu-yi Uzma, would enter into intrigues against him in Tehran soon 
proved to be c o r r e c t . T h o s e  intrigues became so serious that Zill al- 
Sultan feared that he would not retain office in March when provincial
160. F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.21, 20 April 1905.
161. The previous Imam Jum^ahad died in late November 1903, and the 
post had then passed to his son who was aged only 12.
(Fo0 t 248:787. Aganoor to Grant Duff, No.77, 29 December 1903.)
162. F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.7, 26 January 1905.
163. F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No.7, 26 January, 1905, and
FoO. 248:845, Aganoor to Hardinge, No.33, Confidential,
15 July 1905.
164. Fo0c 248:845. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.36, 17 July 1905.
165. F.O. 248:845. Preece to Hardinge, No,12, 22 February 1905.
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governorships were reviewed. He therefore sent one of his sons,
together with a trusted servant (his Munshi-Bashi) to the capital, there
to defend his i n t e r e s t s . Z i l l  al-Sultan did manage to retain his 
167
post, but from later reports it is clear that his sense of insecurity
was growing in 1905, and that he was less vigorous as a Governor than
168
he had been in the past. During the summer of 1905, his health began
to deteriorate, and in late October he left for a long visit to Europe
169
with two of his favourite sons.
While Zill al-Sultan was away, the MunshT-BashT acted as Governor, 
but he was not a resolute administratorP News of the disturbances 
in Fars in November and December 1905, caused unrest in the city, and
in 1906 there was renewed agitation against the activities of the Church
171 -
Missionary Society. By the time Zill al-Sultan returned to Isfahan
the influence of Najafi and his brother Shaykh Nur Allah had become even 
172
greater. Events m  Tehran leading up to the granting of the
Constitution x^ere followed with great interest, and contributed to a 
general sense of excitement and restlessness. After a prolonged period 
of renewed turbulence, Zill al-Sultan was finally dismissed as Governor 
of Isfahan on March 7th, 1907.
1660 F.O. 248:845e Preece to Hardinge, No.19, 2 April 1905. (Appoint­
ments were generally reviewed or changed at the beginning of the 
year, and this was in March - 20th, 21st or 22nd.)
Preece to Hardinge, No,22, 24 April 1905.
Aganoor to Hardinge, No.36, 17 July 1905, and
Preece to Grant Duff, No.55, 4 October 1905. 
Aganoor to Grant Duff, No.58, 4 November 1905. 
Aganoor to Grant Duff, No.58, 4 November 1905, and 
Aganoor to Grant Duff, No.77, 12 December 1905.
Grant Duff to Grey, No.ll, 4 January 1906.
Grant Duff to Grey, No.60, 30 January 1906, and
Grant Duff to Grey, No.80, 10 February 1906.
167. F.,0. 248 :845.
168. F.,0. 248 : 845.
F,,0. 248 :845.
169. F,.0. 248 :845.
170. F..0. 248 : 845 „
F.,0. 248 :845.
171 . F..0. 248 : 866.
172. F..0. 248 :866„
F,.0. 248 : 866,
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One other important source of discontent in Isfahan which calls
for attention is the rising price of basic foodstuffs. The frequency
and quite detailed nature of consular reports during this period make
it possible to recognize two distinct, but related aspects of that
issue: short-term, and sometimes very sharp, fluctuations; and a longer-
term trend of rising prices which is discernable throughout the whole
of Muzaffar al-Din's reign. For example, in 1897/98, the lowest price
quoted in the consular reports for wheat is 6Q qirans per kharvar, and 
- - 173
for bread, 27 shahis per mann. The highest prices for that year were
- - 174
100 qirans per kharvar for wheat, and 40 shahis per mann for bread.
By 1905/6, the lowest recorded price for wheat was 100 qirans per kharvar,
- - 175 . . ~
and for bread 40 shahis per mann. The highest figures were 122 qirans
— — — 176
per kharvar for wheat, and 46 shahis per mann for bread.
The causes of these two sets of changes are usually different, but
they are sometimes linked. The short-term fluctuations were often 
seasonal; grain was usually in short supply, and more expensive, at the
period just before the harvest, even if there had been no hoarding.
Other factors giving rise to short-term fluctuations were natural 
circumstances, such as climatic variations (a great proportion of a crop 
might fail in a particular year); or attack by pests. If such 
circumstances prevailed for more than one growing season, they were likely 
to have an impact on the long-term price, as well as giving rise to 
short-term fluctuations.
173. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.24, 2 June 1898.
174. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.50, 8 December 1898.
175. F.O. 248:845. Aganoor to Durand, No.26, 20 May 1905.
1761. F.O. 248:845o Aganoor to Durand, No.77, 30 December 1905.
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There is a third category of causes of such fluctuations, and 
these can best be described as deriving from an unusually high demand 
for, or a shortage in the supply of, food. Either of these factors 
could be actual or potential. The arrival in Isfahan of Stn^a^l-Saltana
o •
and his large entourage in April 1901 has already been noted as having 
just such an effect. The possibility of a large number of troops being 
sent to the province in the late autumn of 1903 had similar consequences.
In the first case prices rose rapidly, and they declined with equal
~ . . 177speed after Shu^^l-Saltana and his men had left the city for the south.
»
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In the second case the rise in prices was less sharp; but the decline
too was slower, and prices did not approach their previous levels until
11 1
it was absolutely certain that troops would not be sent to the province.
During periods of unrest and violence, prices could often go up steeply
and suddenly. This was usually a result of high demand arising from
panic buying; or of difficulties in procuring grain supplies, either
because of the closure of the basaars, or because of an unwillingness on
the part of those who held grain to release their stocks. The highest
recorded prices which are to be found in the British consular reports
from Isfahan during this period occur during the time of the anti-Babi
riots in July and August 1903. Under normal circumstances, grain and
bread were at their cheapest at that time of the year, for the harvest
was in; but in 1903, although crops had been quite good, wheat still
cost 155 qirans per kharvar, and bread was 60 shahis per mann, at the
180height of the disturbances! On occasion, even the rumour of potential
177. F.O. 248:742* Preece to Hardinge, No.16, 25 April 1901.
178. F.O. 248:742* Aganoor to Hardinge, No.42, Confidential, 10 August 1903*
179. F.O. 248:742. Aganoor to Hardinge, No*65, 8 October 1903.
180* F.O* 248:763. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.43, 13 August 1903.
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shortages was sufficient to cause a temporary increase in 
181
prices.
The importance of agriculture in Isfahan was very great. The
province enjoys considerable natural advantages for this activity as
it lies in a well-watered and fertile basin between the eastern slopes
of the Zagros mountains and the central desert. The climate is
regarded as one of the best in Persia, but, as will be seen, it can
also be capricious. There is no reason to believe that the climate
during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din was greatly different than at
other times, or that pests were any less or any more active; and
similar patterns of crop damage and failure to those described below
have almost certainly existed throughout much of the history of Persia.
The early years of the reign of Muzaffar al-Din seem to have been
relatively free from any such climatic vagaries or from serious attack
by pests. Snow and rainfall were at a relatively low level during the
winter of 1899/1900, and precipitation was even more deficient the
following winter. During the autumn and winter of 1900/1901 weevils
182
caused considerable losses to grain which was in store. The opium
183
crop of 1901 suffered from the shortage of water, and in the same year
184
late frosts did much harm to fruit trees. That year was also a bad
one for the tobacco harvest, as high winds and rain in the autumn did much
185
damage to the plants. In the same year the sunn pest greatly reduced
181. F.O. 248:699. Preece to Durand, No.14, 9 March 1899.
182. F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.16, 25 April 1901.
183. F.O. 248:742. Aganoor to Spring Rice, No*5, 27 February 1901.
184. F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.30, 13 August 1901.
185. F.O, 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.42, 16 October 1901.
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the wheat harvest. In 1902 sunn continued to affect that crop,
but not as badly as in 1901, and most of the damage was confined to
187
the area around Linjan. In 1903, the tobacco crop again suffered
188great damage as a result of high winds and rain in the autumn.
The winter of 1904/5 was both long and cold, and this did great harm
189
to the opium and barley crops, as well as to vines and almond trees.
The most significant of the factors mentioned above appears to 
have been the partial drought following low winter precipitation from 
1899 to 1901o The impact of this is noticeable, not only on harvest 
levels, but also on the later processing of food; for mills relied 
on water power, and when the Zayanda Rud was low, then output of flour 
was considerably reduced.
One of the reasons most frequently mentioned in reports of short­
term price fluctuations was the hoarding of stocks. The object of 
those who held grain was usually to obtain the maximum possible price, 
and some tried to achieve this by restricting supplies which went to 
market. In this matter Najafi and his family were the object of much
186. F.O. 248:742. Preece to Rardinge, No,21, 21 May 1901. The pest 
in question is referred to in various British sources as sin, 
senn and sunn. The latter variant is that given by B.A. Keen,
The Agricultural Development of the Middle East, London 1946, p.70,,
who also provides the insect' s Latin name: Eurygaster Entegriceps.
The insect sucks the sap of the plant and attacks many cereals, 
particularly wheat.
Preece to Des Graz, No.31, 16 July 1902.
Aganoor to Hardinge, No.65, 8 October 1903.
Aganoor to Hardinge, No.36, 17 July 1905, and
Preece to Hardinge, No.19, 2 April 1905,
Schneider to Durand, No,37, 26 August 1899, and 








criticism. For example, in August 1898 a large crowd of women
assembled outside Najafl's house, which was near the Masjid-i Shah, and
accused him of responsibility for keeping grain prices high. In order
to placate them he ordered that some of his grain should be sold at a
price of 50 qirans per kharvar (the current price in the bazaar was
about 80 qirans per kharvar) ; but Aganoor said that the muj tahid
had sold only a very small amount at this price, though his stores of
191
grain were known to be the largest in the province. Earlier that
year Najafi had been involved in an attempt to drive up the price of meat. 
He is reported to have delivered a judgment that certain mutton had not 
been slaughtered in the correct manner, and that therefore Muslims could 
not. eat it. The butchers declared a strike against this judgment and 
meat was, for a short time, very scarce and very expensive. Aganoor 
noted that many members of the population had observed that Najafi, who
owned large herds of sheep, had not had any of his own animals slaughtered
192
to help reduce the price. In December 1898, anonymous placards
appeared around the city which condemned Najafi for his part in grain
hoarding.193 When the mujtahid left Isfahan for Tehran in the autumn
of 1903, one of the reasons for relief among the population was a hope
that there would then be less grain hoarding, and that prices would 
194
therefore fall.
There were, however, other causes apart from hoarding which were 
responsible for the high price of grain and bread in Isfahan. The 
prices for grain which prevailed in neighbouring provinces - particularly
191. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.40, 27 August 1898.
192. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.5, 1 March 1898.
193. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.50, 8 December 1898.
194. F.O. 248:820. Aganoor to Hardinge, No.17, 18 Aprrl 1904.
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in Fars and Yazd - were often even higher than in Isfahan, and this
encouraged an export trade. There were many complaints in Isfahan in
the early summer of 1898 that, despite very good harvest prospects,
wheat was still expensive and there were minor riots over this in late 
196
June. In August Aganoor confirmed that the harvest had indeed been
a good one, but he reported that those who held grain were looking for
the most profitable market. Najafi had sent much grain to Yazd the
previous year, and he was waiting to see whether prices would be high
197there again m  1898. Zill al-Sultan was alarmed by the high prices,
and took several steps to try to reduce them. He sent telegrams to
Tehran requesting permission to forbid the export of grain from the
province in the hope that this would force hoarders to sell their stocks 
198
in the city. This request was refused, and Aganoor believed that this
was because the holders of grain had exercised influence in the capital
. . . 199
to be allowed to export it if they so wished. In the autumn, some
4,000 kharvars of wheat were sent from Isfahan to Yazd.^^ Other
agricultural products too were exported at this time to markets where
prices were higher, and there are reports of clarified butter being sent
-  201
to Tehran from Isfahan. A further complication was caused by the 
fact that growers of wheat in outlying areas - such as Sultanabad, 
Gu'lpayagan, Chahar Mahall, Burujird and Khumayn - who had previously 
sent most of their harvest to Isfahan, had now realized that they could 
get better prices by sending their produce direct to Fars and Yazd, and
195. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.38, 24 August 1898.
196. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.22, 26 June 1898.
197. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.38, 24 August 1898.
198. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.39, 25 August 1898.
199. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.39, 25 Augus t 1898.
200. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.48, 3 November 1898.
201. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.50, 8' December 1898,
2S2
this too reduced the level of supplies available in the city. It
was Zill al-Sultan!s view, with which Aganoor agreed, that there was
no absolute shortage of grain after the 1898 harvest; and that it was
hoarding and exports that were responsible for the high prices which
prevailed. The Governor gave orders in late October 1898 that the
maximum price of wheat should be 80 qirans per kharvar, and that bread
should be sold at 30 shahis per mann. But the order was not effective,
and only very poor quality wheat, often adultered with earth, was to
be had at 80 qirans per kharvar. The best wheat cost 110 qirans per
kharvar, and average quality wheat was priced at 100 qirans per kharvar.
This represented an increase of some 80 per cent since the spring, and
203
much hardship resulted.
In considering the apparent long-term increase in prices several 
causes can be recognized. One of these was a change in the pattern of
cultivation with a move away from wheat and barley to more remunerative
204 . . . .
crops, particularly opium and tobacco. This was not an innovation m
the reign of Muzaffar al~Din Shah for the change was under way during 
*
the latter years of his father's rule. One traveller noted in 1890 that
Zill al-Sultan had given orders that anyone growing opium had to devote 
• *
one part of his land to cereals for every four which were given over to 
poppies in order to maintain grain s u p p l i e s . T h e  change in crop 
patterns did not have serious consequences when harvests were good; but 
when yields of grain were poor, then shortages did result from such a
202. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.38, 24 August 1898. _In later
years there seems to have been less trade in grain with Fars and Yazd. 
It is possible that this was because of the increasing insecurity on 
the roads, but this is speculation.
203. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.50, 8 December 1898.
204. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.38, 24 August 1898,,
205. I.L. Bird, Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan, I, London 1891, p.267.
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shift in cultivation; and this too helped to increase prices in 1904.
Preece cited heavy speculation in opium as one of the reasons for higher
food prices, and for a consequent reduction in the purchasing power of
207
the bulk of the population.
One other long-term factor was also important, and that was a change
in the pattern of land ownership. Again these changes did not begin in
the reign of Muzaffar al-Din, but were a well-established feature of 
  208
Nasir al-Din's rule. Put at its simplest, what had happened was that 
some of the land which had previously been khalisa (crown land), had 
become virtually the property of the peasants who worked on it. They had 
to sell part of their harvest regularly in order to pay their annual taxes. 
Much of that land had later been bought by members of the religious 
classes, and by members of Zill al-Sultan’s family. These people had 
less difficulty in avoiding, or at least postponing, the payment of their 
taxes. This meant that the new owners did not have to sell the harvest
to meet immediate financial needs, and they could therefore afford to
. . ., . . , 209 , .
keep the g r a m  in store until its- price increased. Indeed m  some
cases the new owners also purchased part of the peasantry*s share of the 
harvest, and this too increased their stocks and potential influence over 
the market.
206. F o0. 248:676, Aganoor to Durand, No.38, 24 August 1898.
207. Preece Report for the Years 1901-1903 on the Trade of Ispahan and
District, Cd.2236-49, in Parliamentary Sessional Papers: Accounts
and Papers 1905, Volume LXXXXI, p.3.
208. On this issue see A.K.S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia, 
London 1969, pp.153-4, and same author, Khalisa in Encyclopaedia 
bf Islam, Leiden (in progress) IV, p.979.
209. F.O. 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.38, 24 August 1898.
210. F.O, 248:676. Aganoor to Durand, No.38, 24 August 1898,
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One final matter concerning agriculture which should be noted,
for it caused much discontent and resentment against Zill al-Sultan,
* •
was the diversion of waters from the Zayanda Rud during 1901. As has been 
noted, winter precipitation in 1899-1900 was low, and similar 
circumstances prevailed the following year. Complaints began to be 
heard in May 1901 that canals near Isfahan were drying up, and that
all the water from the river was being diverted in the district of
. 211 .
Linjan to the west. The regulation of waters of that river is a
212
complex matter, but from consular reports it is clear that at this 
period in the history of Persia, water was expected to flow from Linjan 
into Isfahan until at least the end of the first week in June. In 1901
very little water indeed was reaching Isfahan from the end of the first
213 . . . .
week in Majr. The man responsible for this diversion of water was the
Mulla Bashi who rented many of the villages in the Linjan.area, and who
2i ^
had control of the river’s waters. No water at all was reaching crops
east of Isfahan from early May, and considerable hardship was caused to *
cultivators in that area. The Mulla Bashi was prepared to sell water;
but the price was very high, and many of the crops grown to the east of
. 2 1 5  
Isfahan were ruined.
The reason given by the Mulla Bashi for the diversion of water was
that almost all of the wheat crop in the Linjan district had been
211. F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.21, 21 May 1901. __
212. See A.K.S. Lambton, The Regulation of the Waters of the Zayande 
Rud, Bulletin of the School of Oriental (and African) Studies, 9, 
(1939), pp.663-673.
213. FoOo 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.21, 21 May 1901,
214. F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.21, 21 May 1901.
215. F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.24, 16 June 1901.
destroyed by sunn pest; and that the rice crop was now even more 
important for the inhabitants of the district. The water level in the 
river was very low because of insufficient precipitation during the
two previous winters, and all the water in the river was needed to save
— — — 216 , - 
the rxce, according to the Mulla Bashi. Zxll al-Sultan seems to have
done very little about this matter, and complaints against him were
widespread. These came not only from the cultivators whose crops had
been ruined; but also from the population of Isfahan, as water for
domestic purposes had to be brought into the city from outlying - v .
217 . .
villages. The effects of this diversion continued to be felt for the
rest of the year, for very little water reached districts to the east of
the city before late November, and although the land there had been
ploughed in preparation, the water arrived too late for many grain crops 
218
to be sown. In 1902 the river flowed normally, for there was quite
good precipitation in the winter of 1901/2, but many cultivators in the 
areas to the east of Isfahan lost most of their crops for 2 years as a
—  ^ O 1 Q
result of the Mulla BashiTs action. y
In conclusion then, it can be seen that the people of Isfahan, be 
they living in villages or in the city, had to face many hardships during 
the reign of Muzaffar al-Din. It appears that Zill al-Sultan did, on the 
whole, try to maintain law and order and to govern with vigour. He 
suffered from a lack of troops, and he received little support from the 
central authorities. Indeed, intrigues against him in Tehran, and
216. F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.21, 21 May 1901,
217c 'F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.26, 16 July 1901, and
F.O. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.30,_J3 August 1901. It is
possible that the reason for Zill al-Sultan*s apparent inactivity 
over this issue is related to the fact that the Mulla BashT rented
much land from the Governor; but whether Zill al-Sultan owned land
at Linjan is not clear from the sources used (see F.O.248:820. 
Aganoor to Hardinge, No.6, I February 1904).
218, 248:742, Preece to Hardinge, No.44, 8 November 1901.
219. 248:742. Preece to Hardinge, No.50, 3 December 1901.
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divisions within his own family, were responsible for deflecting a 
considerable part of his energies from the tasks of government.
Isfahan was also the home of another vigorous man - the influential 
religious leader Aqa Najafi; and there were many targets against which 
he could turn fanatical elements in the population. Anglo-Russian 
rivalry, the increasing employment of Belgian officials in Persia, news 
of circumstances abroad, and the credulity attached to rumours - all of 
these played a part in the unfolding pattern of events. In many ways the 
reign of Muzaffar al-Din forms almost the final chapter in the history 
of the decline of Zill al-Sultan. That process had begun in 1888, but the
• ft
Prince continued to show a capacity to rule firmly. It is clear, however, 
that he was losing authority in the latter years of his governorship, 
and that it was this lack of power rather than defects of personality 
which prevented him from ruling as he would have liked. It is not 
difficult to imagine Zill al-Sultan agreeing, at the end of his period
ft •
in office, with the sentiments of the poet whose lines were quoted at 
the opening of this chapter.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
"Justice requires power, intelligence and will."
Leonardo da Vinci.
Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci, arranged, 
rendered into English and introduced by 
E. MacCurdy, London 1945, I, p.97.
The reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah was neither long nor distinguished, 
yet it is an important turning point in the political history of Persia; 
for when that Shah died the country was, nominally at least, governed 
by a constitutional and no longer by an absolute monarch. The outward 
forms of representative parliamentary government had been adopted with 
great speed in the last year of Muzaffar al-Din’s rule.
The first bast of December 1905 began by demanding little more 
than the dismissal of the Sadr-i Afeam,^yn al-Dawla, but it did not end 
until after the Shah had pledged, in February 1906, both to dismiss 
that Minister and establish a House of Justice (CAdalat-Khana) . When
i
neither of these promises was fulfilled many members of the religious 
classes, accompanied by merchants and members of various guilds, left 
Tehran for Qumm, and at the same time a second bast took place in the 
capital. The demands^though^remained vague. Some of the bastis would 
apparently have still been satisfied with the dismissal of the Sadr-i 
ifeam, but others now wished for a more fundamental reform; and on 
August 5th the Shah issued a farman promising to establish a National 
Consultative Assembly (Majlis-i Shawra~yi Milli). Within five weeks 
the law governing elections to this body had been published, and the 
Assembly began its debates on October 7th. The first draft of the 
document known as the Fundamental Law, (Qanun-i Asasi) was ready by 
the end of that month, and the final version was signed by Muzaffar al-
358
Din on December 30th - just eight days before his death. On October 7th
1907 the Supplementary Fundamental Law (Mutammim-i Qanun-i Asasi) was
ratified by his successor Muhammad CAli Shah. Article 26 of that Law
indicates how great was the change that had taken place, for it declared
that "the powers of the realm are all derived from the people; and the
Fundamental Law regulates the employment of those powers".^ Article 35
affirmed the same belief in a different way, "the sovereignty is a trust
2
confided (as a Divine gift) by the people to the person of the King".
c  —  —
It is true that Muhammad Ali Shah was later to dissolve the Assembly
by force ana the granting of the Constitution was then seen to be a
fragile victory; yet the fact that it had been formulated, and that
that process had happened so quickly, gives a special importance to the
reign of Muzaffar al-Din.
Even the most cursory glance at earlier Qajar history \\rill show that
many of the complaints against Muzaffar al-Din were far from being
unique. Sir John Malcolm, writing in 1815, had called attention to the
tyranny and injustice which prevailed in Persia under Fath^Ali Shah,
3
and which had also existed at earlier periods. Court intrigues, 
corruption, arrears of pay to the army and the bureaucracy, tribal 
unrest and insecurity along the roads - these were not new features of 
Persia1s history; but what has been seen in the course of this thesis 
is that the burdens on the population were becoming unbearable, and 
that this was happening because problems were now occurring together, 
and with an intensity that appears not to have been known before.
1. Translation by E.G. Browne in The Persian Revolution, 
Cambridge 1910, p.375.
2. Ibid., p.377.
3. J. Malcolm, The History of Persia from the Most Early Period 
to the Present Time, London 1815, II, Chapter XXIII.
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As well as being faced with many serious internal issues, Muzaffar
*
al-Din was also fated to rule at a time when the external pressures
upon Persia were becoming stronger than they had ever previously been.
The involvement of the great powers was certainly no novel feature of
Qajar history - Fath*kli Shah had come up against the conflicting
interests of France, England and Russia - but by the end of the
nineteenth century Russia was in a much stronger position to exercise
pressure on Persia, and it could do so from Central Asia as well as in
the Caucasus. More important, however, was the fact that awareness of
the ways of Europe, in particular knowledge of different methods of
government and administration, had begun to spread among educated
elements in Persian society. This was largely due to increasing travel
4
and the publication of Persian newspapers abroad. At the same time 
there was increasing resentment at the presence of Europeans in Persia, 
deeper suspicion about their actions, and greater apprehension about 
their motives among more numerous sections of society. On the one hand, 
therefore, there was new knowledge, albeit limited in depth and 
restricted in its diffusion; while on the other hand, there was a great 
and growing lack of confidence in the ability of the government to carry 
out its traditional and essential task of maintaining conditions in which 
the good Islamic life could be lived.
"When Muzaffar al-Din was proclaimed Shah in May 1896, he inherited 
an absolute throne; but that statement can convey a rather false 
impression, unless it is also remembered that his authority was in fact 
very weak. The Persian army was feeble and ineffective, and the finances
4. On the origins and development of the Persian press, see E.G. Broxme, 
The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia, Cambridge 1914; and H.lLRabino, 
La Presse Persane depuis ses or^gines jusqu'a nos jours, Revue du 
Monde Musulman, Vol.XXII, 1913, pp.287^313.
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of his government were chaotic, with very little of the revenue that 
was raised in the provinces actually reaching the central treasury. 
Muzaffar al-Din was nominally absolute and he was certainly irresponsible; 
but he was also virtually without power, and from that inconsistency 
arose many of the difficulties which faced Persia.
It has been seen that the causes of discontent were not new; the 
demands being made of the Shah were similarly traditional. They involved 
a plea for justice, for more honest administration, for the elimination 
of corruption, for an end to the hoarding of grain, for greater security 
for trade, for the preservation of public order in the towns and along 
the roads^and for the defence of the frontiers. In brief, what was 
required was the reassertion of Islamic values and restoration of the 
prestige of Persia. It is suggested here that those demands were not 
fundamentally incompatible with absolute rule, provided that the ruler 
was diligent, honest, patriotic and pious. It is certainly possible that 
the many maladies which afflicted Persia could have been cured more 
effectively by an active and determined Shah, rather than by seeking to 
establish a new form a government.
The new system was an imported one; it had little if any 
relationship with the accepted system of beliefs and values. Although 
there were major differences between the situation in Persia in 1906, 
and that which prevailed in 1925, it would appear that the strong hand
s
of Riza Shah, in the very early years of his reign, did more to meet the 
needs of Persia at that time than did the Constitution established during 
the reign of Muzaffar al-Din. This study has indicated that the 
Constitution came to be granted not in response to a powerful and coherent 
challenge, but rather because Muzaffar al-Din was incapable of
26i
re-invigorating the traditional system of government. Not merely was 
he unable to re-invigorate it, he presided over its further decline.
The result was that in the end the change in the system of government 
came rapidly, and apparently profoundly.
Appearances, however, were deceptive; those who had demanded a 
constitution were few in number, and those who understood the implications 
of such a change were in an even smaller minority. The achievement of 
the constitutionalists might be described as a frustrated victory, but 
in accomplishing it they had succeeded in showing how hollow was the 
position of the monarchy under Muzaffar al-Din.
The aspects of his reign xriiich have been investigated have indicated 
that many of Persia1s problems had deep roots. None of the Qajar rulers
5had persisted m  programmes to reform either the army or the bureaucracy. 
There had been several attempts to put the army on a European footing and 
to change its composition from a largely irregular to a regular, or semi­
regular, body of disciplined men equipped with modern weapons; but all 
these efforts had proved abortive. This was largely because the attempts 
at reform were not sustained and because the necessary accompanying 
measures of financial reorganisation x*ere not introduced. Some 
improvements were made - the most notable being the establishment of the 
Cossack Brigade - but even here it has been seen that decline set in 
during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din. The system for the payment of 
troops was very poor and open to abuse, morale \ < r a s  understandly very low, 
and, with the exception of the Cossack Brigade, equipment and training 
were xroefully inadequate.
5. On attempts to reform under Nasir al-Din Shah, see S. Bakhash,
Iran: Monarchy Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars, 1858-1896,
London 1978.
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The pattern of neglect was repeated in the bureaucracy. Nasir 
al-Din*s early reforms had not been maintained, and although new 
departments of state had been created, ministers continued to be demoted 
or dismissed solely at the will of the Shah. When tenure of office was 
so insecure few bureaucrats would either accept responsibility, or take 
the initiative, in their work; and tendency to amass wealth as the 
only possible source of protection against the effects of loss of office 
became well-nigh irresistible. In this respect too, Muzaffar al-Din1s 
reign saw not only the persistence, but also the aggravation, of earlier 
causes of discontent. The selling of offices is a symptom rather than 
a cause of financial collapse; and to point to the farming of taxes is 
not in itself sufficient to account for the resentment felt by those who 
paid the taxes. What was wrong was not the practice of farming, but 
rather the failure to maintain essential safeguards against its abuse 
adequate inspection and a degree of security, or at the very least of 
continued expectancy of tenure of office,for the farmer. That the 
administrative system of Qajar Persia should be characterised by insecurity 
and venality, permeated with intrigue, and receptive to rumour is not 
surprising; but there was no insuperable obstacle to a strong and 
determined Shah setting limits to those failings.
In Muzaffar al-Din strength and determination were certainly lacking. 
Many Shahs, from dynasties other than the Qajars too, have had to face 
the danger that the sycophancy of courtiers xrould warp their judgment, 
and that news of military, administrative or economic failure would be 
sedulously kept from royal ears. Muzaffar al-DinTs long period of
6, F.O. 60:681. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Confidential No.69, 
22 April 1904.
relative isolation in Tabriz, his lack of administrative experience, 
his shy, mild, melancholic and vacillating personality, and poor 
physical health did not equip him well to re-invigorate the already 
seriously weakened throne of Persia. His personal behaviour during 
the cholera epidemic shows a lack of care and a selfishness that was all 
too common among members of the ruling classes.
It was also Muzaffar al-Din1s misfortune to have been subject to 
considerable Russian influence during his period of residence in Tabriz; 
and he may well have felt unwilling to seek British support against his 
northern neighbour. Any such reluctance was certainly strengthened by 
the refusal of King Edward VII to grant to Muzaffar al-Din, during his 
visit to England in 1902, the honour which had been bestowed upon his 
father - the Order of the Garter. Another factor which reduced the 
possibility of Muzaffar al-Din becoming a strong Shah was the. fact that 
the long sojourn in Tabriz had postponed the opportunity for his followers 
to gain access to the royal treasury; and greed delayed meant greed 
increased. At the very time when Persia needed to reduce expenditures 
and to prevent the waste of money, the Shah in power was both weak and 
surrounded by covetous courtiers. Neither could Muzaffar al-Din rely on 
on family solidarity among the Qajar princes for help in governing the 
country.
Earlier chapters have indicated that in the provinces too the 
personality of the local governor was of great importance, and that 
insecurity and venality were not confined to Tehran. In the provinces 
almost the only hope that the population had for better treatment lay in 
the appointment of a more merciful governor, and they were few and far
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between. Isfahan under Zill al-Sultan certainly seems to have fared 
• » *
better than Fars under its succession of governors. In this matter 
too, the activities of Russia and Great Britain in seeking to win 
influence with leading officials in Tehran, and in the important 
provincial cities, did nothing to reduce Persia’s problems.
Rivalry between Britain and Russia lay just below the surface of
many events during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din. It is arguable that
the most important consequence of the presence of those two great powers
lay in revealing to many Persians the true extent of the weakness of
their government. Had the interests of Russia and Britain not been so
important, had their strategic rivalry in Asia not been so serious, had
their statesmen not sought influence and their officials not been involved
in the demarcation of her frontiers, had their nationals not sought
economic concessions, then it is possible that the outcry against
misgovernment in Persia would have been much less vociferous; for the
suspicion that Islam was being threatened by the unbeliever would have
been very greatly reduced. Loans, concessions and the fact that British
officials were demarcating Persia’s south-eastern frontier; all of these
deepened the humiliating realisation that Persia was not capable of
managing her own affairs, be they internal and economic^or external and
territorial. It is true that in the north-west also Persia could not
defend herself against Kurdish and Turkish incursions, but the presence
of Colonel McMahon and his accompanying party of over 1,500 men in Sistan
7
was a more painful reminder of Persia’s weakness. It is also worth
7. F.O. 60:651. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.182, 29 December 1902. See 
also G.P. Tate, The Frontiers of Baluchistan, London 1909, p.76. 
Most of that book is concerned with the Sistan Arbitration Mission 
of 1902/5. The author was a surveyor with that Mission.
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noting that the size of McMahon's party did little to allay Russian
g
suspicions of British aims in south-eastern Persia.
An important feature of Anglo-Russian rivalry was the wide extent 
of its impact on Persian society„ The burdensome.terms of the various 
loans, and the fact that much of the money was wasted, caused much 
discontent among the educated classes and the merchants; but the poor 
and the illiterate bitterly resented the more obvious signs of Persia's 
impotence such as the use in Tehran of a Muslim graveyard for the
building of a Russian bank, British schemes to supply piped water to
. . 9 . .
the xnhabxtants of the capital met similar opposition. When British
officials in Bushire tried to enforce quarantine measures against Persian 
pilgrims this was seen by the faithful as an attack on Islam by the 
unbeliever, rather than as a genuine attempt to improve standards of public 
health. The superstitious could be encouraged to believe that the
1C
disinfecting stoves were in fact going to be used to kill Muslim children. 
The cholera epidemic of 1904 added a further horrible burden to the lot 
of the population, but attempts by Europeans to restrict freedom of 
movement within Persia were misunderstood and resented, particularly when 
they were applied to a revered religious figure and his followers who 
were proceeding on a pilgrimage to Mashhad.
If the presence of more foreigners exacerbated discontent in Persia, 
essentially by revealing to a wider range of the population the impotence 
of the government, it also encouraged some sections of the population to
8 . P.O. 416:11. Lansdowne to Scott (St.Petersburg), No,426,
31 December 1902.
9. P.O. 60:665. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.25, 26 February 1903.
10. P.O. 60:609. Durand to Salisbury, No.91, 16 September 1899.
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view foreign governments as the primary source of their country's
problems, and by doing so it probably deflected attention from weaknesses
within Persian society and the system of government. The widespread
interest in the Boxer rebellion in China and later in the Boer and
Russo-Japanese wars has been noted, and so too has the warmth and
rapidity of the welcome given to Japanese victories.** Those victories
certainly encouraged hopes, hopes which were not capable of fulfilment,
that Persia too could quickly proceed to reassert herself against Russia,
Anti-European feeling was also increased by the fact that control
of the two most effective organs of government in Persia, the Cossack
Brigade and the Customs administration, were obviously in foreign hands.
That the maintenance of law and order in the capital city was the task
of troops who were led by Russian officers and supplied with Russian
equipment was an affront to Persian sensitivities. The fact that the
Belgians levied new and more onerous duties on essential commodities such
as tea and sugar, and that their chief official regarded the clothes of
a religious dignitary as a suitable costume for a fancy dress party,
12
served only to inflame emotions which were already highly charged.
From the study of the reform of the Customs administration two 
Important findings emerged. In the first case it can be.seen that
change under an absolute Shah, was by no means an impossible task. The
reforms were financially successful and although their implementation 
caused a temporary trade recession (particularly in the south of Persia), 
the volume of imports and exports does not seem to have suffered any 
permanent decline.
11. F.O. 60:684. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Telegraphic No.19, 12 February 1904.
12. F.O. 60:698. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No.40, Confidential, 28 February 
1905. This file in the Public Record Office also contains a copy of 
that photograph.
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There was widespread resentment at, and much vocal opposition to, 
the presence and activities of the Belgians; but revenues accruing to 
the central treasury certainly increased greatly. Had port facilities 
and security along the roads been improved, then mercantile opposition 
to the changes would probably have decreased. The second conclusion to 
be drawn from the reform of the Customs is one which was little noticed 
at the time, but its long-term significance was profound. This was the 
fact that modernisation quite simply meant more government, and when 
the minimal amount of government which already existed was seen as 
intolerably oppressive, then the difficulties in implementing widespread 
reforms were very much increased. Here, as elsewhere, Muzaffar al-Din1s 
legacy was a poor basis from which to begin the process of rebuilding 
an effective monarchy.
Other aspects of the reign of Muzaffar al-Din which have been noted
are that the most effective voice of opposition to the Shah came from the
religious classes, and that the motives of those classes were very mixed.
The religious leaders were the natural voice of the people, because of
their many and intimate links with them; but at the same time some
members of those religious classes were obscurantist, and some were
unscrupulous. A few may even have been both. In both Isfahan and Shiraz
antagonism against religious minorities was incited, and it was an
important factor m  events. The accusation that Ala al-Dawla s house
contained the dagger with which Husayn was slain at the battle of Karbala
. 1 3
was used m  the campaign to stir up opposition to him. Superstitious 
beliefs were present among certain sections of society, and some of the.
13. H. Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1783-1906, Berkeley 1969, p.252.
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religious classes exploited the opportunities presented by this
situation. It is not surprising that the reaction of the religious
classes to the demand for a constitution was far from uniform, and even
those who supported that demand were careful to ensure that all
legislation would be subject to the scrutiny of, and potential veto by,
14a group of five mujtahids.
The picture which emerges of the reign of Muzaffar al-Din is one in
*
which old problems not only persisted, but grew worse; the sources of 
discontent were already many when he came to the throne, but the extent 
and intensity of discontent undoubtedly increased. The personality of 
the Shah was such that he was certainly unwilling to take, and probably 
incapable of taking, the firm and decisive action which was required to 
restore the position and authority of the monarchy. At the same time 
Russia and Britain were determined to preserve their interests in Persia, 
and the rivalry between the two pox^ers increased the difficulties facing 
the country. Prom these circumstances there emerged a constitution - 
but it provided no real answer to PersiaTs many problems.
34. Article 2 of the Supplementary Fundamental Law of October 7th 1907, 
in E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution, Cambridge 1910, pp.372-3.
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officials whose names recur frequently in
Personal Physician to Muzaffar al-Din while he 
was Valicahd in Tabriz, and Consulting Physician- 
in-Chief to the Shah from 1896-1906.
Acting Consul, and Acting Consul-General in 
Isfahan from 1896. The post of Native Agent in 
that city had earlier been held by his father,
Mr. S.P. Aganoor, for nearly forty years.
British Vice-Consul in Yazd from March 1905.
Russian army officer in charge of the Persian 
Cossack Brigade from March 1903 to September 1906.
Acting Oriental Secretary at the British 
Legation from April 1903.
Belgian Customs official who arrived in Persia 
in 1901 (?). Was appointed Director of Customs 
at Bushire in January 1902, and became Director- 
General of Persian Customs for the ports of the 
Persian Gulf from June 1903 till May 1905.
First Secretary at the British Legation in Tehran 
from March 1901. Acted as Charge d'Affaires,
May to October 1902.
British Military Attache in Tehran from 
January 1903.
British Minister in Tehran May 1894 to 
October 1900.
Acting Third Secretary at the British Legation 
June 1901 to December 1903. Acted as Charge 
d TAffaires October and November 1902.
British Vice-Consul in Tehran June 1898 to 
July 1903, thereafter Consul in ShiVaz.
Second Secretary at the British Legation October 
1892 to May 1895. Attached to the entourage of 
the Shah during Muzaffar al-Din!s visit to England 
in 1902, accompanied Viscount Downe to Tehran with 
the mission to present the Order of the Garter to 
the Shah, January to February 1903. Was appointed 
First Secretary to the British Legation in Tehran 
August 1903. Acted as Charge dTAffaires October to 
December 1904 and September 1905 to September 1906.
270
HARDINGE, Sir A.H. 
HARDINGE, The Rt.Hon.C 
HEYNSENNS, J.B,
KEMBALL, Lt.-Col.C.A.
KOSSAGOSWKI, Col. V.A. 










British Minister in Persia October 1900 to 
January 1906.
. First Secretary of the British Legation 
September 1896 to July 1898.
Belgian Customs official who arrived in Persia 
in 1900, became Director-General of Persian 
Customs for the ports of the Persian Gulf from 
June 1905.
Acting Political Resident in the Persian Gulf 
April 1900 to June 1902, and Political Resident 
June 1902 to May 1904.
Russian army officer in charge of the Cossack
Brigade from the summer of 1894 until March 1903.
Russian army officer in charge of the Cossack
Brigade from September 1906.
Assistant Physician at the Court of Muzaffar al- 
Din Shah from 1900, and later Consulting 
Physician-in-Chief to the Shah from 1906 (on 
the retirement of Dr, H. Adcock - see above).
British Vice-Consul at Muhammara from June 1890, 
and Consul for cArabistan from February 1904.
British Consul-General for Khurasan and Sistan 
October 1903 to July 1905.
British Military Attache in Tehran September 1901 
to December 1902*
Belgian Customs official who held many positions 
in Persia after his arrival in March 1898.
Placed in charge of the reform of the Customs 
administration in March 1899. Resigned in 
February 1907.
Arrived in Persia in 1872 and employed as doctor 
to the Indo-European Telegraph Department. 
Appointed doctor to the British Legation in 1891, 
died in Tehran 1905.
British Military Attache in Tehran from November 
1893 to September 1900. Also acted as Oriental 
Secretary for part of this period*
British Consul in Isfahan from August 1891 until 
his retirement in March 1906.
Belgian Customs official who arrived in Persia in 
March 1898. Served first in Kirmanshah^and later 
as Director-General of Customs in Azarbayjan.
RABINO di BORGOMALE, Son of J. Rabino (see below) worked for the
H.L. Imperial Bank in Kirmanshah and was appointed
British Vice-Consul in Rasht during 1906.
RABINO di BORGOMALE, 
J.
Chief Manager of the Imperial Bank in Tehran 








Worked for many years in Persia, first in the 
employment of the Indo-European Telegraph 
Company then for the Persian Telegraph Service,
He was also employed for a time by the Passport 
Section of the Persian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and by the Imperial Bank.
Assistant British Military Attache from January 
1899 and later Military Attache and Oriental 
Secretary from October 1900 to September 1901.
Was Acting Consul in Isfahan June to December 
1899.
First Secretary at the British Legation from 
October 1898, Charge d ’Affaires from March 1900 
to February 1901. Then posted to Egypt, returned 
to Persia as British Minister in July 1906.
British Consul in Kirman from October 1894. Was 
Assistant Commissioner on the Persia - Baluchistan 
Frontier Commission January to April 1896, and 
served as Consul in Kirman until July 1899. 
Returned to Kirman after serving in the war in 
South Africa in January 1903 and was appointed 
Consul-General for Khurasan in February 1906.
British Consul-General in Tabriz from June 1892 
to May 1903.
British Consul-General in Tabriz from August 1903.
NOTES
1. Information on British diplomatic and consular officials drawn 
from Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book, 
London, annually (editions used 1897 to 1908).
2. Information on Belgian Customs officials drax-m from A. Destree,
Les Fonctionnaires Beiges au Service de la Perse 1898-1915, Tehran- 
Li&ge 1976, annexe No.11 Repertoire alphabetique des fonctionnaires 
beiges au service de la Perse entre 1898 et 1915, pp.329-349.
3. Information on other British officials in Persia drawn from
D. Wright, The English Amongst the Persians, London 1977.
4. Where no terminal date of service is given, the man in question
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